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Recent policy analysis has had a growing interest in examining the everyday practices of 
policy work. Despite this, conceptions of what policy can and should encompass tend to be 
focused on its tangible outputs and products, in particular the texts and documents of policy 
and governance.  Policy’s legitimacy is commonly considered to rest on its participants’ 
ability to make rational decisions motivated not by private reasons but by the public good. 
This has had serious implications for scholars’ ability to discuss the non-purposive, non-
verbal and non-rational content in policy work.  
This thesis presents an ethnographic study of emotion in the context of policy work. Starting 
from informants’ own understandings of what emotion means in policy and politics, it 
focuses on a fifteen month period in the policy practices of a Scottish NGO and its 
stakeholders and participants. From the perspective of a participant observer policy worker, 
it uses observation, documents, and interviews to explore the way traditionally “rational” 
models of governance based on apparently objective knowledge and other non-rational, 
“caring” ways of knowing are brought to bear upon policy work through detailed 
examination of practice. 
Analysis of these practices begins by examining the way that informants described the 
anxieties caused by competing understandings of “good” governance. Emotion and 
rationality were considered mutually exclusive but equally essential components of policy 
making. This thesis proposes that the way these anxieties were managed by the Partnership’s 
policy participants was to split these incommensurable expectations of governance between 
two self-identifying groups:  activists such as community organisers and professionals such 
as civil servants. Splitting knowledge in this way helped the wider policy making community 









1. INTRODUCTION: THE ROOTS OF THE PROJECT 
 
When you study a field at university you are given certain structures for making sense of its 
outputs and objectives. Perhaps you are also given some intellectual architecture for 
categorising its processes and rhythms of life. However, when you leave university and you 
are lucky enough to go on and work in that same field, you quickly realise that successfully 
making sense of something and successfully doing something are quite different 
propositions. It is possible to no longer be able make sense of this thing as you once did in 
your dissertation, but to find that you are increasingly getting better at doing it. It can 
sometimes feel disturbingly like the more you get how to do it the less you can make sense 
of it, and that the two shifts are somehow connected. 
This thesis was born of the frustrating functional tension between a pair of parallel 
educations. On the one hand policy as process and as product is the subject of a vastly 
diverse and conflicting set of interpretations, categorisations, enquiries and approaches in 
social research, with a great number of specialisations and subfields which are carefully 
patrolled by funding structures, university hierarchies and disciplinary associations. On the 
other hand there is the collection of practices, relationships and professional identities that 
constitute the doing of policy work. Access and prestige in the first formative experience is 
about one’s ability to describe explicitly, categorise and to bring clarity to a complex issue. 
Access and prestige in the latter is very often about tacit knowledge, insider advantage and 
the vague, dark arts of rhetoric and creative representation, as well as even more ephemeral 
skills about relating to your fellow humans. This latter type of education can only really be 
delivered one way: by doing. 
There is much anxiety about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and legitimate study of 
the working life of humans, and my formulation of my thesis’ central research problem was 
made more, not less, difficult because I started from my own everyday practice of working 
life. Not only does this tension about knowledge and meaning make studying everyday 
practice problematic for a researcher, everyday practice itself may also be experienced as 
problematic by the practitioner too. This tension is woven into the rhythms of everyday life 
when one’s work is itself about knowledge, as policy work could legitimately claim to be 
(Tenbensel 2006). These anxieties were drawn together by Richard Sennett in his assessment 
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of craft in society, The Craftsman (2009), as a cultural shift around the skills and practices 
necessary for an ‘open relationship between problem solving and problem finding’ (Sennett 
2009, p.38). Specifically, Sennett argues that analysis and practical application of knowledge 
have become conceptually separate processes. ‘Bearers of embodied knowledge but mere 
manual labourers’ are not accorded the same privileges as rational analysts or inspired artists 
(Sennett 2009, p.45). By contrast, Sennett considers craftsmanship to be about ‘the intimate 
connection between hand and head. Every good craftsman conducts a dialogue between 
concrete practices and thinking; this dialogue evolves into sustaining habits, and these habits 
establish a rhythm between problem solving and problem finding’ (Sennett 2009, p.9). 
Establishing that rhythm, whether as a musician, labourer or policy worker, is a matter of 
mindful repetition, improvisation and pragmatic adaptation. Such skills are learned by 
experience, not just technical instruction. If talk of “craft” sounds suspiciously romantic, one 
of the most self-consciously craft-oriented workplaces still in operation in modern Britain is 
also perhaps one of the most witheringly unsentimental. It also happens to be the workplace I 
started my post-university education in, and its pedagogical attitudes created the framework 
for thinking about policy that established my research problem for this thesis. 
1.1 I  am a craftswoman 
After graduating in Politics I became a journalist, initially in print and more lastingly in 
broadcasting. Because of this my education took a craft route, unexpectedly for me. The 
world of journalism introduced me to the idea that I was not studying a subject where we all 
knew what the learning objectives looked like and that I would get rewarded fairly in line 
with my marks, nor an art in which my own fulfilment of a personal vision was at stake. My 
new work was a craft. Other journalists policed whatever standards there were and other 
journalists would from now on decide if my work was “good enough”. The only way to 
really learn a craft like this was to do it, again and again and again, and to find a great 
practitioner of the craft and apprentice myself. Anyone could learn to be a journalist, several 
people told me, although temperament helped enormously. Writing talent in the artistic sense 
was presented as a non-essential and actually sometimes distracting attribute. News is made 
out of words in much the same way as buildings are made out of bricks; the occasional 
Hampton Court is commissioned, but most of us will build garage extensions for a living. 
From now on in order to write about politics I didn’t need to do thorough-going research, I 
needed to go out and find the story, then know how to find the top line. From experience I 
can say that these things may not be instinctive but they can be learned by most of us, and 
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that being told what a top line is and trying to find one yourself is a very different learning 
process. 
When I switched careers to working in think tanks and third sector organisations a few years 
later, I was therefore primed to learn quite self-consciously as a craftswoman. When I came 
in turn to take on interns, I already had a framework for thinking about entry to a field as 
admission to a guild of craftspeople, and that it was my duty to share the little tricks that 
would make them not just technically correct but professionally competent. They would 
learn them not by observing but by doing. When interns arrived, they typically understood a 
great deal about the substantive issues we worked on. Perfectly understandably, I found I had 
to be much more explicit with them about practical matters that I usually only discussed 
casually, if at all, with other colleagues. Among these key competencies was a whole realm 
of behaviours and concepts that came under the heading of “emotion”, particularly the 
management of our own and other people’s emotions to get our objectives met as policy 
workers and lobbyists. And even if they didn’t get met, I found myself telling them, 
somehow our work still mattered, in ways I and my fellow policy workers sometimes found 
difficult to articulate to funders or board members. I found it hard to explain to my interns 
why it was sometimes enough to “do” without working towards a specific material change in 
the world. There’s something important and constructive about being “in the loop”, even 
without a clear win at the end of the day. It was something to do with relationships, perhaps, 
or something to do with showing you care or believe in your right to expression on a topic. 
We were also aware that there were emotional costs to the work we did, perhaps precisely 
because of the strength of the commitment we needed to continue in the face of indifference. 
Tired, drawn colleagues would commiserate one another at the end of every conference 
season; “burn-out” was a concept that was used often among my fellow policy workers. 
However this did not sit easily with the other education about policy and politics I and my 
interns had to draw upon. It was my observation and others’ that “emotion” was a key part of 
being a “good” policy officer, yet it was not supposed to be a part of making “good” policy, 
and we lacked any vocabulary or conceptual framework that could legitimately explain why 
emotion mattered, or even – and this was strange to realise – what and where it was. This 
effective silencing of such an important everyday part of my work became the inspiration for 
a research project looking at the understandings and practices of emotion in policy work.  
1.2 The structure of this thesis  
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In Chapter 2 I begin by surveying the existing literatures about the intersection between 
politics, policy, reason and emotion. Following my use of Sennett’s (2009) vocabulary of 
craft to explore my own experiences of working in policy I adapt his framework of the 
‘Head’ and ‘Hand’ aspects of craft-making. I explore the way political thought has 
conceptualised a split from the thinking and doing aspects of making political decisions. 
Successive movements in political and policy studies have enforced and policed an emphasis 
on an objective understanding of rationality and have taken the ‘Head’ to be the primary 
focus of legitimate political inquiry. I outline how this has had implications for what is 
generally understood to be the substance and purpose of policy. I also underline the 
connection between sources of knowledge and political legitimacy in liberal democratic 
thought, and the concomitant assumption in much political thought that the citizen is a 
fundamentally autonomous, rational entity. I explore the way “emotion” in these literatures 
is generally treated as an unexamined “black box” of non-rationality, and that such non-
rational thought and behaviour is broadly considered pathological and disruptive to 
legitimate, “good” governance. In turning to practice-oriented literatures which take the 
‘Hands’ as their point of departure for studying policy making, I conclude that most scholars 
have adopted the dichotomy between emotion and reason, either simply leaving context-
specific understandings of “the emotional” and its role in decision-making largely 
unexplored, or adopting existing decontextualised definitions of “emotion”. I attempt to 
address this lacuna in political studies literatures by adding a third component to Sennett’s 
craft sensibility, the ‘Heart’, and examining how scholarship with an explicit focus on what 
is commonly called “the emotional” has dealt with political institutions and practices. I 
consider how these literatures might address one anothers’ weaknesses and unexamined 
assumptions. 
Chapter 3 takes this conceptual challenge and considers how I constructed a coherent 
ethnographic study around it. I present the way my research strategy developed in dialogue 
between the demands of my discipline, the research challenges I set myself as a policy 
practitioner and the realities of policy work and the political world. It is simultaneously a 
methodological explanation of a piece of political ethnography, an exploration of how my 
own practice as an ethnographer evolved over time , and a more or less chronological story 
of the development of my involvement with the organisation with whom I worked while 
conducting my research, an NGO I have called the Partnership. I reflect upon the tools I used 
to complete my fieldwork, which included; participant and non-participant observation; 
informal and unstructured interviews; the collection and production of documents and other 
pieces of material culture. At the same time I consider the way analysis and representation 
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are intimately connected with fieldwork in making meaning in ethnography, and how as a 
piece of expressive representation this thesis constitutes the next iteration of an ongoing 
meaning-making process. I draw upon Jackson’s ethnographic exploration of the politics of 
storytelling (2002) to explain my ontological and epistemological stance, its relationship to 
the way I conducted my fieldwork and the use of metaphor in my ethnographic writing. 
Chapters 4 to 7 each explore an aspect of my findings around emotion and policy making 
practices. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with my informants described “emotion” and the 
behaviours, thoughts and feelings they associated with it. I outline how the emotional and the 
rational were seen as two incompatible but essential ways of knowing and being in the world 
and how informants dealt with the anxiety of needing both brought to bear on making 
“good” policy decisions. I use Kleinian (1996) concepts of splitting to explore the way 
informants described rationality as adhering to and residing in the person of “professionals” 
such as civil servants, and emotion as adhering to and residing in activists. Chapter 4 sets out 
the way informants discussed the idea of emotion in the context of their policy activities with 
me. I reflect upon the connections I and they made with other ideas and concepts about 
emotion. I explain the observable behaviours, speech and other phenomena my informants 
considered to be indicative of an emotional stance in policy work, and I present the way they 
experienced the emotional personally and how they and I conceived of its relationship to 
rationality. I present the range of inner reflections, behaviours and speech which were 
associated with rational, dispassionate professionalism, and how those described as 
“professionals” related to the idea of “emotion”. In Chapter 5 I present the way activism was 
associated with an “emotional” stance, and again I examine the way thoughts, behaviours 
and speech were considered to be emotional. I conclude these two chapters by drawing upon  
Lyth’s (1990a) work around the use of institutions to contain anxieties to examine how this 
split between emotional and rational policy actors might reflect an anxiety about justice, care 
and “good” governance which was present both within individual informants and in the 
wider cultural context they inhabit. I employ the metaphor of emotion as the Shadow of 
rationality, and consider how this enables scholars to think differently about what “emotion” 
signifies in policy work. 
With this psychosocial dimension of policy in mind, Chapters 6 and 7 go on to consider what 
the practices of policy are actually addressing at a relational level. Drawing upon Newman’s 
recent work on the experiences of women in policy (Newman 2012b) I examine what 
happens “in-between” rationality and emotion as the primary locus of the Partnership’s 
work. Chapter 6 addresses the interpersonal and relational aspects of the in-betweeness of 
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policy work by looking at the way specialist policy workers such as myself interacted with 
other policy actors and indeed other workers at the Partnership. I explore how the 
Partnership’s role in policy work could be interpreted as an obligation to contain the split 
nature of knowledge in policy without resolving it, effectively meaning that its stated aim of 
resolving conflict and arriving at consensus is unattainable. I reflect upon the similarities 
between my ethnographic stance and my previous professional roles’ in-betweeness. In 
Chapter 7 I look at how the practices of in-betweeness at the Partnership played out 
physically by exploring how pieces of material culture which inscribe and reproduce in-
betweeness were created. I use a case study of the production of a policy briefing paper to 
unpack how policy writing is a practice of in-betweeness which has a performative 
“afterlife” enduring beyond the Partnership’s immediate context. I reflect upon how the 
material culture of policy enables its activities to serve a wider role containing the anxieties 
about “good” governance of the society around it. 
Chapter 8 offers reflections upon the way these findings, my analysis of them and the 
existing literature can be used to re-evaluate the meaning of the “emotional” in policy work. 
I revisit the challenge of defining emotion as something more explicit than non-rationality 
and consider how understanding emotion as rationality’s shadow in a metaphorical sense 
helps to explain both what is contained within it and the relation between these two ways of 
knowing and being. I also explore how a focus on emotion shifts the focus of inquiry away 
from the purely purposive aspects of policy work to those aspects which are less easily 
contained within discrete categories or activities. Instead it reframes the places and times of 
policy as liminal spaces “in-between” positions and status quos. I also consider where the 
acceptance of a fuller account of the emotional practices of policy leaves the rational 
governor, or indeed the rational citizen, as the cornerstones of liberal democratic institutions. 
I conclude with some suggestions for how a craft understanding of policy work might 
produce an ongoing research agenda with something new and distinctive to offer, 
methodologically and conceptually. 
Finally, it seems important to acknowledge from the beginning what sort of a piece of work 
this is, or perhaps more accurately what sort of a piece of work it isn’t. During the course of 
my fieldwork and my analysis of my data I have drawn upon a very diverse range of 
literatures, some from the more usual resources for political studies but just as many – if not 
more – from scholarship in very different fields, notably performance studies, psychoanalytic 
studies and literary criticism. I did not set out to consciously refute any particular set of 
existing resources for talking about the practices of politics, but I have repeatedly found 
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myself working at the limits of their scope and have felt the need to reach beyond these to 
other disciplines and substantive topics, and I would suggest that there are two structural 
reasons for this slight case of conceptual kleptomania.  
Firstly, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I set out to examine emotion in the 
everyday work of policy making. I wanted to make a positive articulation of what practices, 
concepts and beliefs people involved in policy think are contained within “emotion”. As I 
will explore in the following chapter, even in interpretive critical policy studies literature I 
found little pre-existing work that shared this starting point, and this obliged me to explore 
scholarship which has foregrounded emotion and not defined it negatively against 
“rationality”. Perhaps approaching the same problem from the opposite direction, there is an 
emphasis on the making of policy in this thesis rather than its implementation. The relational 
politics of governance and administration have been relatively well-documented by 
psychosocial researchers in recent years. There are far fewer investigations of the relational 
dimensions of political work itself; the constitutive negotiations of meaning which go into 
the creation of the policies which then become enacted. As a result of my fieldwork I found 
the politics scholar in me needing to question assumptions about power and status in policy 
which are common to this psychosocial literature, as I will explain in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
In particular, my ambition to collect data on what I and others described as “emotional” in 
policy making obliged me to move beyond text-based, descriptive approaches to what the 
practices and artefacts of policy are and to consider such slippery things as silences, bodies, 
spaces and storytelling. I became committed to examining how these things seemed to be 
allied to the “emotional” and why, and how they are implicated in sometimes surprising 
strategies around power, status and agency. I also quickly realised that this demanded to be 
thought of as a representational challenge rather than as a matter of ever-closer descriptive 
accuracy. Conventional political and policy studies literatures provided poor resources for 
that sort of representative work, but arts, humanities and anthropological literatures provided 
much-needed inspiration. The resources may be diverse, but their territories all overlap the 








2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 A research problem 
There are a wide range of complexly interrelated skills spanning various academic and 
intellectual disciplines, as well as social skills, involved in being seen by your peers as a 
great policy worker, but it would seem that only some of them are formally noted or 
discussed. To be practically wise, as opposed to intellectually eminent, in policy matters you 
need to work with something called “emotion”, whatever that may be. But “emotion” is not 
traditionally part of the technical or intellectual ideal of policy making. 
This is ‘the sharp edge in the problem of skill; the head and the hand are not simply 
separated intellectually but socially’ (Sennett 2009, p.45). Sennett’s thesis is about the 
integration of head and hand – thinking and doing - in the pursuit of work that is excellently 
suited to finding and solving the problems of everyday life, in the broadest sense of that 
phrase. My own thesis owes much to this formulation of the tensions that produced the idea 
for this research, but to the Head and the Hands I would also wish to add the Heart. This 
dimension perhaps more directly addresses the normative and ethical dimension of what 
“good” work might be judged to be by a society than Sennett’s book makes room for, and 
captures the questions of motive and morals implied in the - as yet undefined - realm of 
“emotion” in policy making. The remainder of this chapter will consider the major currents 
in thinking about policy work as regards emotion, starting with Head-driven analysis of 
policy and administration, followed by the turn towards the exploration of policy as a 
practice (the Hands). Finally, it will examine how some of the extremely diverse literatures 
that take emotion itself as their departure point relate most strongly to questions of politics, 
power and policy, and how they suggest the study of the Heart in turn may relate to study of 
the Head and the Hand. 
2.2 The Head 
The roots of the contemporary “problem” with emotion and public life, and in particular 
public administration and decision making, run deep. There is a long tradition of social and 
political thought in which good governance has been seen as a fundamentally rational 
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process, and rationality is conceived of in binary opposition to a typically less well-defined 
cluster of concepts around the unreasonable and the non-rational, with emotions typically 
included in the latter category. Starting with the classical texts of political philosophy that 
helped to define the political, such as The Republic, a careful establishment of emotion as 
distinct and excluded from the civic virtue of reason takes place: “When reason and its 
subordinates [spirit and desire] are all agreed that reason should rule and there is no civil war 
among them […] That is exactly what we mean by self-control or discipline in a city or in an 
individual” (Plato 1974, p.160). The concept of “public reason”, distinct from “private 
reason”, can trace a line of descent through Kant, Habermas, and Rawls, among others. The 
division between public and private in the exercise of reason according to this tradition is 
strongly rooted in the virtues of deliberation and debate; if, given freedom of belief and 
expression, individuals come to radically different conclusions, an appeal should be made to 
decision-making in the public interest rather than personal interest. Key to understanding the 
history of the concept of reason in political thought is that private reasons are not 
justifications for actions carried out on the public stage. In the classical world it was 
commonly considered that reason should ideally rule over passion, particularly in the 
governance of a community or state; episteme appears in Aristotelian ethics (Aristotle & 
Barnes 2004) and in Plato’s Republic (1974) as “justified true belief” in contrast with 
common belief. As such, the idea of the exercise of public reason is closely entwined with 
the ideal of democracy, and in particular the ideal of a liberal, plural democracy (Gaus 2003, 
p.15). Emotions have tended to be seen as irrational and therefore abnormal, unusual or even 
pathological, with destructive or unintended consequences (Brinton 1974, Goodwin, Jasper 
and Poletta 2001, Lutz 1986, Richards 2007, Berezin 2002). We come to the study of public 
life and politics culturally and intellectually primed to see emotion as that which is non-
rational, and therefore inadmissible in taking public decisions. 
Before considering alternatives to this way of thinking about the non-rational in public life, I 
want to explore the genealogy of this model of good governance and how it is still 
pervasively influential in contemporary thinking about administration, governance and 
political life. In particular, the way modern scientific inquiry has been put to work creating 
structural and technological interventions aimed at making human behaviour conform to this 
ideal is a key part of understanding how rationality and good democratic governance have 
become elided as concepts. From the advent of management science in public 
administration, through the rise of incentive-driven managerialism, to the current 
preoccupation with technological “neuro” policy interventions in everyday life, a particular 
type of valid knowledge has dominated policy making and public administration. I explore 
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how this dominant framework for understanding what is valid knowledge in policy has 
influenced contemporary scholarship, even among scholars who have quite different 
epistemological roots. 
2.2.1 Rationality and the rise of Administrative Man 
The evolution of policy as a science has fostered particular kinds of relationship to its aims 
and methods, and specifically it may be seen as an attempt to operationalize the normative 
project of public reason in social research. Rationalist approaches to policy making propose 
a model which, hugely simplified, identifies problems or opportunities at the most 
productive level of analysis, identifies the community’s interests in the matter as clearly as 
possible and makes decisions based upon as much relevant data that optimise those interests. 
‘Basically, [a rationalist approach] assumes that policy emerges via a logical path; and issue 
moves through the political system in a processual way from point of entry, through decision 
and implementation, until a final choice is made to proceed with or terminate a course of 
action’ (Jenkins 1997, p.35). However, at the very least the complexity of a modern state 
works against such linear flows of information. Herbert Simon considered this ability to 
work within the position of “bounded rationality” as one of the attributes of what he termed 
“administrative man”: ‘[He] recognises that the world he perceives is a drastically simplified 
model of the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world’ (Simon 1962, 
p.xxvix). Simon’s language is telling; whatever else policy making may be about, it is 
primarily about bringing order to chaos, even to the point of bringing double order – to the 
world and to man. Beyond Administrative Man’s desk in the Department for Policy lies 
buzzing, blooming confusion in his personal life and the “real” world. The institution of 
policy making provides a rationalising framework for proceeding in an unruly and infinite 
universe. In the classic texts of policy science, the non-rational – which for now shall stand 
for a range of things that by default includes the emotional – is implicitly the object of this 
double-order. Policy is the technical practices of a political community in which citizens 
exercise their public reason, and normatively it is an essential component of good 
governance. 
The rationalist models of the policy process and of the work performed within it has long 
been the subject of considerable criticism and revision, a process paralleled by the revision 
of the treatment of policy analysis as an exclusively scientific undertaking. From Lindblom’s 
‘Science of “Muddling Through”’ (1959) onwards, the plausibility of policy making as a 
closed system in which rational and disinterested actors weigh the options for addressing a 
cleanly defined problem has been debated and questioned. Lindblom offered 
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“Incrementalism” as an alternative model to the rationalist policy system or bounded 
rationality (Lindblom 1959; Lindblom 1979). An incrementalist view of policy would hold 
that: 
 Instead of exhaustively exploring possible solutions to policy problems, 
decision-makers simplify their analytical tasks; in this sense, the means and 
the end of policy are often intertwined. 
 Decision-makers confine their activities to variables and consequences of 
immediate concern to themselves. 
 Policy/ political change happens only marginally and is not the function of 
any coherent set of guiding goals. 
 Socio-political context is intrinsic rather than incidental to policy decision-
making. 
(Smith & May 1997, pp.170–171) 
Of key importance to the scope of this chapter is incrementalism’s insistence on the 
interactional, negotiated and incomplete nature of policy making. While the policy maker is 
still considered to be a rational actor, rationality has been reformulated to mean “politically 
rational”; that is to say rational in the social and political context in which the actor operates 
(Smith & May 1997, p.186). The decision maker refers not just to the problem but to the 
context in which he must act in order to assess his options. With a greater focus on context 
comes a new importance of the decision-making organisation and its political dynamics, and 
this in turn necessitates a consideration of how decision-making is relates to the values, 
ideologies and personal relationships of an organisation. Organisational and management 
science have been conscripted into the study of policy and public administration as a result 
of this shift towards concern about context and the political nature of policy making for 
several decades (Barberis 2013), and these disciplines have an established if somewhat 
marginal tradition of considering “the emotional” in collective decision-making. However 
the ways in which they have been applied in policy analysis have been frequently been 
ambiguous as regards the normative place of both public reason and emotion in governance. 
2.2.2 Reformulating rationality: the manager as hero  
Clarke and Newman (1997) have traced the ways that political shifts in attitudes to the 
normative justification for the nature of the State, particularly the New Right, and the growth 
of a particular offshoot of organisational science, managerialism, have interacted over 
several decades to produce what is commonly described as New Public Management (NPM). 
NPM was originally formulated as a term for capturing several contemporary developments 
in the organisation of public administration; ‘NPM began life as a conceptual device 
invented for the purpose of structuring scholarly discussion’ (Barzelay 2002, p.15) however 
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in turn it has come to shape how practitioners think about their work. Clarke and Newman 
see NPM as the confluence of an argument for a reduced and more cost-efficient State 
modelled on private business prerogatives, the decline of public deference towards 
organisations and institutions and a simultaneous emergence of the manager as a dynamic 
force for organisational (and therefore social) change; ‘This identification of management as 
being business-like, as the driving force for greater productivity, efficiency or "value for 
money" is based on a fairly general conception as management as a progressive social force’ 
(Clarke & Newman 1997, p.34). Traditional public administration, with its roots in the 
institution-as-vector for public reason model, was increasingly identified with a self-
justifying inertia – the incrementalist paradigm supported this assessment of public 
administration as the enemy of change and innovation, change which would bring increased 
efficiency and effectiveness if primed by the right personal incentives for managers (Dawson 
& Dargie 2002, p.36). The Whitehall reforms of the early 1980’s embedded NPM doctrines 
within UK public administration: ‘The Thatcher years were decisive. The creation of the 
Efficiency Unit and ensuing programme of efficiency scrutiny was seen by one top mandarin 
as the point from which management was given a high priority in Whitehall’ (Barberis 2013, 
p.332). Several scholars, notably Christopher Pollitt (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2000; 
Pollitt 2013) and Janet Newman (Newman 2000; Newman 2002), have regarded the Blair 
years as a continuation and elaboration of these earlier assertions of NPM doctrine, 
notwithstanding some tensions or distortions that can arguably be observed.  
The wide-ranging and contested history of how much and in what ways NPM has reshaped 
policy and public administration in the UK is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, if 
understood as perhaps the most successful influence on Governmental thinking about 
governance in the last thirty years, NPM’s stance on the normative questions of the nature of 
good policy and public administration are directly relevant to the way emotion has been 
discussed in relation to policy making recently both in and outside the academy. 
Interestingly, in this respect NPM does not have a fundamentally different epistemological 
stance on the non-rational to the old public administration science it was supposed to replace, 
that is to say a positivist-empiricist relationship to society and the world around society. Of 
particular relevance is the drive towards target-driven practice and the corresponding 
emphasis on what has passed into cliché as “what works” and evidence-based policy making. 
‘Old notions of progress, based on the state and its professionals "solving" social problems, 
have been displaced by a more limited vision of "more effective service delivery" or 
"improved customer responsiveness". The images of the future in the transformational 
discourse are simultaneously more visionary and more circumscribed’ (Clarke & Newman 
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1997, p.37). In trying to remove questions of “the Good” from the execution of good 
governance, and hence sidestepping the political bargaining and inertia of incrementalism, an 
objectivity about what needs to be done in society is implicitly asserted: doing well is giving 
the customer/citizen or commissioner of services what they want or need from you. Because 
the object of policy has become more self-referential and less tied to wider questions of 
realising the good society it could be said that it also become less political in the sense that 
Lindblom meant the word. It could also be said that understanding what is admissible as 
evidence acquires new urgency in such a technocratic world. In both these matters, an 
implicit stance about rationality and non-rationality is being adopted by NPM. Evidence-
Based Policy is a significant consequence of the managerialist bent of NPM; although it 
shares a similar belief in the rationalising “truth” of social sciences as Lasswellian public 
administration science, ‘[it] must be understood as a project focused on enhancing the 
techniques of managing and controlling the policy making processes’ (Parsons 2002, p.44). 
In Evidence-Based Policy’s use of quantitative, measurable inputs and outcomes definite 
statements are being made about what kinds of evidence about the world are admissible: ‘the 
application of reliable knowledge’ (Head 2010, p.13) is a key preoccupation, and reflects the 
epistemological spirit of NPM, namely that generalizable research and quantitative quasi-
scientific knowledge in particular is inherently more reliable for making policy than research 
which seeks to capture experience (Head 2010, p.17). NPM is thus more than a description 
of the characteristics of policy making; it also captures a set of values about the nature of 
good governance, one that cannot be anything but uncomfortable with the presence of 
emotion in decision-making. How, after all, do you reliably measure an emotion if we 
understand that term to relate to a person’s experience? 
2.2.3 Recent developments: I rrational People Saved by 
Rational Technologies 
Notwithstanding the considerable scholarly criticism of both NPM and its relationship to 
knowledge and evidence, it is striking how its identification of the non-rational with the 
unreliable has persisted. In particular the concept of “emotion” is rarely explicitly defined 
even in policy thinking that seeks to address this topic directly in policy making, and very 
often seeks an “objective”, static understanding of it as a non-reasonable and therefore 
disruptive (even if human and natural) element in decision-making. Some thought has even 
been given to containing it with a view to expelling it from the policy process. There has 
been a distinct trend in the last ten years towards bringing the insights of neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology to bear upon policy-making. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s book 
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Nudge (Thaler & Sunstein 2009) was a popular summary of work that has helped shape both 
the Obama administration and David Cameron’s Conservative party’s policy positions 
(Anon n.d.). Cognitive science and behavioural economics was yet another source of 
“reliable” evidence – i.e. evidence that is based in certain epistemological and ontological 
traditions – for making impartial and objective policy decisions. Several other popular or 
practitioner-oriented books and briefings have been published in the last decade on the topic 
of applying these ideas about emotion and other factors as a cognitive bind in policy and 
decision-making (John et al. 2011; Earls 2009; Ariely 2009; Dawnay & Shah 2005). 
As applied to policy making in the UK in the last ten years, our emotional lives, insofar as 
they can be captured and catalogued by cognitive science or behavioural economics, are 
documented as the non-rational that is inevitably part of, but often gets in the way of, 
rational decision making in our own interests (Wilkins 2013, p.6).  In many ways this 
literature is a reformulation of Herbert Simon’s “bounded rationality” thesis as a critique of 
the rational actor model, however the remedy it proposes is more rationality prior to the actor 
in the form of scientific research.  As one critique of both Sunstein and Thaler and Ariely 
observes: ‘Factors that can lead to mistakes in individual judgement and decision-making 
[include] optimism and overconfidence, loss aversion, a status quo bias[…] People may also 
deliberate badly because of social pressure’ (Hausman & Welch 2010, p.126). A UK 
government department known as the Behavioural Insights Team has been set up to channel 
‘academic research in behavioural economics and psychology to public policy and services’ 
to ‘encourage people to make better decisions for themselves’ and to ‘champion scientific 
methodology to bring greater rigour to policy evaluation’, notably through randomised trials 
(Anon n.d.). Recently increasing attention has been paid by policy analysts to the way 
emotion or other non-rational knowledge is being presented or reshaped by this turn towards 
the neurological and biological (and, perhaps, away from the cultural and social) in policy 
making (Wilkins 2013; Whitehead et al. 2011; Pykett, 2012).  
The “neuro” body of literature is interesting in the way that it casts emotion as a) an 
inevitable problem and b) as non-rational in the making of decisions about policy and other 
matters, but clearly cannot speak to the research agenda that this thesis proposes. This 
research project was born out of the cultural meaning and practice of something that was 
called “emotion” in a specific working context; whatever scientifically observable processes 
may be involved in decision-making and working lives there is no reason they will be more 
meaningful than other experiential and subjective explanations for the world to be found 
among the people who do the work in question, or that these external definitions of emotion 
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have any impact on the way they structure their social world. It does not seem to follow that 
the non-rational necessarily implies a bad decision at a personal or group level, as ‘why 
should these factors be regarded as interferences with rational choice?’ (Hausman & Welch 
2010, p.126). 
2.2.4 Influence of the Head in contemporary scholarship  
Perhaps it is unsurprising given the extremely strong intellectual traditions connecting 
rationality with deliberative democracy and legitimacy in public administration that emotion 
as part of the non-rational has been adopted as an uncomplicated concept even by scholars 
wishing to interrogate it in policy making. A wide variety of scholars simply do not define 
what emotion may or may not be as a category. For example, in considering emotion in the 
context of deliberative forums, Barnes (2008) does not explain what emotion is to be defined 
as, instead introducing the term during an exposition of the concepts of motivation and 
values in explaining activist engagement in social movements; this is itself presented as in 
opposition to the “positive space” occupied by rational deliberation. Similarly Martin (2012) 
introduces the term “emotion” in an overview of the critiques of the rational model of 
deliberation without being explicit about what is contained within that category, also 
including the term “affect” without explanation or differentiation from the term “emotion”. 
The difficult business of defining “emotion” has produced other approaches. In considering 
emotion and decision making in foreign policy, Renshon and Lerner (2012) list an exemplar 
set of emotions. This is a common approach. Newman (2012a) explores the challenges to 
research methodology and the deliberative nature of governance posed by emotion, but 
asides a broad description of the work that emotion may do simply provides a list of specific 
emotions. Describing emotion in the first instance by reference to a list of discrete emotions 
the reader will hopefully recognise is also an approach employed by Hardill and Mills (2013) 
and Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2001).  
Scholars who may otherwise be firmly rooted in interpretivist or constructivist approaches 
reach for “objective”, fixed definitions of what emotion is. This appears to frequently be 
marked by an attempt to synthesise or recapitulate the very fragmented literatures that 
address “emotion”, a Sisyphean task this chapter also attempts but will also demonstrate is 
not productive. This approach is understandable since the established traditions of policy 
analysis offer little for scholars to work with. Yet it is extremely problematic creating a 
coherent ontological argument why any one particular definition of emotion is appropriate to 
use in the context of interpretive policy research, and quite often this question is simply left 
hanging. For example, Newman’s article that has just been discussed goes on to explain how 
27 
 
the author’s concerns about being able to access emotion in a generalizable or objective way 
led to analysing interviews through ‘the study of emotional registers of discourse: where 
emotion words occurred (‘I felt’; ‘we got angry’; ‘it was satisfying’; ‘it was unbearable’) 
(Newman 2012a, p.470), apparently based on Newman’s own understanding of what an 
emotion word would look like. Newman concludes that “affect” is a better term than 
“emotion” for what she has observed, but does not explain what the difference between the 
two concepts is, or how these terms relate to her own interviewees’ understandings and 
practices of emotion (assuming that they have some). Thrift’s Non-Representational Theory 
is a major influence on thinking about emotion and politics, perhaps implicitly on 
Newman’s, and contrasts “affect”, drawing heavily on Deleuze, as an escape from the 
apparently socially- and linguistically-ordered concept he understands “emotion” to be; 
‘affect stands for the unruly body’s ability to go its own way which cannot be reduced to just 
social organisation’ (Thrift 2007, p.225). Thrift’s exploration of affect is exceptionally wide-
ranging, attempting a “Grand Synthesis” of affect but also emotion-related thought. Fischer 
(Fischer 2009) also picks up on the emotion-mood-affect schema, and also addresses an 
exceptionally wide range of traditions of thought about emotion from Aristotle to 
contemporary neuroscience, attempting a synthesis to provide a forward direction for policy 
analysis. Fischer’s argument could be summarised by saying that what these traditions have 
in common is that emotion is non-rational, although it does important cognitive work. 
However, for the interpretive policy analyst interested in the making of meaning in policy 
making and its practice, importing other disciplines’ definitions of emotion wholesale to 
one’s research context or, even worse, failing to be explicit in a description of emotion at all, 
presents clear ontological problems. Likewise, assuming that emotion as understood in 
context is necessarily the binary opposite of reason and rationality requires justification. 
What do policy makers talk about when they talk about emotion? How does that show in 
what they do? Why should that necessarily have anything to do with what a neuroscientist or 
a post-empiricist philosopher thinks about emotion? One way or another, as policy analysts 
we still find it very hard to talk about emotion, we are reluctant to rely on the tools and 
methods available to us in our own discipline to investigate for ourselves, and – strangest of 
all - we never seem to ask the people doing policy what they think about the matter. 
This enthusiasm for common-sense or decontextualised, synthetic understandings of emotion 
exists even in scholarly climates somewhat hostile to such approaches. Much academic 
criticism has been levelled at the normative and epistemological foundations of rationalist 
descriptions of ideal policy processes as found in policy and public administration science 
and its developments in NPM. However, as a system of belief about policy and politics, 
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“authorised instrumentalism”(Colebatch 2006, p.6) or the “rational system model” (Gordon 
et al. 1997), particularly as expressed through the managerial doctrine, is alive and well and 
going about its business in Whitehall and Holyrood.  The Civil Service Code enshrines the 
values of the contemporary Whitehall administration (Scotland has a very similar code), and 
this emphasises the rationalist nature of public service. Two of the core values, “objectivity” 
and “impartiality” speak to anxiety around non-reason in public life; 
‘”Objectivity” is basing your advice and decisions on rigorous analysis of the 
evidence. 
“Impartiality” is acting solely according to the merits of the case’ 
      (Anon 2010, p.1) 
This description echoes the concerns about the kind of knowledge that is “rigorous” in the 
first place as seen in Evidence-Based Policy. The current Coalition Government have 
broadly continued the trend towards managerialism and NPM public values, although 
arguably the place of “evidence” has been somewhat shaken (Pyper 2013). Therefore any 
student of policy or politics does no service to their project by ignoring managerialism and 
rationalism’s power as a cultural system of understanding and ordering everyday speech and 
action, however unsatisfactorily. It is as Gordon et al. point out perhaps the only explicitly 
acknowledged way of doing public policy “well”:  
‘The main explanation for the [rational system model's] continuing existence must 
lie in its status as a normative model and as a 'dignified' myth which is often shared 
by the policy-makers themselves. Acceptance of the rational model helps the 
researcher towards a comfortable life; it enables him or her to appear to engage in 
direct debate with the policy-makers on the basis that information provided by the 
researchers will be an aid to better policy-making.’ (Gordon et al. 1997, p.7) 
It is therefore not surprising at all ‘that social and policy sciences have failed to develop a 
language capable of dealing with this basic dimension of political life’ (Fischer 2009, p.272). 
Emotion is not meant to be integral to political life at all; if you do not ask an emotional 
question you are unlikely to get an emotional answer. What is perhaps more striking is that 
despite the way that, thanks to the foregrounding of everyday behaviour and language, policy 
analysis has successfully questioned other fundamental concepts and models in policy 
derived from the rationalist traditions - notably the scope of the policy making process, the 
diversity of its participants and even the project of rational deliberation itself - the concept of 
emotion has not routinely received quite the same scrutiny by scholars. 
However, the lack of a reflective vocabulary for considering the place of emotion in policy 
could also be viewed as an opportunity of sorts. As a researcher, another way of seeing this 
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division between what we say we do (or perhaps more accurately what we say we believe we 
ought to do) and what we might be observed to do is as a productive tension between 
normative theory and practice, one which when foregrounded reveals much about both sides 
of the equation.  
2.3 The Hands 
The “practice turn” in policy analysis turned scholarly attention towards the Hands as a 
redress to the normative abstractions of the Head; ‘The problem is that while there is a clear 
account in the texts of professional policy work as the systematic comparison of options, this 
bears little resemblance to the experience of practitioners' (Colebatch & Radin 2006, p.221). 
The turn to practice in the study of policy work (Yanow 2007; Yanow 1996) has sought to 
address the gap between everyday life in policy making looks like and what an ideal policy 
process is described as according to the normative assumptions of policy and public 
administration science, and the next section of this chapter will explore this literature’s 
responses to both policy work and emotion within that context. The literature explored in this 
section will share a broad interpretivist orientation as a result; an interpretive approach to 
policy analysis ‘is one that focuses on the meanings of policies, on the values, feelings and/ 
or beliefs which they express, and on the processes by which those meanings are 
communicated to and “read” by various audiences’ (Yanow 1996, p.8). The idea of emotion 
in an interpretive analysis of policy could plausibly have two aspects; the way emotion is 
manifested in the physical world and the way it is a constituent part of meaning-making. In 
particular, scholars interested in the discursive and argumentative dimensions of practice 
have shown the most sustained interest in the concept of “emotion” in policy work. 
What does a focus on practice capture that a focus on the intellectual categories of social 
policy risk missing? Or, to put it more metaphorically, what are we looking at in the Hand? 
Miettenen et al. acknowledge the diversity of theories of practice, but consider the common 
elements of them to be; ‘the embodied nature of practice; knowledge as a way of acting and 
of using artefacts, rather than only as verbal or textual representations of the world; and the 
significance of material objects and artefacts for practices are chief among them’ (Miettinen 
et al. 2009, p.1312). Miettenen et al. also emphasise the presence of two complementary 
branches of investigation around practice, the first being an ethnographically-oriented 
empirical documentation of social life. ‘What people do to get their work done… itself 
constitutes an explanation of everyday life, and it enjoys full explanatory status… 
substituting for theories, explanations, norms or ideologies’ (Miettinen et al. 2009, p.1312) 
The second is a theoretical project which makes a statement about the nature of knowledge 
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and of reality, one which emphasises the importance of “being-in-the-world” as preceding 
knowledge and cognition. Both threads of practice studies interact in an interest in the way 
we learn how to be in the world, suggesting at the same time a phenomenological project and 
a research orientation.  
I would summarise the key aspects of the way practice has been conceived of in policy work 
in four overarching themes. These all have relevance for an inquiry into the “emotional” in 
policy making, but do not necessarily help the scholar who wishes to take emotion as their 
point of departure as a researcher. Firstly, this literature demonstrates that the practices of 
policy conflict with or problematise concepts of policy as inherently systematic or purely 
about episteme. Secondly, the practices of policy are overwhelmingly understood to be text- 
and speech-based in practice-oriented policy analysis. Thirdly, the practices of policy are 
understood to be purposive, aimed at distributing resources or other finite goods. Finally, 
emotion has tended to be treated as an external, stable substantive category, rather than 
something that is itself a practice produced in a particular cultural and historical context. By 
addressing each of these themes in turn, I will explore how these approaches further the 
consideration of the “non-rational” in policy work, but also how they might fall short of 
providing a complete set of tools for a researcher of the “emotional”. 
2.3.1 Destabil ising ideas about the work of policy 
The turn to practice in policy studies addresses the gap between academic descriptions of the 
nature of policy work and the actual experience of practitioners. This approach asserts that 
there is always an interaction between what we do and the sense that we make of our 
everyday activities, and that the idea of policy and the doing of policy are intertwined in 
complex ways that are not immediately apparent or necessarily coherent. The idea that the 
researcher can learn about these things through the act of learning itself is common to most 
ethnographic traditions, but Lave and Wenger’s work on “communities of practice” (Lave 
1991; Wenger 1998) fully develops this as a response to the apparently irreconcilable 
expertises involved in becoming competent in a professional context. In particular the idea 
that shared (and contested) beliefs inform activity and activity shapes belief in professional 
settings, in dialogue with the construction and reconstruction of professional identities, is a 
key feature of a community of practice:  
‘Learning is… a social phenomenon constituted in the experienced, lived in 
world through legitimate peripheral participation in ongoing social practice; the 
process of changing knowledgeable skill is subsumed in processes of changing 
identity in and through membership of a community of practitioners; and 
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mastery is a an organisational, relational characteristic of communities of 
practice’ (Lave 2001, p.64) 
From this perspective there is no reason why a concept of emotion should not form a part of 
that culturally and historically situated collective dialogue of identity and practice in policy 
work, in fact it might appear strange to omit it. The two most relevant ideas from the 
“communities of practice” literature for the topic under consideration are; that becoming a 
skilful worker consists of the back-and-forth of thinking and doing involved in 
apprenticeship and; that this is something which is done in reference and relation to other 
workers. Or to put it into the Head-Hand-Heart schema: ‘The hands… establish a repertoire 
of learned gestures. The gestures can be further refined or revised within the rhythmic 
process that occurs in, and sustains, practicing. Prehension presides over each technical step, 
and each step is full of ethical implication’ (Sennett 2009, p.178). While there has been 
considerable take-up of the idea of a community of practice within policy programmes in and 
beyond the academy (notably in education policy), having significant impact on specific 
policies (Hodkinson & Hodkinson 2003; Hearn & White 2009; Bathmaker & Avis 2005; 
Coburn & Stein 2006), the same cannot be said for the work of governance itself. Policy 
workers are strangely not often thought of as a community of practitioners themselves. 
Relatively few extensive investigations of the practice of governance and policy making 
have been conducted, among them notably the ethnography of everyday life in a Whitehall 
ministry undertaken by Rhodes (Rhodes 2005). Similarly, the literature around communities 
of practice in any field rarely directly addresses the matter of emotion. And yet, thinking 
back to the set of experiences that inspireded this thesis’ research problem, policy work 
could be thought of as possessing all the characteristics of a community of practice, and 
thinking of it in this way might go some way to beginning to explain some of the more 
relational and identity-driven aspects of what it means to do this work skilfully every day. If 
our emotions can begin to be understood as a dimension of the cultural beliefs and practices 
that constitute everyday life we may begin to find a language to talk about them. A turn to 
the everyday practices of doing policy work should make room for understanding of the 
relational, non-rational and exploring what is contained within the “black box” of emotion in  
public policy. However, I would argue that other factors have limited the practice turn’s 
ability to do this work. 
2.3.2 “Policy is made of language” 
A “turn to practice” is superficially straightforward, but in fact it is not self-evident what the 
“practices of policy” are. Traditional or common-sense articulations of the scope of policy 
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making do not provide many sophisticated descriptions of policy practices as there is so little 
emphasis on the non-abstract, non-episteme components of policy work. However, a 
scholarship of policy practice as articulated by Mietenen et al. - which could potentially look 
at every level of analysis and at every material artefact, gesture, speech and the meanings 
made of these by a very wide range of actors - demands some articulation of the nature of 
policy to provide scholars with a framework to build their analysis around and structure their 
data collection. Perhaps the dominant understanding of the nature of policy in interpretive or 
poststructuralist policy analysis is that of persuasion: 
‘Public policy is made of language […] Democracy has been called a system of 
government by discussion. Political parties, the electorate, the legislature, the 
executive, the courts, the media, interest groups and independent experts all 
engage in a continual process of debate and reciprocal persuasion.’ (Majone 
1989, p.1) 
The great multiplicity of perspectives and meanings in understanding a policy issue are all 
engaged in a process of contestation, of persuading a group to allocate its resources in a 
particular way, and this is where the work of policy takes place. This work consists not just 
of influencing the choice of options but also of shaping how those choices are understood; 
'The question then becomes, "in what way does mobilising a discourse of the systematic 
comparison of options contribute to the process of generating support for an outcome?" 
(Colebatch & Radin 2006, p.224).  This approach emphasises the primacy of language and 
how it is used to create meaning in policy, and in turn foregrounds the analysis of discourse, 
language and speech practices in studying policy. The analysis of discourse and meaning as a 
tool for critical policy studies is still a very broad field, however, encompassing orientations 
that cover “dramaturgical” approaches (Hajer 2005a), the “argumentative” approach (Fischer 
& Forester 1993), “institutional ethnography” as practiced by Dorothy Smith (2005), and 
other conceptions of meaning (Wagenaar 2011), not all of which have much to say explicitly 
about the possible place of “emotion” in making policy.  
Critical policy analysis which has drawn upon the language practices of policy work has 
tended to view emotion as something revealed through language and made accessible 
through “tells” in language. Some recent empirical work attempts to trace a way through this 
tradition of discursive practice towards emotion (Durnová 2013; Davidson & Orsini 2010; 
Newman 2012a). Durnova in particular explores the ways in which sharing meaning can also 
constitute sharing emotion in end-of-life care through a practice she describes as “intimacy”, 
which has both physical and social components; ‘intimacy links meanings of dying to 
particular emotions’ (Durnová 2013, p.150). As I have already explored, Newman’s recent 
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examination of the “knowledge work” of women working in policy and advocacy (2012a), 
itself heavily methodologically influenced by Smith’s institutional ethnography, looked for 
emotional words in interview transcripts. I will explore the methodological issues of 
analysing emotion primarily through language in later chapters. What is immediately 
relevant to my exploration of emotion and policy is that such approaches frame what 
emotion is through their understanding of where policy and governance happen, and this 
usually effectively (if not always conceptually) means working with language at the expense 
of other sources of meaning. This has implications for what emotion can be. An emphasis on 
what is said will inevitably mean missing all the things which are not said or written (which 
could include how things are said) but also might miss all the things that are, for one reason 
or another, unspeakable. 
2.3.3 Must policy have a purpose?  
Following Majone’s (1989) recasting of the policy actor as rhetorician, one strand in 
particular of interpretive policy analysis has focused more explicitly on emotion as one of 
the components of what constitutes a persuasive argument in policy making. The 
“Argumentative Turn” in policy analysis is concerned with moving beyond an understanding 
of policy as a narrative practice to seeing it as an argumentative practice, that is to say one 
that integrates empirical and normative practices. This is based on a specific understanding 
of what “narrative” and “argument” consist of; ‘Whereas narrative ties a story together with 
a beginning, a middle and an end through the device of a plot, an argument is structured 
around premises designed to logically lead to conclusions’ (Fischer 2009, p.181). Several 
factors influence the likely success of an argument. Success depends on “narrative 
rationality”; this ‘includes but moves beyond literary structures [about narrative] to show 
more systematically how empirical, normative, structural and rhetorical components interact 
to supply narrative credibility, or “good reasons” (Fischer 2003, p.177). Narrative credibility 
rests on three factors; narrative probability; narrative fidelity; and characterological  
coherence (Fischer 2009, p.177).  
The importance of relations between policy actors and their beliefs about one another’s 
trustworthiness (their estimation of one another, for want of another phrase) and of the 
truthfulness of their stories means that emotion needs to be understood as an integral 
component of reason and as an important component of rhetoric; ‘Thought and belief are to 
be understood as the efficient cause of emotion and, as such, emotional responses need to be 
interpreted as intelligent reactions that can be dealt with through reasoned persuasion’ 
(Fischer 2009, p.275). Our emotions, as understood in this way, are powerful indicators of 
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what argument is to be acted upon in making policy; ‘some stories are more truthful and 
humane than others, which can be sorted out through the discursive logic of good reasons' 
(Fischer 2003, p.167). 
According to this body of literature, emotion finds a home in deliberative democratic 
practice as a cognitive component of meaning making according to the “argumentative turn”. 
However, without questioning the description of what emotion is (although one could, as 
previously discussed), it arguably only provides a home for a certain type of emotion. 
Specifically this is a constructive rather than destructive intrusion of emotion into the 
deliberative process; the narrators want to be believed and respected, rather than reviled; the 
participants want to reach a decision, rather than wreck any chance of consensus; the 
discussants wait to hear the response to their point of view, rather than insult their 
interlocutors and walk out the room. Most of us can think of an episode where the stories and 
arguments told were outrageous, truly lacking in narrative integrity and told by the most 
unreliable narrator, yet were somehow powerful enough to change the game of decision 
making entirely. Where does that power come from? What do we pass over in only analysing 
the things that matter to deliberation and critical rationality? Poststructuralist policy analysis’ 
emphasis on language and deliberation creates a bias towards the purposive that makes it 
hard to answer these questions. 
Argumentative approaches to policy analysis assume that we are all engaged in policy work 
to achieve something, and that something is the distribution of resources to address a 
problem. That is an assumption that needs to be justified. In particular it is problematic when 
trying to build a conception of policy making in which the full range of “emotional” factors 
can be seen as meaningful, particularly when they are disruptive or damaging to the 
argumentative work of policy or, indeed, the people involved. Newman (2012a) explores this 
in relation to the challenge to the deliberative work of policy, and therefore to the 
“deliberative subject” the citizen needs to be, but there is a prior question to be asked about 
the scope of policy work itself, one that pays more attention to the non-verbal and non-
representative. To return to the challenge this chapter began with, argumentation and 
deliberation is not a model of policy making that comfortably accommodates the apparently 
aimless occasional paraphernalia of doing policy work well; the drinks reception for a new 
intake of parliamentary researchers, for example, or the jokey tone of an email, or knowing 
just how to manage a fractious discussion so everyone has expressed their anger with each 
other although it is of no relevance to the topic under consideration.  
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An assumption about the exclusively purposive nature of policy work possibly lingers on 
because of the understanding of narrative that is provided by argumentative and 
communicative approaches to policy analysis. However, it is a peculiarly social scientist’s 
understanding, and maybe not the only one that cultural critics would recognise. In particular 
the idea that narrative can only describe “what is” and makes no contribution to the possible 
is a key problem (Fischer 2003, p.181). Maybe in turn this understanding of narrative is 
because of what we as social scientists and policy analysts think are the components of 
stories: words, characters, contexts and facts. However, this overlooks so much of what 
Fischer describes as the mercurial nature of story-telling: 'To be replicable over time by 
different investigators, the objects of investigation require fixed categories. By contrast, 
symbolic ambiguity in art is generally taken to be a source of depth and richness' (Fischer 
2003, p.170). That symbolic ambiguity arguably takes place between the signs, or behind 
them, or above them. Perhaps it is in understanding stories and narratives as operating at 
both levels simultaneously we may get closer to accommodating the “emotional” dimension 
of policy making; in other words, policy making with the ambiguity left in. Without this 
tolerance for ambiguity, so much behaviour in policy work appears superfluous or 
unconstructive. In the words of a famous management self-help book, policy work is 
assumed to be about “getting to YES” (Fisher et al. 2012). This is more than a facetious 
comparison. Fisher et al.’s thesis has less interest in the contextual nuances of argumentation 
or in the nature of the appeal to narrative plausibility as argumentative approaches; however 
it encourages a deliberative, non-adversarial technique which in turn is intended to better 
promote making decisions, based on assessment of well-evidenced reasons for action. Things 
inevitably get lost in this way of seeing decision making activity, appearing to be Fischer’s 
“non-productive sidetracks” (Fischer 2003, p.177). What happens, for example, when you 
seem to have a collection of people gathered together to show they are enthusiastically 
committed to “NO”? Is their rejection of “YES” complete, or is it just that their “YES” is 
taking place somewhere beyond the purposive activities of policy work? 
2.3.4 Emotion as Practice?  
Some remedy for the twin problems of the possible unspeakable and non-constructive 
aspects of emotion might be found in the analysis of the non-verbal in policy making. To 
return to Mietenen et al.’s (2009) observation, an interest in practice (and the practice of 
emotion in particular) needs to encompass material culture and the embodied as well as text 
and language. However it is relatively hard to find ethnographies of the cultural and material 
artefacts of policy and politics – the contemporary archaeology of political life. A notable 
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exception is Carter’s (2011) ethnographic exploration of the meaning of “freebies” at policy 
events. As the title of the article suggests, the way the author judged these freebies to “mean” 
in the context of these events called into question just how “evidence-based” policy 
formation really was, instead relying on complex, non-verbal and maybe non-rational 
significations attached to objects such as furry toys or clocks. The objects in Carter’s 
collection, as “stuff” (Carter 2011), are substituting the role of words, as sign-signifiers. 
While this expands the range of possibilities for policy analysis, it does not fundamentally 
question the interpretive and representative acts which posed such problems for the 
investigation of emotion through discourse. A more radical, comprehensive and fully 
theorised articulation of how the non-verbal, the political and the emotional interface can be 
found in the literature around non-representational theory. While this posits many intriguing 
possibilities for interpretive policy analysis it derives from very different ontological 
positions; nevertheless it too is a significant literature which takes practice as its departure 
point. It is also the inspiration for a significant set of empirical studies of governance 
practice that deal with embodiment and space. 
This poses a difficult challenge, however; in order to avoid reasserting the primacy of 
language, this work needs to be done in a way that takes material culture, bodies and space 
as things to be analysed on their own terms without automatically translating them into yet 
more words. This is the fundamental challenge at the heart of non-representational theory. In 
particular it aims to reconfigure inquiry around emotion to escape the culturally-specific 
“folkbiology” about biological drives, instead proposing “affect” as a synthesis of ‘analytical 
objects that have conventionally been kept apart, namely the biological and the social’ 
(Thrift 2007, p.221). The overall aim of this is to create an analytical space between 
subjectivities and spaces. There are several problematic aspects of non-representational 
theory prescriptions for social enquiry, not least the plausibility of creating an “inhuman” 
sensibility in the research of political spaces, and equally there are some aspects to the 
emotion-affect-drives continuum that certain scholars, notably Thrift, see as problematic that 
maybe are not. However, non-representational theory is a powerful riposte to the idea that 
political work (and therefore policy work) is all about words and intentionality and that 
which can be made into words. It is explicit in its rejection of the ceaselessly deliberative, 
autonomously reasoning political subject. Particularly as developed and articulated by 
Dewsbury (2003) and Anderson and Harrison (2012), non-representational theory articulates 
a need to understand the non-verbal in particular and the spaces (in addition to the 
subjectivities) of politics in general, and throws down a challenge to researchers of political 
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spaces to find ways to attend to and transmit these non-verbal things in their own terms and 
allow them, somehow, to perform.  
Non-representational theory has significantly informed the work of human geographers 
seeking to understand policy making as an affective political space, populated by bodies, 
materials and voids as well as words and signs. This emotional geographical perspective 
considers the way ‘policy may have to be small in scale, humanising in intent, embedded in 
context and enacted through bodies and so on’ (Anderson & Smith 2001, p.7). This set of 
lenses has recently been used to analyse how vulnerable bodies “enliven” the evidence base 
used in policy making (Hardill & Mills 2013), how conceptions of the governance of the 
State and self become gendered (Pykett, 2012), how policy interacts with spatialities of 
closeness, distance and (in)visibility in community development and deprivation alleviation 
(Jupp 2013) and how activist pedagogical techniques might create new ways of 
conceptualising the human self (Roelvink 2010), among several other empirical studies. It is 
interesting to note that many of these studies analyse the way policies are delivered, or 
perhaps the way their policy “problems” get articulated, rather than the way they actually 
come into being. In other words, governance is being framed as a practice, but the practices 
of politics remain relatively unexamined. 
Even in the fields of social enquiry that take practice as their departure point, there is still 
some considerable unexplored space around the meaning of emotion and its practices in 
policy making work, particularly in terms of empirical study. There is also a relatively 
underexplored but essential territory involving the ways we can know emotion in research in 
a way that it methodologically consistent with practice-focused traditions of research. 
Instead of treating emotion as a stable substantive category, external to the practice contexts 
we research, there are grounds for understanding “emotion” as an emergent component of 
the practice of policy making. Prior to investigating the effects emotion has upon policy 
delivery or deliberation, there is work to be done examining the ways in which emotion is 
itself a practice produced in a particular cultural and historical context. To do this, a turn 
towards traditions of enquiry that make “emotion” their substantive focus and explicit 
research problem is productive. 
2.4 The Heart  
In trying to find a way to approach emotion in policy making does it help to start from 
emotion and work towards policy, given that there is a lack of a consistent intellectual 
framework readily available in policy and governance studies themselves? While it is not 
38 
 
necessarily straightforward to make such connections, perhaps the points at which such 
literatures investigate power, representation and decision making could help to plug the 
“emotional gap” in the various policy literatures. Indeed, many scholars are investigating 
these possibilities and this final section of the present chapter will provide a critical overview 
of the recent work that is most relevant to the scope of this research project and trace its 
origins in social thought and inquiry. 
That said, there is much research that is conducted on emotions qua emotions that will not be 
dealt with here in great depth. This is because these literatures are informed by 
epistemological stances which are not easily reconciled with an approach oriented towards 
the practice of policy work, one which understands the meaningfulness of the concept 
emotion to be generated within the context of that practice.  
2.4.1 Polit ical psychology  
Most of the emerging field of political psychology has tended to approach the observation 
and study of emotion in political decision-making by trying to find universal emotional 
schemas that may act as explanatory and predictive tools. This has often involved the 
“unrolling” of emotion into a series of dimensions and indicators for the purposes of 
gathering data from populations, and reconstituting affect through the analysis of these data 
(Fineman 2008). It draws heavily on experimental psychological research into the physical 
and socio-biological characteristics of different, discrete emotions, which in turn has been 
heavily influenced by “basic emotions” research (Ekman 1982; Ekman 2004; Forgas 2001; 
Strack et al. 1988). Of particular relevance to my study of emotion and policy making, the 
psychological sub-field of affective bias, motivation and preferences (for example in group 
decision-making) has readily translated to considerations of voting behaviour, candidate 
selection and political decision-making. “Affect” is only one dimension of political 
psychological research, however the overall concern with cognition and reasoning is striking 
to a scholar such as myself who is interested in the cultural construction of rationality and its 
opposites. As one edited collection of essays on political choice-making explains: ‘a growing 
band of us have worked to develop an account of how people reason about political choices’ 
(Brody 1993, p.xiii). From an experimental psychological point of view, the relevance of 
affect and emotion to political behaviour can be summed up as ‘whether emotion is a help, or 
hindrance, in achieving democratic and just regimes’ and can be considered ‘the highest-
stakes issue current in political psychology’ (Marcus 2003, p.182). 
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Notwithstanding some scholarship which has employed comparative case study approaches, 
political psychology has something of a bias towards experimental, quasi-experimental and 
socio-biological research (Kaarbo & Beasley 1999). This preference is reflected in the recent 
work around emotion, affect and political decision making. The impact of the intersecting 
concepts of motivation, cognitive and opportunity on voting intention has been explored in 
various ways by political psychologists. Ladd and Lenz have used large n time series data 
from an American polling company to examine how anxiety is used by voters to monitor the 
amount of attention they should pay to political processes (2011). Miller (2011) has used the 
same datasets to interrogate a commonplace belief that what he terms “low sophistication”  
corresponds with emotional motivations for political activity, instead arguing that “high 
sophiticates” draw upon emotion more readily and intensely to appraise political behaviour 
such as presidential voting. Weith, Littvay and Dawes have used twin studies to examine the 
heritability of political psychological dispositions and how this impacts voting behaviours, 
concluding that an inherited sense of control and one’s voting intentions ‘can primarily be 
attributed to genetic factors’ (Littvay et al. 2011, p.1249). Another major strand of political 
psychological research, of perhaps the clearest relevance to my own project, looks at the way 
groups make decisions in political contexts and draws upon scholarship relating to 
organisational psychology. Recent examples include Hafner-Burton, Hughes and Victor’s 
(2013) appraisal of elite political decision-making and the way these elites may differ 
cognitively from other segments of the population. Tausch, Becker et al. (2011) have used 
surveys of student populations to examine how feelings of efficacy and contempt, as a form 
of psychological distancing, determine whether political collective action taken is 
“normative” or “non-normative” (conventional or unconventional and extreme). Mercier and 
Landemore (2012) and Charness and Sutter (2012) have both examined models of political 
decision making that claim ‘group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning’ (Mercier 
& Landemore 2012, p.243), albeit with rather different focuses which could be interpreted as 
somewhat contradictory. Charness and Sutter emphasise the improved interest-maximisation 
potential of group deliberation, presented as a desirable outcome, and Mercier and 
Landemore use confirmation bias models to explain how deliberative democratic processes 
frequently fail to have any transformative effect on participants’ preferences, as they are 
supposed to. Frey, Schulz-Hardt and Stahlberg (Frey et al. 1996) have also looked at 
confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance to examine how the composition of deliberative 
decision-making groups can affect their behaviour and search for information about the topic 
under consideration. This is by no means and exhaustive list of the current state of political 
psychological research which touches on decision-making and emotion. But it does serve to 
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illustrate the scope and scale of the field’s ambitions in tackling questions which, if not 
identical to my own, have a very clear overlap in terms of their concerns. They too hinge on 
the question of the “proper” relation of emotion to political action and governance, albeit 
framed in terms of efficacy rather than cultural norms. 
The challenges such an experimental empirical approach poses to an interpretive policy 
analyst are abundant, and have already been explored elsewhere in this review. I have also 
explained that these definitions find their way into otherwise interpretively-oriented or 
practice-focused work, and it is not to say that, taken on its own terms, this field of inquiry 
lacks legitimacy. However, as these recent studies illustrate, political psychology’s 
relationship to the world of practice is quite often fundamentally at odds with the aim of 
empirical observation of everyday life. In order to make it replicable, and therefore 
scientifically valid according to the standards of experimental psychology, political 
behaviour is essentially decontextualised. This inevitably raises questions for the researcher 
of policy making practices about ecological validity; ‘reflexiveness and experiential validity 
are squeezed out’ (Fineman 2008, p.277). But more fundamentally, and more relevantly for 
my review of current research, when such research talks about “emotion” it is probably not 
how “emotion” is understood among those who do policy work. 
It is beyond the scope of this research to attempt to integrate this body of knowledge into the 
critical and interpretive policy literature, especially since there is apparently so little 
systematic research into culturally-produced meanings of the concept of emotion in policy 
and politics work. The “anthropology of emotions” (Lutz & White 1986) arguably still has 
much work to do in Western political working life; if policy analysts were to investigate 
categories such as gender or ethnicity, in which the biological world is also apparently 
deeply entwined, without doing this work the robustness of their methodology would rightly 
be questioned. In an attempt to find a way of addressing this lack within policy studies, two 
research approaches will be examined that have treated emotion as the independent variable 
in social research: the sociology of emotions and psychosocial studies. 
2.4.2 Sociology of Emotions  
The sociology of emotions may employ either a social constructionist or a positivist 
approach to the matter of defining emotions (Kemper 1981). Since the latter approach has 
much in common with many of the literatures addressed so far, the former will be addressed 
as more likely to provide a good fit with a focus on everyday practices in policy. 
Constructionist-oriented sociology of emotion owes its intellectual roots to Erving 
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Goffman’s symbolic interactionism, dramaturgy and social rules and roles (Hochschild 1979; 
Scheff 2003). Keeping this chapter’s focus on work and practice, Hochschild  developed 
Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective to examine the roles and rules around feeling in social 
interaction in workplaces, drawing the distinction between “surface acting” and “deep 
acting” (Hochschild 1983, p.36). Where surface acting is something that we consciously do 
or “put on”, at odds with what we feel to be our true emotions, deep acting  can either be 
achieved by ‘directly exhorting feeling [or] by making indirect use of a trained imagination’ 
(Hochschild 1983, p.38). The former is about persuading yourself to feel things that others 
expect you to, or that you feel your current circumstances demand, such as crying at a 
funeral. The latter is more about using a “trained imagination” to mine your past experience 
for a scenario that gives you an appropriate emotion to relive in order to fulfil your current 
emotional obligations. These expectations are scripted by a complex set of “feeling rules”, 
which ‘guide emotion by establishing the sense of entitlement or obligation that governs 
emotional exchanges’ (Hochschild 1983, p.56).  
There is no logical reason why the sociology of emotions should exclusively concern itself 
with stereotypically “emotional” worlds, frequently highly feminised ones, in which “care” 
is a prominent and contested concept. And yet this field of inquiry has tended to be 
dominated by such empirical focuses. Nursing and health care studies have made particularly 
extensive use of emotional labour as a lens for; examining and contesting the gendered 
implications of the concept of care (James 1992; Staden 1998); analysing stress and “burn-
out” in nursing contexts (Mann & Cowburn 2005; Brotheridge & Grandey 2002); and 
proposing systematic ways of supporting nursing practitioners (Mann 2005; Brotheridge & 
Lee 2003), among a wide spectrum of applications. Hochschild’s original empirical case 
studies that formed the background for the first articulation of the concept of emotional 
labour took place in the airline industry, among female flight attendants (Hochschild 1983), 
and this workplace, along with other service industry jobs, have formed a consistent part of 
the emotional labour literature (Korczynski 2003; Williams 2003; Taylor & Tyler 2000; 
Cohen 2010), along  with teaching and education studies . Generally studies informed by the 
concept of emotional labour will emphasise the component of care considered by the general 
public to be involved in doing the work, and the gendered nature of that work. Within studies 
of working practices that are not stereotypically considered “caring” or “people centred” 
there is far less uptake of the idea of emotional labour, and hardly any in scholarly 
examinations of explicitly political work, one notable exception being a study of the 
emotional labour involved in trade union activism (Franzway 2000), though again this 
focused only on the women within a labour organisation. In general the idea that men may 
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emotionally labour is far less widely explored (Nixon 2009), perhaps because of a common 
conception of emotional labour as ‘a gendered cultural performance’ which  presents  
emotional labourers as ‘distillations of patriarchal femininity’ (Williams 2003, p.513). While 
there is a challenging political project implied by these observations, it does not logically 
follow that men do not labour emotionally and, most pertinently of all to the scope of this 
research project, that there is no emotional labour involved in supposedly detached, rational 
and perhaps traditionally masculinised work. 
There are three main challenges in using the concept of emotional labour in political and 
policy work. The first concerns the terms of reference in emotional labour literature. Just as 
in Goffman’s work, “emotion” as a culturally-rooted category is left strangely unexamined. 
However, nothing in the interpretive tradition in the sociology of emotions is inconsistent 
with a more critical stance in relationship to the concept of emotion – and perhaps this is 
actually necessary work that needs more attention. Secondly, emotional labour is 
fundamentally care work, but does anyone really care in policy making? There is some cause 
to think that care in the sense the concept is used in emotional labour literature is a matter for 
policy. The importance of motivation and commitment is important to activist and 
professional identities in politics has been asserted by several scholars (Goodwin et al. 
2001). There is also a body of literature exploring the idea of the State, its employees and its 
citizens as carers as expressed through (often gendered) descriptions of policy 
implementation: 
‘Is the state becoming too much like your nanny? Does it act like your dad or more 
like your uncle? Does it tell you what to do, protect you from harm, or nurture you 
like a mother? Which familial figure should the state aspire to be in relation to the 
cultivation of citizens and the appropriate extent of government regulation?’ (Pykett, 
2012, p.217) 
Perhaps it is time to think about expanding the list of people and institutions who are 
expected to care in return for some other reward into the world of policy work. Finally, and 
perhaps most problematically, emotional labour places its analytical emphasis on labour 
relations, in which ‘parts of the self are made available […] to be consumed by customers’ 
(Williams 2003, p.517) with attendant issues about alienation, domination and subordination. 
While some of this could be relevant to policy work – there are many paid professionals 
involved - maybe it does not capture everything that goes into the practice of the work of 
policy, and at the least the complex interplay of power, status and legitimacy make this a far 
more difficult workplace to analyse in terms of the transactions involved in emotional 
labour. Policy work is generally normatively understood as “more than” work; (unpaid) 
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activists, third sector workers and professional representatives participate, often out-of-
hours, because they care, but this care is also expected to be exhibited in the commitment of 
politicians to similarly gruelling working lives and their willingness to experience a lack of 
personal privacy in the course of their duties. The Civil Service Code is extremely articulate 
about the way the “public good” is meant to motivate civil servants; the traditional 
conception of “public reason” encodes this effort for the Good within it. Arguably the 
“public life” aspect of policy adds a layer of complexity to the idea of emotional acting and 
the way the emotional self is constructed and endures beyond labour relations. In 
emphasising labour relations, the construction of the emotional self in policy is maybe 
passed too swiftly to the professional role as experienced in the moment. Policy work may 
be an emotional effort, but this is not introduced to the lives of participants because they 
labour. Policy workers may do emotional work, but few of them are there because they are 
employed primarily to care. Those whose work involves caring may potentially be 
immensely powerful or they could be extremely vulnerable in that context or beyond. 
Attending to but not flattening these layers of subjectivities and emotional consciousnesses 
can perhaps be traced as a tension throughout the various literatures that have been 
considered in this chapter; the sociology of emotions’ emphasis on the socially constructed 
and constituted aspect of making meaning from this category called “emotion” is only one 
pass at an explanation. We can see this anxiety in non representational theory’s emphasis on 
the space as a flow of affective contagion, de-emphasising the individual’s introspective 
emotional subjectivity. It is also present in more bio-social explanations, attempting to 
remove the interpretive or subjective framing of the problem supplied by the researcher and 
the subject alike. What all the scholarship considered so far has in common perhaps is a 
hesitance to engage with the individual experience of emotional subjectivity and its 
expression, in relation with other emotional subjective selves and collectives, as a valid 
system of meaning of emotion in itself. To those researchers who want to understand the 
practices of emotion this is problematic; regardless of whether one can make an intellectual 
argument against understanding or defining emotion on these terms, if this understanding of 
the emotional self is a part of the wider system of meaning in the context one studies then it 
orders the practices of the people with which one engages. They live in a world in which this 
is what emotion is; understanding their practices requires understanding how this works. 
2.4.3 Psychosocial approaches  
Psychosocial literatures attempt to work with rather than against the understandings of 
emotion held by the participants of research themselves, albeit with a critical stance, while 
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still placing such understandings in a sociological context. This ‘psychoanalytical sociology’ 
(Clarke et al. 2006) seeks to explore the bridge between collective and individual emotional 
experience and practice. It considers that there are powerful affective forces that underlie 
emotional responses which interact with social and cultural “rules” and constructions of 
appropriate affect, but also to acknowledge what has been called the “sociological turn in 
psychology” (Kirschner & Martin 2010); that our unique emotional histories are not just 
products of personal experience but also are a product of our socio-cultural histories. The 
link between the micro- and macro-sociology of emotion is made through the multitudes of 
bridgings between these shared and individual experiences, meanings and narratives. 
Many of the recent empirical and theoretical investigations of emotion and policy have made 
use of psychosocial literature, either extensively or more implicitly. Fewer have made use of 
it as an investigative or analytical tool. Durnová acknowledges psychosocial theorising of 
emotions as useful in showing that ‘how actors feel about a policy issues shapes what they 
do and what they understand as relevant’ (Durnová 2013, p.500). Psychosocial approaches 
have been used to problematize the place of values in governance and how these interact 
with the way meanings are produced in policy (Taylor 2006). Moving from the use of 
psychosocial studies as theoretical and conceptual to methodological and practical has been 
less widespread. This absence is particularly surprising in research about policy, politics and 
governance in general that uses ethnographic research methods, as the epistemological 
orientations and data collection practices of these two methods of enquiry have long been 
considered closely related (Brody 1981; Ewing 1987). Clarke (2006) outlines an approach 
for what is termed a psychosocial method that aims to integrate sociological and 
psychoanalytic practices coherently. This method is aimed at documenting ‘where the 
respondent attaches meaning to life experiences’ (Clarke 2006, p.1163). Clarke suggests four 
principles for conducting empirical psychosocial research with the broad aim of conceiving 
of both researcher and respondent as co-producers of meaning; using open-ended questions 
to allow participants to associate key concepts freely with their own meanings; eliciting a 
story, to see how the way a story is told implies relations to and between meanings and 
people; to use “how” questions rather than “why” questions, as the latter tends to elicit 
technical or sociological answers rather than stories rooted in the participant’s experience 
and finally; using respondents’ ordering and phrasing to follow up with questions, rather 
than our own interpretations of what they have just said (Clarke 2006, pp.1162–1164). 
In respect of its potential as an empirical research tool to study emotion and policy, politics 
or governance, psychosocial theory has made perhaps its greatest impact in an emerging 
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body of literature concerned with what has been described as “emotional governance” 
(Richards 2007). Examples from within this field perhaps illustrate some of the possibilities 
but also the dangers of applying psychoanalytic approaches to wider social phenomena they 
were never originally developed to address. When used as a tool for finding out what groups 
of people or individuals “really” think through repressed desires or other psychoanalytic 
concepts as applied and defined by the researcher themselves one creates an ontological 
paradox; while the overall aims of the research project may be interpretive and/ or critical, in 
practice this research proceeds as an uncovering of a broad social reality available only to the 
psychosocially informed researcher. Thus institutions may be recast as the fulfilment of a 
whole society’s repressed racist desire, or the very concept of altruism or “acting in the 
public good” reframed as “really” being about the affirmation of exploitative social relations 
(Froggett 2002; Hunter 2010), regardless of informants’ own beliefs and emotional 
experiences of their practices. This particular application of psychosocial approaches does 
not seem to address the lack in the other relevant literatures that recommended their 
development; it moves away from giving space and scholarly recognition to research 
informants’ own understandings of their emotional lives as historically and culturally 
situated subjects. Furthermore, when psychosocial theory is applied in this way there is a 
troubling propensity for the scholar to police other’s emotions as either “positive” or 
“negative” or “constructive” or “destructive” (Clarke 2003). The success of the application 
of the tools available in psychosocial literature turns on their integration into a coherent 
methodology of social inquiry. Furthermore there is no single orthodoxy, no objective 
emotional reality, within psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic literature that can be 
straightforwardly transplanted to the interpretation of policy, politics and governance 
(Becker et al. 2012, p.181). However, when psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic literature 
is treated as a huge and diverse body of empirical research and analysis about the way 
emotional lives are lived and experienced, one that shares an epistemological orientation 
with ethnography, it is a way of interrogating the possibilities of the meaning(s) of emotion 
to one’s ethnographic informants. But it offers no more privileged knowledge than this. This 
is acknowledged by Hoggett in that ‘psychosocial research has been criticised for “top 
down” interpretation and advocate a dialogical approach to data collection and interpretation 
in dialogue with research participants’ (Becker et al. 2012), an approach arguably more in 
line with most psychoanalytic practice. 
2.4.4 Psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and the polit ical  
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Within its own research traditions psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have had much to say 
about power, politics and collective meaning making. Indeed, far from being the 
introspective, individualistic and atomising experience of popular stereotype, the emphasis 
on human relations found within most traditions of therapeutic practice have encouraged its 
practitioners to address questions of political and social experience at group and societal 
levels from the outset. Perhaps one of the most discussed instances of this early engagement 
with the political is the well-known 1932 exchange of views between Einstein and Freud on 
the subject of war and its avoidability or inevitability (Rose 1993, p.15). Notwithstanding his 
own emphasis on the “rationalisation” of the policy process, Harold Lasswell was a lay 
psychoanalyst who published extensively on both psychoanalytic topics (Lasswell 1935; 
Lasswell 1937) and on the contributions Freudian psychoanalysis could make to 
understanding the motives and behaviours of political actors (Lasswell 1932; Lasswell 1939; 
Lasswell 1946). His contribution which gained perhaps the widest popular cultural appeal 
was the idea that political behaviour has an intimate relationship with psychopathology, and 
in particular that successful politicians are “psychopaths”, although this is a gross 
oversimplification of the thesis to be found in Psychopathology and Politics (1986). The way 
this exploration of personality, power and politics has been taken up in popular narratives is 
a good illustration of the way Andrew Samuels argues psychotherapeutic scholarship and 
practice has struggled to articulate ways of working across the inner or personal experience 
of politics and its wider context without becoming remote, distorted or just plain ludicrous 
(Samuels 2004). In particular he highlights the fact that psychotherapy and psychoanalysis 
has an unhappy history of ‘collusion… with all manner of normative and oppressive 
practices’ (Samuels 2004, p.826). The psychotherapeutic project is not necessarily a 
progressive or emancipatory one, as conventionally understood.  While I lack Samuels’ 
somewhat millenarian assessment of my generation’s political attitudes and behaviours, I 
share his interest in the way that psychotherapeutic perspectives on society and behaviour 
can help in ‘finding out how secret things – childhood experiences, intimate relationships, 
fantasies (including sexual fantasies), dreams and bodily sensations – may be reframed and 
turned to… political ends’ (Samuels 2004, p.820). Arguably, this is the territory covered by 
the psychosocial literature I addressed in the previous section. However, I want to 
acknowledge the specifically psychotherapeutic sources of these trends in social research and 
analysis, and in particular look at two aspects of this literature. The first is the explicit 
addressing of political institutions and politics in recent psychotherapeutic literatures. The 
other is the large body of work which looks at the politics of the psychotherapeutic encounter 
itself, and how wider social structures come to bear on these relations. 
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In the somewhat shorter list of psychotherapeutically-informed analyses of politics, some 
scholars have used the insights of group and organisational research to explore the political 
consequences of collective constructions of social reality. Allan Frosch has examined the 
way rigid ideology is produced within groups through the Kleinian concept of desymbolised 
or concrete thinking, in which no other perspectives on the meaning or nature of experience 
can be tolerated (Frosch 2012). Michael Rustin has had a sustained focus on the insights 
psychotherapy can bring to politics as a collective act, particularly around the construction of 
reason and “unreason” (Rustin 1991; Rustin 2001). There has also been something of an 
activist movement in the last twenty years around employing the insights of 
psychotherapeutic theory, research and practice in the practices of politics and policy. 
Organisations and campaigns such as Psychotherapists and Counsellors for Social 
Responsibility, which among other ambitions aims to ‘engage with policy makers and the 
media in ways that acknowledge diversity and discourage polarised thinking’ (Anon n.d.) or 
Antidote,  which more explicitly argues for the promotion of “emotional literacy” in public 
life (Totton 2000). As Totton points out, this particular formulation of the “problem” of 
emotion in politics – or “politics of emotions” has a somewhat uncomfortable implication. 
This tendency lobbies for therapists to have a seat at the policy-making table, as experts in 
emotion. This in turn rests on an unclear distinction between an “emotional” decision and a 
“reasonable” political one, where only a professional can know the difference; ‘it seems that 
now the therapists will be added to the ranks of technocrats in the cabinet, since they know 
so much better than the mob how to combine and separate emotions and politics’(Totton 
2000, p.51). It is possible to see this argument as trying to answer the same “problem” of 
emotion in politics as the “neuro” movement in policy making, albeit with a very different 
set of technical skills. Therapy, not technology, will contain emotion and save politics from 
being unruly and unreasonable. Other prominent strands of thought in this literature have 
dealt specifically with how fantasy and subjectivity are at play within political action and 
understanding. Zizek has drawn on Lacanian thought to explore the nature of ideology and 
political desire (Žižek 2000; Zizek 2002). Flax (2012) has explored how feminist 
psychotherapeutic thought has challenged assumptions about political subjectivity.  
Flax’s work also addresses the other, much broader body of work around the politics of 
psychotherapy and analysis, in particular how wider structures of power and meaning are 
present in the therapeutic encounter itself. A full exploration of this body of work would take 
more space than is available here, but I would like to note two broad tendencies within it. 
Firstly, there is an interesting group of scholarship which approaches this matter through the 
use of broad categories and certain well-established persecutionary “isms”. For example; 
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class; gender; race; sexuality (Chodorow 1989; Flax 1983; Layton et al. 2006; Altman 2005; 
Fuss 2013; Connell 1987). The other focuses on more fine-grain analysis of power in 
relations between therapist and client, what a sociologist might call the micropolitics of 
therapy, can be found in several explorations of boundaries, ethics and power in therapeutic 
settings (Proctor 2002; Pope & Vasquez 2010; De Varis 1994; Mack 1994). Hook (2003) has 
made the journey in the opposite direction by using Foucault’s sovereignty-discipline-
government complex to examine psychotherapeutic practice. Different scholars and different 
studies place greater or lesser emphasis on examination of specific case histories or broader 
observations. A smaller number have dealt with group or organisational experiences. If more 
overtly “political” and group or institutional settings were subject to such analysis, perhaps 
more exploration of the ambiguities or contestations about categories relating to, for 
example, ethnicity, class or sexuality might be more apparent within these literatures. As 
Judith Butler observes, ‘feminist theory has taken the category of women to be foundational 
to any further political claims without realising that the category effects a political closure on 
the kinds of experiences articulable as part of feminist discourse’ (Butler 2013, p.325). 
Butler is trying to draw attention to queerness of the gendered sort, but I am interested in the 
ways that queernesses of different kinds relating to uncategorisable experiences are at work 
in political settings more generally, and in the ways that groups idealise or diminish each 
other’s shared identities and social realities. 
2.5 Conclusion: Reframing the research problem 
In this chapter I have explored the way reason and emotion have been thought about by 
major strands of relevant literature, broadly grouped around whether their primary interest is 
in rationality, practice or the “emotional” in policy and politics. I have critically assessed 
their contributions to a wider culturally- and historically-situated understanding of how 
reason, emotion and public life relate to each other which forms the context for my own 
research explored in this thesis. I have also considered the relevant impact these traditions of 
thought have had on policy practitioners. Of all the literatures reviewed here, the various 
models which assert the “rational” as the only legitimate source of knowledge about a policy 
issue, and by extension the only efficient or acceptable way of making policy decisions, have 
by far the most traction as a widely accepted explanation of “good” policy making. What all 
these approaches have in common is a belief that the “right” policy decision, and the “right” 
process for arriving at that decision, ought to refer only to an objectively verifiable 
maximisation of the interests of the people involved, or at least a minimisation of the harm 
that could occur to those interests. Furthermore they all share a conviction that such interests 
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and their optimisation can and should be measured objectively in a manner which any third 
party observer would be able to replicate precisely. I have shown how this has become 
entwined with popular and scholarly conceptions of democratic legitimacy as a key 
component of a value of “transparency”, by which governors and agents of the state can 
demonstrate they have acted for public reasons rather than private ones. This has in turn had 
serious consequences for the vocabulary available to scholars of policy and politics when 
they come to consider emotion in this context, even if they are critical of the rationalist 
model of decision making and policy evidence presented by other disciplines and scholarly 
traditions. In attempting to talk about what emotion means in policy making many 
researchers repeat the negative definition of emotion as simply “that which is non-rational”, 
an association which frequently leads to the pathologising of emotion in decision-making, 
most notably in the “neuro” body of policy research. Very few scholars have considered the 
way the concept of emotion positively associates with beliefs, values and behaviours in 
policy work as understood by practitioners. 
Practice-based approaches to studying emotion in policy have for the most part continued 
this trend. This is despite the potential for an empirical focus on the everyday life of policy 
making to pay greater attention to the gap between normative beliefs and behaviours in this 
context. This unwillingness or inability to examine the “emotional” in context derives in 
large part from what the practices of policy are considered to be. Majone’s maxim that 
‘policy is made of language’ (Majone 1989) appears to have been widely adhered to by 
scholars of policy making practice, whether consciously or not, perhaps as a result of a prior 
set of beliefs about the purpose of doing policy in the first place. The tendency to explain 
what policy is through its outcomes and instrumental functions in society – the distribution 
of resources, for example – is understandable when scholars need to clarify the limits of their 
field and of their empirical research. However, this has had two consequences for the study 
of policy making practices which have limited the ability of this scholarship to interrogate 
what emotion is and where it fits into policy work. The first is that on a practical level few 
scholars have looked beyond the verbal, and more specifically the text, to document policy. 
The second is that any behaviours or practices deemed to be disruptive to the process of 
posing and responding to argument and deliberation have tended to be seen as ‘non-
productive sidetracks’ (Fischer 2003, p.177). As scholars such as Thrift (2007) have pointed 
out, this approach does not fundamentally interrogate the idea of the autonomously reasoning 
deliberative political subject, and ignores the non-verbal, somatic, relational and situated 
aspects of what could be considered emotional. 
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In an attempt to address this difficulty in finding definitions of the emotional which reflect 
these relational and non-verbal components in ways that open up the “black box”of non-
rationality I have drawn upon scholarship which takes emotion as its point of departure. 
However, it must be noted that notwithstanding the wide range of literature which examines 
the intersection of power, institutions and individuals in society, notably psychosocial 
studies, there are still fairly few empirical studies which primarily look at decision-making 
and democratic political institutions, rather than the implementation of policy. Perhaps 
because of this, the way categories of political actors are created and perpetuated through 
these relations has not been interrogated as much as scholars’ perceptions of the way power 
of one sort or another is distributed among them. 
My aim for this thesis is to make a contribution to each of these current research challenges. 
Firstly, I empirically examine what is meant by policy participants when they talk about 
“emotion” in everyday life. I have begun with a conviction that in order to meaningfully 
study policy work research cannot only be concerned about “what works”; it must also be 
able to attend to “what matters”. Rather than simply trying to access this through language, 
and particularly written language, I have set myself the challenge of capturing the non-
verbal, non-purposive aspects of the practices of policy. My work reflects the common 
psychosocial concern for the way that power is a something which is fundamentally 
produced in and through relations, but I explore the ways that plays out in making policy 
rather than its implementation. I also use the relational practices of emotion to examine the 
way categories of participants are created, idealised and diminished and what new insights 
this can offer for the study of the complexities of power. More specifically, I look at the way 
rationality and emotion relate in complex ways to cultural ideals about democratic 
governance, including models of legitimacy and fairness. I also explore the different rules 
about “being emotional” and examine if these apply to different types of policy participant 
and under what circumstances. Following Lyth’s (1990b; 1988) lead, I look at how 
institutions and individuals negotiate anxieties about these ideal behaviours and policy 





‘Lie down  
in the word-hoard, burrow    
the coil and gleam  
of your furrowed brain.  
 
Compose in darkness.    
Expect aurora borealis    
in the long foray  
but no cascade of light.  
 
Keep your eye clear  
as the bleb of the icicle,  
trust the feel of what nubbed treasure    
your hands have known.’ 
   Seamus Heaney, ‘North’ 
I stared at these words, handwritten on a piece of paper in my spidery scrawl, for a year. 
When I sat down to write my thesis chapter by chapter in the early autumn of 2013, the very 
first thing I did was pin the end of ‘North’ to the board above my desk. It had got to the stage 
where I could no longer not write, if I might be allowed a double negative, and Heaney’s 
“ocean-deafened voices” had been calling to me for months beforehand. Not-writing, as 
opposed to writing, is a necessary part of the compositional process for me. It’s something of 
a false distinction, because I have spent plenty of time not-writing since I committed myself 
to writing, and I have written constantly and a length during the not-writing phase of my 
research process. But it was time for not-writing to come to an end. I needed to make a 
commitment and I needed to figure out how to do it. Two years of experiences needed to be 
corralled into something that could go out into the world, living a second life through prose. 
Ever since the end of my formal fieldwork in April of the same year this poem had been 
rattling around my head in the way that songs do sometimes. My intuitive choice of poem 
was a reflection not just of the necessity of writing, but also of the way an ethnographic 
project and thesis is in an intimate relationship with its writer. This poem has history for me, 
and was a constant reminder to me throughout the writing process to reflect upon my 
position within the research and within the text. It was also a metaphor which helped me 
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believe in what I was doing and helped what I was doing feel meaningful. It did not just 
evoke what my thesis was; it invoked what it could be. 
In this chapter I would like to explore both the purposive and expressive sides of thesis 
writing and approach the question of methods – how I did what I did and why – in two 
parallel ways. The first of these explorations is perhaps the more traditional in social 
sciences doctorates, which is to proceed from research question to methodology to methods 
logically and teleologically. The overall structure of this chapter reflects this convention, and 
has sections which deal in turn with; ontology and epistemology; ethnographic orientations; 
site and sample selection; reflexivity and positioning within the field; research methods and 
tools; and analysis. The other dimension is less goal-orientated and more precarious, a matter 
of telling the accidental story of a thesis with all of its set-backs and conflicts and 
ambiguities. Heaney’s poem hints at the strange combination of bewildering multiplicity and 
fierce discipline thesis writing demanded of me. This chapter will explain how I have 
attempted to remain true both to the precision required of professional social researchers and 
to the world of my research, a chaotic world which continually thwarted, undermined and 
generally messed with this desire for systematic, closed understanding. It is a story about 
finding a place to stand in the world and in writing as a researcher. Without an account of 
both pressures, there is no honest way of explaining why this thesis looks the way it does. 
Along the way, I will explain how ‘North’ (or the metaphors within ‘North’) came to be a 
part of my thesis. 
3.1 ‘Compose in darkness ’: the ontology of mess  
I have already made a statement about my approach to ethnographic enquiry by starting this 
thesis with a literature review (of sorts). In seeking out ‘a third position, reducible to neither 
one’s own nor the other’s: a view from in-between, from within the shared space of 
intersubjectivity itself’ (Jackson 2002, p.256) I was looking for a particular form of 
ethnographic judgment. It is one that proceeds from practical and social engagement, critical 
of presupposed abstractions and categories, as a way of understanding others. This implies a 
loss of certainty, and even existential unsafety: ‘being obliged to live among others on their 
own terms constitutes a kind of ‘limit-experience’ in which one’s own identity and sanity are 
risked in order to explore the possibility of knowing the world other than one has known it 
before’ (Jackson 2002, p.262). In treating different habits and world-views even 
momentarily as coherent and plausible, one’s own begin to seem less coherent and plausible, 
at least in the sense that they seem obvious and natural and innate. From the outset of my 
doctoral research I had an intuitive grasp of the personal and practical dimensions of this 
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judging stance through living my own tangled social, cultural and political identity and my 
attempts to accommodate it within a school, university and political career. What I was less 
prepared to negotiate, however, was the way this ethnographic stance would interact with the 
expectations of the academy. 
Articulating my ontological and methodological stance as an ethnographer was a difficult 
journey for me, and it would probably be fair to say that I did not find the words to convey it 
even approximately for a very long time. As a result, I struggled to clear my milestones as a 
first-year doctoral candidate. Presenting to my peers in Politics became a form of ordeal 
which I dreaded. Mine was the only thesis that year, and one of very few in the entire subject 
area, to take a more or less “classic” ethnographic approach (“deep hanging out” in 
Clifford’s somewhat disparaging phrase (1997, p.56) which Geertz rehabilitated (1998)) and 
as a result much of my audience were unfamiliar with the conventions, methods and 
principles of ethnography.  I was expected to be able to calmly and clearly delineate my 
research question, my sample size and profile, my data collection tools and my analytical 
process. Things, concepts, stages, units of analysis were expected to be discrete and 
contained. But try as I might, things just kept on popping out of the clever little boxes I made 
for them, and my peers were unable to help stuff them back in. I was distressed by this, 
partly because I wanted to excel academically, partly because I knew that demonstrably 
“methodical” research design made a big difference to how seriously a piece of research was 
taken outside the academy, and because I was convinced of the importance of intellectual 
clarity about these matters in social inquiry. Becoming an ethnographer should not imply 
laxity about them, a conviction I still hold. And yet I somehow interpreted my project’s 
inability to “fit” not as a sign that the topic was unknowable or that my research problem was 
invalid, but that I needed to try harder, to find the right way of representing it. The stage was 
set for a distressing phase in which the happenings of the practical and social world I 
inhabited as a researcher (full of funding cuts, vague job descriptions, baffling linguistic 
lacunae and sudden and unexplained coming and goings) and my desire for a linear route 
through it as a doctoral candidate became increasingly at odds. This difficulty applied to the 
knowability of the key concepts I was working with (‘What is ”emotion”?’, ‘How can you 
know it?’, ‘Is it your emotion or someone else’s?’ etc.). It also applied to the methodological 
reassurances I was supposed to give, namely that if I built the right machine and fed it the 
right materials, no-one could quibble with the final product.  A proceeds demonstrably to B, 
which proceeds demonstrably to C, and so on. 
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Things came to a climax of sorts about ten months into my fieldwork. My key contact at my 
host organisation had announced her sudden intention to quit with a couple of months’ 
notice, the main source of funding had not been renewed and more jobs were slated for cuts, 
and I was starting to sense panic overwhelming the organisation. My own role in the 
organisation had been revised several times from the original position I had thought I would 
occupy, and while I was still happy that I could do the work I wanted to this was only 
because I had been extremely adaptable and tenacious. This tenacity was starting to wear 
thin. I was finding it harder and harder to get straight answers out of my informants about the 
practical side of the work we did, and plans kept being changed without me being consulted. 
After a series of difficult and potentially reputationally hazardous mishaps thanks to this 
general breakdown in the normal life of the organisation I had a phone call with one 
informant which made the mess of things transparent. I had been gathering potential 
participants and their stories for a slot in an upcoming public event, and had been trying to 
contact a keynote speaker. I was informed by the person on the phone that I wasn’t working 
on this anymore as plans had changed, and the keynote speaker had been contacted by the 
Director anyway.  ‘This place is crazy at the moment,’ my interlocutor said, cheerily, by way 
of explanation. I was stunned, left without a proper area of responsibility in the organisation 
and wondering how I could do my research. But I was also personally upset: I was offering 
to work for free, and I had considerable experience they could have drawn upon, but they 
were making bad use of me. Unable to be resilient and professional any longer, I flew down 
the stairs to my supervisor’s office and angrily unloaded all my outrage and incredulity on 
him, while he looked rather taken aback by my loss of composure. I noted in my journal on 
that day that I had thumped the back of a chair; a hint at the physical potential of my anger.  
Underneath it all was a loss of confidence and an anxiety about how I could make the case 
that this was a “proper” piece of research. Once we had got around to exploring these 
anxieties, my supervisor suggested; ‘Perhaps this is the work, Rosie. Perhaps this is policy 
work. Perhaps you need to bear witness to it’. His point was that if you research the real 
world, the real world will confound your theoretical models and frameworks in ways that 
surprise but do not necessarily delegitimise your scholarly aims. Not only that, we went on to 
discuss, perhaps this was where “emotion” happened; not just in discrete and containable 
moments where the self and the other can step back from the work of policy, but in raw, 
unpredictable and uncontainable streaks. I felt like I had found a metaphor for talking about 




‘A slippery phenomenon, one that changed its shape, and was fuzzy around the 
edges. … Something which wasn’t definite. That didn’t have a single form. A fluid 
object. Or even one which was ephemeral in any given form, flipping from one 
configuration to another, dancing like a flame.’ (Law 2004, p.5)  
I had always worried that my determination to study something which was not only 
contested in policy and political studies literature but which was most often present only in 
its absence was the sign of an academically illegitimate project. Just like Law and his 
colleague, I was trying to catch hold of a flickering flame, “a slippery phenomenon”. Law’s 
decision to embrace this radical uncertainty reflected a conviction that “methodological 
moralising” is only one possible response to the ambiguity of the object of study; that is to 
say, insisting that ‘things should be clear, either because they needed to be put right, or 
because they really were clear all along and our methods weren’t understanding them’ (Law 
2004, p.5). The complex and ephemeral does not necessarily equate with the meaningless in 
social life, but Law argues that too often social researchers confuse these qualities with one 
another because we are accustomed to expect our research to make social “reality” clearer 
and less ambiguous. Indeed, we may argue it is the justification for doing what we do, and 
measure its quality against that outcome. Law puts this way of thinking even more bluntly; 
‘If findings are vague, then it isn’t reality that is vague, but those doing the research. They’ve 
failed’ (Law 2004, p.6). But this isn’t an ontologically robust way of thinking about research 
and the world. If reality can be vague, social researchers have a duty not to obfuscate that 
simply because it makes them professionally uncomfortable. It was becoming clear that I 
would not be able to do that anyway, at least not in any straightforward way. To clarify, what 
I am saying is not that “policy” or “emotion” are too hard to capture, or that I was not up to 
the job, but that they are fluid, mercurial things with fuzzy edges and my research data and 
findings represent that fact. My commitment to an ethnography of “in-betweenness” had 
always had that overlapping and inexactitude built into it. I was ‘composing in darkness’, 
trying to feel the shape of things that perhaps have no clear outlines. The question now was: 
how to collect data and analyse it in such a way that worked with this in-between fuzziness 
without abandoning any sense of meaning? 
3.2 Whose ethnography? 
Ethnography such as this one which takes place within a culture – and indeed a subculture – 
the researcher is familiar with or identifies with relies heavily on the researcher’s capacity 
for making things strange, and there have not been too many insider ethnographic accounts 
of policy making and policy makers. It might be said that there is a fundamental 
incompatibility between ethnographic inquiry and the knowledge claims of States and their 
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bureaucracies; ‘It is a kind of cosmopolitan claim: to stand above the specifics of one’s 
institution and social context. Ethnography erodes that claim’ (Kuus 2013, p.54). Acting as a 
“professional stranger” (Agar 1996) is not only difficult for the researcher, it is challenging 
to the researcher’s informants. However, this perhaps underestimates how well “we” 
(modern Western policy makers) know ourselves, how much we are actually strangers to 
ourselves in many ways, and how willing people can be to explore this. My use of the rich 
psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic literatures addressing exactly this strangeness is an 
attempt to open up some critical distance from these knowledge claims from within the 
traditions of thought I and my informants have reference to. 
Psychosocial studies is an extremely broad field, and I want to focus here on the way it has 
been applied to explicitly political contexts, and particularly the practices of governance. The 
application of this approach to the world of “capital P” politics, political institutions and the 
groups and individuals primarily seeking to change policy and politics has apparently been 
fairly rare, with a few notable exceptions (Evans 2003; Lewis 2004).  In Chapter 2 I 
provided an overview of psychosocial research in policy studies, concluding by agreeing 
with Hoggett’s srgument that such approaches have sometimes been too “top-down” in their 
epistemological position and that a more dialogical approach is appropriate in ethnography 
(Becker et al. 2012). I was clear from the outset that I was investigating the silenced category 
of emotion and the emotional in policy work with no  privileged knowledge; as an inhabitant 
of the social world of policy work I was going to have to figure this out in dialogue with the 
interpretations offered by my participants. As a result, my research owes a significant 
epistemological and ontological debt to the institutional ethnography tradition, particularly as 
articulated by Dorothy Smith (2005). I was acutely aware both of the lack of consistency and 
consensus about the meaning of emotion in academic policy studies literature and, frankly, 
of my own inability as a policy worker to articulate clearly what I meant by “emotion” in this 
context. There did not seem to be any justification for deciding what emotion was a priori 
and treating my research as a revelatory or emancipatory exercise in “uncovering it”. It was 
imperative to develop an ethnographic sensibility that ‘means to find out just how people’s 
doings in the everyday are articulated to and coordinated by extended social relations’ 
(Smith 2005, p.36). I was deeply implicated in the practices of policy as an NGO policy 
manager of some years’ standing, and I re-entered policy work in a similar professional 
capacity to conduct my fieldwork. As a researcher I stood within the world of my research, 
creating meaning intersubjectively in dialogue with the people I worked alongside. 
Furthermore, institutional ethnography, in common with Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis, 
has a commitment to ‘pushing the boundaries of conventional divisions between the micro 
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and macro’ (Smith 2005, p.36). However, the institutional ethnography approach provided 
certain conceptual limitations as well as advantages. These came into relief during the 
conduct of my research. Institutional ethnography’s emphasis on the text as the prime locus 
of power and authority and hence the ultimate field of analysis does not provide much 
opportunity to examine that which is not written down. Attending to these non-textual parts 
of policy proved crucial to observing the “emotional”: the oral, the embodied, the silent. 
It’s all very well to be convinced of in-betweenness in the abstract, but the personal perils of 
it were brought home to me as I began to negotiate the parameters of my research at the start 
of my fieldwork. I initially wanted to take up a position as a participant observer, sitting full-
time within an organisation with its staff. When I was eventually successful in securing an 
organisation’s approval in principle to conduct my research there, but the staff did not see 
the relevance of “being there” all the time because they couldn’t see how their work was 
itself emotional. I was refused permission to work-shadow their policy officer on an ongoing 
basis. Initially I disagreed with this decision on an epistemological basis, and personally 
disliked the fact that my research appeared to be being rewritten as “better” research by the 
organisation. I felt I needed to keep control over the design of my research to prove it was 
“proper”. However, on reflection I realised that, so long as I was aware of what was 
happening, I was being presented with an interesting research opportunity. I had my ideas 
about what ethnography was – deep hanging out – and also about what emotion was and 
what policy was and where I would find them. The organisation’s staff had their own ideas. 
But somewhere between these ideas was an interesting discussion waiting to be had, since 
‘the discovery of obstacles to access, and perhaps of effective means of overcoming them, 
itself provides insights into the social organisation of the setting or the orientations of the 
people being researched’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, p.41). The staff weren’t 
disengaging from the project, but suggesting that I cede some control to them to establish 
some key concepts. By observing that process I would learn a great deal of how emotion was 
thought about in practice by the Partnership staff, and probably by many of their colleagues 
in government and other NGOs. Not only that, but they were also offering to introduce me to 
the places and the people they deemed to be essentially “emotional”, which was likely to be 
very productive from a research point of view. The places and the people that were presented 
to me in those first months of fieldwork as suitably “emotional” were always, without 
exception, ones in which activists and “grassroots” contributors were the main focus. This, in 
turn, provided me with an opportunity to ask them about why they didn’t believe there was 
any “emotion” to observe in their everyday office life or their meetings with civil servants.  
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Kuus talks about the difficulties of negotiating access to conduct ethnographic research in 
diplomatic contexts, but the broad point about power and the parameters of research applies 
to any policy field: 
‘A diplomat who specialises in security policy is unlikely to be enthusiastic about a 
project that involves “deep hanging out” in work settings. Even mentioning “deep 
hanging out” in this context amply illustrates the origins of the phrase in a particular 
set of power relations that is not applicable in foreign policy settings’ (Kuus 2013, 
p.54) 
Ethnographic practice has to take account of these specificities and power relations. This 
thesis is not just “my” ethnography; it is also my informants’ ethnography, regardless of their 
qualifications for conducting one. It was changed by the organisation and its inhabitants and 
interlocutors, continually and over time. The parameters of this research and its key concepts 
have been constructed between my own aims or needs and those of my informants. Nowhere 
was this more evident than in the way the concept of an ethnographic field was constructed 
in negotiation with the everyday practice of my informants. 
3.3 Constructing a field in context  
Ethnographers are notoriously reluctant to write prescriptions for ethnographic method. In 
contrast to methodologies which define themselves according to the suite of techniques and 
processes commonly employed by researchers in that tradition, ethnography is commonly 
described as an ‘seeing with an ethnographic sensibility’ (Pader 2014) (emphasis my own). 
Ethnography appears to resist cataloguing along research methods lines. As a first-time 
ethnographer I was left terrified by the lack of a reassuring process with a clear beginning 
input and end output implied by Pader’s description of this sensibility. The interpretive 
ethnographic methods literature I read  seemed to advocate a way of being in the world 
rather than any specific steps I might take to guarantee that sensibility: ‘a feeling, an 
excitement, and a deep appreciation, even maybe a bit of awe, that human groups create the 
intricate, rich, and dynamic structures of living we call culture’ (Pader 2014, p.205). This 
disciplinary reluctance to prescribe research tools or articulate what successful outputs look 
like makes an ethnographer’s attempt to construct a persuasive rationale for their research 
approach harder perhaps than for those referring to more procedurally-defined literatures. At 
the research design stage of my thesis, trying to persuade my colleagues that my work was 
practicable, robust and credible, I was dismayed to continually read that, in the words of 
Hammersley and Atkinson, ‘the course of ethnography cannot be predetermined… Research 
design should be a reflexive process which operates throughout every stage of a project’ 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, p.24).  
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Uncomfortable as it was for me at the beginning, it appeared that an ethnographic sensibility 
was not something that I would start out with as a prerequisite for doing a “good” 
ethnography, but was something I would hopefully acquire as I learned to be in the world in 
such a way that allowed me to make visible what was currently invisible, in this specific case 
the emotional in public policy making. I was likely to not have it at the start and learn to do it 
through experimentation in the field. In order to achieve this I needed not a static plan but a 
strategy for action: 
‘An ethnographic strategy involves collating an initial set of ideas that the 
ethnographer can carry into the field, use to negotiate access, adapt as the research 
progresses, scrap if necessary or stubbornly stick to at times when it appears that the 
ethnography might be under threat’ (Neyland 2008, p.26) 
This conceptual distinction between a strategy and a plan was an important one in the course 
of my research, as my ethnography proved to be almost constantly under threat from a 
variety of sources, including; funding crises; organisational contraction; political upheavals 
such as ministerial reshuffles; redundancies; and more personal matters such as moving 
cities. Seen as a plan relying on perfect execution for its legitimacy, my research was 
doomed. Seen as a strategy for exploring the world with an ethnographic sensibility, my 
research was an exciting and academically productive place from which to witness political 
life. Because of its evolving and embedded nature, this ethnography resists any attempt to 
filter out what might be called the “background noise” of policy work, because these 
ephemera contributed to my growing understanding of the world of my research. Therefore 
this thesis is not just an account of a problem that I chose to research. Because of the 
embedded nature and focus of the research, it is inevitably a representation also of the 
unravelling of a group of people’s much-cherished project and a traumatic fifteen months in 
the life of a political organisation and its staff. It took place against the build-up to what 
surely must be one of the most definitive and fractious events in recent Scottish political 
history, the 2014 independence referendum. It also took place in the third year of “austerity”, 
a euphemistic term for the deepest cuts to UK public spending in at least thirty years, and the 
seventh year since the collapse of Lehman brothers and the beginning of the “credit crunch”. 
The wider social and political context is of enormous relevance to understanding the life-
world of a political campaigning organisation. It is an explicit and self-conscious component 
of the knowledge required to do the job of working in policy. 
Narrowing the focus of my ethnographic site somewhat, I found my route into policy work 
in Scotland through the ethnographer’s customary combination of accident, networks and 
design (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996). Whereas “traditional” ethnographic studies have 
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been seen as bounded in some spatial or temporal way (a village, for example), as 
ethnography has responded to global or trans-local phenomena other ways of configuring the 
field have tried to account for the movement of ideas, people, resources or other things of 
interest; ‘they include “follow the person”, “follow the object” and “follow the metaphor”’ 
(Burrell 2009, p.182). My experience of working in policy framed my expectations of “the 
field” I was about to enter as one in which I would have to “follow the practice” or “follow 
the action”. I was aware of the potential for policy work to be distributed, networked, non-
local and uncontainable within working hours and job descriptions. As a consequence, the 
constructed nature of the concept of “the field” in ethnographic fieldwork was particularly 
unignorable for me in the context of my chosen research topic. ‘Multilocal projects… draw 
upon some problem, some formulation of a topic, which is significantly translocal, not to be 
confined within some single space’ (Hannerz 2003, p.206): the multi-local nature of my field 
needed to reflect the daily practices that constitute the making of policy. Defining a field as a 
place or time was less important perhaps than finding a place to stand and a role to play in 
relation to others involved in policy making. At the point at which I was approaching people 
in Scotland to negotiate becoming a participant observer in their policy work, I reflected: 
‘I am keen to locate myself primarily within a policy structure rather than within a 
particular organisation or group. My aim is to observe how a range of actors use the 
policy process and interact within it with regard to their shared emotional life. The 
networks around a Parliamentary committee or a civil service task force would 
afford me the flexibility to move between different participants’ perspectives and 
would tolerate a “freelance” participant like myself. In terms of physical practice I 
will be located in a range of sites, as I intend to observe both plenary meetings and 
also the daily practice of a small number of informant’s working lives.’ 
What I was trying to get at in this statement was that I wanted to observe something – 
“emotion” – which was hard to define and not conventionally supposed to be present in 
policy making. I suspected that the best way of starting conversations and becoming more 
sensitised to “the emotional” in policy making was to have the opportunity to observe and 
talk to as wide a range of actors as possible from a position which was not too rigidly 
defined, but which gave me some license to talk to these policy participants in such a way as 
was sanctioned to be somewhat mercurial. As I began to contact people who worked in 
policy, it became clear to me that in order to locate myself in policy at all, and in order to 
have a presence in policy, I did need to be located within an organisation. The construction 
of the field for me thus became in large part about finding an organisation whose work was 
positioned in-between perspectives and interests in policy formation. 
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The process of defining a field was made yet more complicated by my own background 
working in policy before I returned to academia; had I ever really “left the field” and, if not, 
did it compromise my ability to conduct research within it? ‘Such “native ethnographers” 
make it difficult to speak of access in conventional terms, particularly when they study their 
own communities’ (Harrington 2003, p.597), and I was aware of both the advantages and 
pitfalls of exploiting my existing identity and contacts. I had considered requesting 
permission from my previous employers in London to remain as their policy manager and 
conduct my research from within that position. Apart from the practical challenges of 
conducting a three-year project from within an organisation which had lost most of its 
funding and had no obvious means of paying its rent for the coming year, I felt uneasy about 
the demands such an arrangement would make on the professional relationships I had built 
up in that role. I was the only policy specialist in a small organisation, working in a small 
sector: if I just started to write about my everyday life confidentiality would be obviously 
impossible, given the relational nature of the research I wanted to conduct. I also knew that 
at some point my loyalty to my research or my organisation would be set at odds with one 
another, and I would struggle to defend either choice. I wanted ideally to start with a new 
role in a new organisation, preferably in a slightly different policy context. Scotland seemed 
a good place to look, as my skills were transferable and the progress of funding cuts were a 
year or so behind those in London and I stood a better chance of finding a suitable, stable 
host organisation. I was very familiar with the broad political landscape of Scotland, having 
worked as a journalist there some years before. I emailed policy contacts in Scotland or with 
Scottish connections I had met through my previous role, asking not that they take me on but 
that they introduce me to other contacts that might. In the end, someone I had worked with 
on research projects in London put me in touch with a person who worked in policy at an 
organisation I shall refer to throughout this thesis as the Partnership. We shared an alma 
mater – Edinburgh – and even a dissertation supervisor. He was intrigued by my topic, and 
my background working in Scotland and London. We exchanged emails, met at the 
University of Edinburgh to discuss my work, and he made my introductions to the director of 
the Partnership. In principle, the director said he was interested in my research too, and 
invited me to send him an outline research proposal. The Partnership was to become my 
place to stand within policy for the next two years. 
The Partnership is an independent umbrella group for a range of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), community groups and individuals whose focus is broadly on the 
causes and consequences of poverty. The Partnership’s purpose is to pool resources and 
influence from across these organisation to campaign for the eradication of poverty in 
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Scotland, and it uses various tools to achieve this; research; convening standing discussion 
groups and networks; lobbying at Scottish, UK and European levels, depending on specific 
circumstances; publishing briefings, reports and position papers; holding events for the 
public, civil servants, parliamentarians and the voluntary sector to debate public policy 
matters; and briefing and influencing the media. At the time I began my field work there in 
February 2012, the Partnership had eleven full-time or part-time staff; when I left in April 
2013 this had reduced to seven staff members. Of the original eleven staff, three were full- or 
part-time policy officers, four were community organisers/ researchers, two were 
administrators and the rest performed coordinating roles or had specific areas of 
responsibility which combined the above functions in various ways. It was governed by a 
board drawn from its membership, who met regularly and appeared to enjoy constructive 
relations with the Director, Jonathan. The Partnership received some financial support from 
its membership, but owing to the profile of many of its members not all could pay enough to 
make the Partnership financially self-sustaining. Most of the funding which paid for the 
research, community organising and policy work was in fact drawn from grants from 
foundations, from the Scottish or Westminster Governments or from arm’s length State 
funding bodies. This sort of funding was given not to add to core capacity but to fund 
specific projects, programmes of work and other interventions and as a result most staff were 
in effect on short- to medium-term contracts. The Partnership without exception sought to 
fund all its strands of activity in perpetuity and to retain the skills and experience of its staff, 
however, leading to cyclical funding issues which are common in the voluntary sector 
(Kendall 2004). 
My route into fieldwork was through one such externally-funded programme of policy work. 
It had been granted a large tranche of money to run for four years, and it had its own full-
time dedicated policy officer, Louise. She was an experienced policy worker, with an 
international background, and she had largely set up and defined this programme of policy 
work herself, in close collaboration with Jonathan. She also drew upon the expertise of the 
community research officer, Cathy, and the Partnership’s other policy officers, who worked 
part-time. She also collaborated closely with a network of community “fieldworkers” who 
also worked for the Partnership part-time from home and were distributed around Scotland; 
they were managed by Roy from the Glasgow head office. Just as importantly, perhaps in 
some ways more so, she operated within a personally-defined network of contacts who did 
policy work in government, other NGOs and in the media. Jonathan decided that Louise’s 
work was the best fit for me within the organisation, and from the start I was put in touch 
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with her to see if she wanted to take me on. From that point on, I saw little of Jonathan, and 
Louise’s work became my field.  
On the face of it there are problems with this situation; Louise’s relationship with me and my 
research and her personal approach to policy making would loom very large in my research 
and my positioning within the field. Gatekeepers such as Louise can ‘help or hinder research 
depending on their personal thoughts on the validity of the research and its value, as well as 
their approach to the welfare of the people under their charge’ (Reeves 2010, p.317). All of 
these issues of control did indeed crop up between Louise, Jonathan and I. However, I would 
defend the intimacy of my association with a small number of people and my reliance on 
them as collaborators in my research because these circumstances reflect the nature of policy 
making, particularly in a small legislature such as Scotland. There are no formal parameters 
around policy work in the way that there are perhaps in health care or other statutory 
services; there are no requirements which oblige a community of policy makers to include 
someone in their work. The ability to be competent and operate effectively as a policy 
worker relies on personal ties with a relatively small group of people, and policy projects and 
ideas are bound up in the identity of those actors. An investigation of the relational aspect of 
governance needs to accept and work with rather than in defiance of this identification 
between person and role. Louise was her project and her project was Louise; I couldn’t work 
in policy with the Partnership without it being defined and framed by Louise as a person 
with whom I had a relationship. My positioning within the field and my ability to be a 
reflexive policy and research practitioner was crucial to maintaining some critical distance 
about these relations, however. 
3.4 ‘Keep your eye clear as the bleb of the icicle’: relations 
within the field  
One consequence of dealing with such a distributed and diffuse, multi-sited ethnographic 
field was that questions of access and identity in the field were subject to constant definition, 
negotiation and renegotiation. When an ethnographer constructs their site as a village with a 
governing hierarchy, questions of access, consent and power can be seen as relatively binary, 
regardless of the possible complexities behind that governance structure. Such a research is 
either in or out, accepted or rejected, socially competent or socially incompetent, they have 
either “entered the field” or “left the field”. Success as an ethnographer is commonly defined 
as becoming a competent member of a community: 
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‘The ethnographer, on entering the field site, works to transition himself or herself 
from outsider to insider, becoming accepted as a quasi member of the society under 
study on an equal footing to others of similar social standing’ (Burrell 2009, p.182) 
In common with many other scholars, including Burrell, I would argue that this is a 
simplistic understanding of what occurs between researcher and informer in the process of 
ethnographic research. I would also agree with Jackson (1998) that such an attitude to the 
aim of ethnographic understanding – to acquire an ability to “pass” for someone else’s 
subjectivity – is both empirically unproductive and existentially treacherous. I understand an 
ethnography, particularly an ethnography of “emotion” in modern Western governance, as an 
investigation of relations and therefore of my own and others’ being-in-the world, ‘a domain 
of inter-est (inter-existence) and intercorporeity that lies between people… Relation is prior 
to relata’ (Jackson 1998, p.3). Although this may sound abstract and impractical, this 
understanding of ethnography has very practical groundings indeed when applied to the 
question of how power, meaning and identity intersect in ethnographic research. To say that 
the practice of framing the project and its relations was intersubjectively worked out also 
suggests that the practices of being-in-the-world in relation to each other were subject to 
similar negotiation. It is furthermore to say that my own position within the field and my 
identity as insider or outsider, powerful or abject, was always being produced and worked 
out in these relations, in reference to but always exceeding pre-existing categories I and 
others brought to our interactions. 
To take one dimension of my positioning within the field as an example, I am English. I 
would like to qualify that statement shortly, but in the context of the research I was 
conducting in Scotland and during the long build-up to a referendum on independence called 
by a nationalist party, I was commonly identified as English by informants. I was aware of 
this partly through the way that many informants would explain Glaswegian idiom to me or 
explain Scottish politics to me, although I was never in need of either intervention. People 
heard my accent and assumed I wouldn’t understand, however, and that I was different. A 
few informants, such as Jenny, took care to point out how “Scottish” people were “different” 
to “English” people because of certain traits they perceived to set these two groups apart. In 
Jenny’s case, she answered my query about why I had observed a certain reserve about 
refusing unreasonable requests by saying ‘that’s very Scottish’.  I was struck by her 
precision; she was claiming this trait as something that I might not necessarily possess or 
understand as an English person. I was also surprised by how she had assumed this was 
something I had only observed during my fieldwork in Scotland. She was aware of my 
previous jobs in London and I had actually been reflecting on something I considered to be a 
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common phenomenon. These were relatively benign occasions in which my own 
understanding of my position in the field and that of others were somewhat misaligned. 
Nevertheless, I experienced these interactions as somehow negating and upsetting, and one 
particularly extreme example of this sense of being “Englished” threw what was at stake into 
relief. 
At a large public event to discuss the Partnership’s work I was helping pass the roving mike 
around a floor discussion. At one side of the room was a sort of dais at which six people (two 
women, four men) sat. These were politicians – MPs and Members of the Scottish 
Parliament. A man in a wheelchair was selected to speak by the chair. I was the nearest 
roving mike and I went up beside him to hand him the microphone while trying to balance 
my notebook on my hip and take notes. I wrote: 
‘When he begins his voice is thin, high-pitched, lisping… just not right in some way. 
Malformed, and it makes you feel for him as this is an exposed thing to do if you 
don’t have a stereotypical commanding voice. ‘Why should we listen to the 
ENGLISH government? They’re turning their ears away from the people,’ he begins, 
in broken and lisping but emphatic tones. He continues, struggling to get it out 
clearly: ‘When Scotland has her independence, I’d like to see England wiped off the 
face of the earth.’ 
[Silence for 5 seconds] 
There is barely audible intake of breath. I can’t help it, or maybe I don’t want to. I 
give the man a look that must reflect some of what I’m feeling – I mean that word 
literally. My heart is beating hard and I want to shout at him. I’m offended not just 
because England’s where I’m from but also because of the bigotry of it all. I’ve 
never been so close to shouting out, but I can’t – because no-one has even batted an 
eyelid. The nastiness of the moment hasn’t been acknowledged at all. The chair 
doesn’t say anything, the politicians don’t move, nor do the audience. I feel unsafe in 
an acute way. I make do with taking the mike off him like it’s covered in shit as what 
else can I do?’  
Later on, one of my fellow workers at the Partnership did come up to me in a quiet moment 
and express displeasure that I had had to listen to this. Somewhat ironically, this man was 
monickered “Racist English Guy” however. It was intended to be shorthand for who he was 
“racist” about (the wrong word, I think).  
So now it is perhaps time to introduce myself, or at least a version of me. I am white, pale, 
blue eyed and more or less blonde. I grew up on the Sussex coast, the daughter of two 
teachers, and I have a fairly unremarkable, vaguely RP accent. I have a degree from a 
Russell Group university. At the time of my fieldwork I was unmarried but in a long-term 
heterosexual relationship, had no children and was in my early thirties. These markers 
perhaps pointed to an “iconic other” for my informants, one which does not necessarily 
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mirror my own experience of myself and the world. These markers also hide complexities. 
Neither of my parents are English; both have Irish roots, via Scotland. I was brought up in a 
Dissenting tradition but my mother and several of my relatives are or have been Catholic; I 
had to attend an Anglican primary school. Others may hear me as just “Southern” or 
“English”; I can tell the difference between an Essex accent and a Brighton one and a Dorset 
one and where I am from such distinctions form an important part of the local identity. I did 
not go to public school. The town I am from is very proud of its republican and radical 
liberal traditions. Notwithstanding my possible outward “vanilla” appearance, for a variety 
of reasons I experience myself as rootless, hybrid, confused and difficult.  
I am unsure whether I would pass any test of Englishness, since I am not sure if I really grew 
up in England as I usually see it represented either side of the Scottish border. Certainly, I 
don’t recognise the iconic otherness (or sameness) of “England” on offer in the context of 
my research as a place that feels like home. Nevertheless, I had been “Englished” repeatedly 
during my fieldwork and it was a fight to hold on to my belief in my own experience of 
myself and the world and to find ways of talking and writing about my Englishness which 
did not ignore my interlocutors’ ideas about it or my own. I was not in any immediate danger 
as I stood listening to “Racist English Guy”, and at the time I told myself that I should see 
this as something I should rise above. Perhaps this was an attempt to regain some self-
determination and agency by a member of a marginalised group. Was I not the “powerful” 
one here: did my “Englishness” not confer that on me? But the silence around me in the 
plenary refracted the relations I had with the categorical otherings around me in a way that 
frightened me. Power is not contained within categories but produced in specific social 
relations. On a local basis, such otherings can create new negations and new abuses. A few 
years ago, one of my much older, more senior male colleagues in Glasgow told me as we 
walked out of a pub into a dark and empty side street that he believed English girls were 
more sexually adventurous than Scottish ones, and he grabbed my arm, telling me that I 
should come back to his house and get high with him. My construction as “other” can grant 
all sorts of powers to those around me in embodied and situated relationships, even if the 
category I am allotted by myself or others maps to an oppressive and all-powerful position in 
the abstract. I am mindful that if this can be true for me, it can be true for those that I other in 
turn. 
‘As long as culture is invoked as the discursive means of drawing and redrawing boundaries, 
vast areas of human experience and reality are going to be suppressed, abolished, and 
ostracised’ (Jackson 2002, p.118). As much as my ethnography needed to enter into an 
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understanding of this “Scottishness” constructed in opposition to an “Englishness”, my 
presence in those spaces and in this text was as an impossibility, or a pariah, to both these 
identities and nations. A component of my ethnographic practice has been a fight to hold 
onto that impossible sensibility, to be difficult and in-between the several truths I met and to 
continue to locate my existence between them. This was a fight to ‘keep my eye clear as the 
bleb of the icicle’ as Heaney put it, an image suitably lacking in submissive empathy but full 
of ethnographic judgement. This was Heaney’s commitment as a Northern Irish writer, and it 
is no accident that I have drawn upon his experiences to understand my own. There are 
overlaps in our writing projects, my own fractured familial experience of Ulsterness 
triangulating the claims made by Scottishness, Englishness and Britishness, and perhaps 
undermining all of these terms in the process. 
This is to say that, in recognising another’s experience and existence, you do not face a 
choice between their voice or your own. It is a search for a new voice which can speak to a 
changed understanding. My thesis does not claim to allow unheard voices to speak directly 
and to retract my own voice because I do not think ontologically and practically it can do 
this. Such an attempt would revert to imitation, a dishonest imitation at that. It is instead an 
attempt to find a metaphor, or perhaps a series of metaphors, for talking about social life. 
The metaphor is a mode of understanding: 
‘One crosses to and fro between one’s own standpoint and the standpoint of another 
dialogically, availing oneself of common images or tropes to compare one’s 
experiences with the experiences of the other. The result is a rough overlapping that 
uses the inexactitude of metaphor … to open up conversation, to break an impasse, 
to close the distance between self and other’ (Jackson 2002, p.259) 
A metaphor is a way of talking about similarity without implying sameness. For this reason, 
metaphor – and therefore poetry – became very important for representing my research and 
ideas like emotion more generally.  
Questions of permission and consent reflected this complex landscape of power and the 
intersubjective being-in-the-world implied by my understanding of social meaning. At the 
encouragement of my supervisors I was glad to approach the issue of consent in my 
fieldwork in a less pseudo-contractual way than the University’s ethics assessment form 
presumed I would, boldly saying “No” when asked if I had sought written permission from 
my research “subjects”.  The research plan I sent to the Partnership at the project’s inception 
stated my position on written consent forms clearly: 
‘I feel they don’t recognise the fact that I will develop a relationship with the group 
and individuals which is bound to change throughout the life of the project. What 
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may be fine to informants in one context might shift over time and not be fine in 
another and they should feel free to suggest changes to the way we work throughout. 
From the outset I will be explicit in saying that I want to build and maintain 
relationships based on mutual trust and respect and if at any time either party feels 
that new working practices should be explored we are all free to do so.’ 
The Partnership’s staff, as gatekeepers of the strand of policy work I participated in, were 
relaxed about consent to the point of alarming me, however, assuring me that I and my field 
work didn’t need to be explained to anyone from outside the organisation who might happen 
to attend their events. They regarded their own explicit permission as sufficient to be taken 
as tacit permission from attendees, since they all attended knowing that their contributions 
could be recorded and transmitted to third parties anyway. I said that I was uncomfortable 
with this, since the sorts of uses I might have put their contributions to were different to the 
Partnership’s. In the end, we negotiated that they would explain who I was at the start of 
each meeting or event, that I was here to observe what was happening to write a doctoral 
thesis, and if anyone wanted to ask questions or raise objections they should raise their hand. 
From the very first meeting I attended I realised that the way the Partnership ran its events, 
and the relationship it had with its attendees, meant that there was little risk of anyone 
feeling corralled into participation against their will. Just as I had discovered with the 
Partnership itself, saying “no” was not taboo. People actively asked questions about my 
work, although never very many, and never objected to my presence. They also proved more 
relaxed than I did about the idea others might find out that they had spoken with me and 
what they had said. I in fact discovered that Partnership and Scottish Government staff 
members had been comparing notes about their experiences with me half way through the 
research. I have ensured that any disclosure of this nature is my informants’ choice, 
however; all names of people and organisations have been changed throughout this study and 
identifying details such as locations of events or Scottish Government employees’ 
departments have been omitted if necessary. 
Although plenty of informants expressed an interest in the eventual findings of my research, 
no-one ever had much interest in looking through a transcript of any interviews I conducted 
and I quickly gave up raising the possibility with people. I did discuss the matter with Louise 
and other members of the Partnership’s staff, who didn’t feel they needed or wanted to 
plough through a long transcript of an interview. On another level this stance was also a 
pragmatic decision: I did not see any legitimate way of cordoning off interview transcripts 
from the wider pool of materials and observations I would also draw upon and this had 
consequences for confidentiality. I was always aware that discrete, formal interviews would 
only be a small part of the data that I used. As time went on, I began to question their 
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usefulness more generally and made less and less use of them. I became convinced that there 
was something very tokenistic about offering transcripts for informants to approve when the 
majority of my data that involved them could not be shared in a similar manner. Overall, I 
am conflicted about the ethics of such participant approval for similar reasons to my 
scepticism about written consent forms. I am not sure how far such written consent is in fact 
not about ethics at all but institutional insurance and legal indemnity. It does not remove the 
situated nature of the duty of reflexivity and respect I owe my informants. In setting out to 
research the relational nature of governance, I have to acknowledge that power is produced 
not through abstract categorisations but through situated and contextualised interactions. 
Deciding who was a priori “vulnerable” and who was not based on their membership of a 
group or possession of a set of characteristics was not ontologically or ethically sound in the 
case of this research.  
For all these reasons, from early in on in my research design I was clear that I was not going 
to run a collaborative project with my informants and that they would not have veto over the 
overall findings and analysis contained in my final thesis. My work and this thesis is not a 
piece of advocacy written as if from within another subjectivity; I believe this to be 
ontologically and ethically undesirable and questionable. Just as I do not have a right to 
never feel offended or rejected during the course of my research, my informants are entitled 
to my understanding but not my uncritical friendship. 
3.5 ‘T rust what your hands have known’: Research 
materials 
Notwithstanding their commitment to an ethnographic sensibility, much of the interpretive 
scholarship on policy and politics focused on the products of policy rather than its generative 
practices and made extensive use of “traditional” one-on-one interviewing and more limited 
use of immersive ethnographic methods such as extended participant-observation (see for 
e.g. Newman 2012; Rhodes 2005; Bevir 2006). Interpretive policy analysis more generally 
has a rich tradition of engaging with the verbal , and particularly the textual, owing to a 
tendency to consider argument as the practice of policy making and politics (see Fischer 
2009; Fischer 2003; Colebatch & Radin 2006; Barnes 2008; Hajer 2005; Durnová 2013; 
Orsini & Smith 2010). As a result of this emphasis on the verbal there is a strong, established 
tradition in policy studies of capturing the words involved in policy, be they spoken or 
written, and analysing them interpretively. It no doubt helps that the tools used for doing this 
lend themselves to description in ways that are relatively easy to assimilate into traditional 
social science research design, in that they are discrete events or artefacts with beginnings 
70 
 
and endings which can be quantified quite specifically (“n interviews, lasting between x and 
y minutes”, “n documents, gathered between x and y, according to criteria z, a, b”). I used 
formal interviews, alongside informal ones, and I also worked with documents, although as 
my research evolved in light of my own analysis and the circumstances under which I 
worked, the way I collected verbal ethnographic material and the way I worked with it 
changed. 
Documents are a key part of the everyday practices of policy making (Freeman & Maybin 
2011), and I was undoubtedly working in a highly literate environment. I knew from the 
outset that I needed to account for the textual in my fieldwork in some way, since this was a 
reflection of the everyday life of policy work: 
‘In the scrutiny of documentary sources, the ethnographer thus recognises and builds 
on his or her socialised competence as a member of a literate culture. Not only does 
the researcher read and write, but also he or she reflects on the very activities of 
reading and writing in social settings.’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, p.133) 
I was unsure exactly how to approach this textuality initially. As I have explained I was 
dissatisfied with the heavy focus on texts as the location of policy practice common to many 
interpretive policy studies. However I was also aware that the scrutiny of the writing 
practices of policy, and of texts as artefacts and mediators of relations between people, was 
not as common as might be expected. The roots of ethnographic enquiry in non-literate, 
radically “other” settings and among people who are assumed to be unknown to the academy 
and unable to speak for themselves in that setting have had consequences for the study of 
political and policy elites: 
‘They place less emphasis on bounded communities in bounded places… Although 
they use the idiom of ethnographic fieldwork and writing, the actual empirical 
analysis is built on a mix of interviews, documentary analysis and some 
ethnographic observation. There is still a veritable glass ceiling on ethnographic 
work’ (Kuus 2013, p.53) 
I have drawn upon written texts and used them as research material as they have appeared in 
the everyday relations of the Partnership’s policy work, for example as emails, as drafts and 
redrafts of policy documents or as tweets or texts. I haven’t sought out documents outside of 
this context; I am interested in the way they mediate and reify relationships that I have 
gathered significant amounts of other forms of material about. I have used the evolution of 
one text in particular to examine how text interacts with other forms of relating and making 
meaning. This was a policy briefing I was asked to compile by the Partnership towards the 
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end of my field work. Key to my treatment of this material was its place in the work of 
policy as an artefact and a piece of material culture, not simply a repository for words. 
In my original research strategy I had placed significant emphasis on clearly defined, 
recorded interviews drawn from a systematically sampled cohort of interviewees who 
represented as-yet-to-be-defined categories of participants. I did not pre-determine the 
categories I would use to find my interviewees as I wanted to allow who is “interesting” to 
emerge from my ongoing dialogue with my theory, data and analysis, I used my own 
theoretically-derived categories member identified categories of policy participant “folk” 
categories that are normally encapsulated in the “situated vocabularies” of a given culture; 
“observer identified categories” are types constructed by an observer’ (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 1996, p.50). In the event three such categories were very clearly and self-
consciously reported by a range of informants; civil servants; activists and NGO workers. 
The Partnership used these categories to ensure diversity and representativeness at its own 
events. I determined that I would interview two informants in depth at roughly the 
beginning, middle and end of my research, to see how their descriptions of emotion, policy 
work and their positioning within it changed and evolved. I approached participants in the 
Partnership’s policy work myself, often after meeting at a public event, and I recorded these 
interviews on MP3 files. I also made notes on my own thoughts or our physical behaviour 
during these interviews. I made extensive use of non-directive questioning as  stimuli to 
talking about a broad area (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, p.117), as much to see how 
connections were made as what eventually got said. My intention was to triangulate my own 
experiences, my theoretical understandings and the observations of others through discussion 
with a range of informants. I felt that one-on-one interviews would give I and my informants 
the time and privacy to explore these things freely and would be clear evidence of the depth 
of my engagement with my fieldwork. 
Once my fieldwork was underway, it became increasingly clear to me that my interviews 
were of more limited practical use to me than I had originally thought. There was a practical 
aspect to this; of the six people I originally intended to interview during the lifetime of my 
project three left their jobs before the end of my fieldwork, and two were unable to find a 
mutually convenient time to follow up with me after their first interview. Instead of the three 
discrete phases of interviewing I had carefully planned around key events in the lifetime of 
the Partnership’s policy programme, changes to the programme of work and staffing plus the 
difficulty of getting one-on-one time together meant that there was one long, somewhat 
ragged series of appointments. My first interviews with some informants were now 
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happening – if they eventually happened at all – after the second interview with others. 
Questions I had asked previous interviewees were no longer relevant. People might not have 
been involved with the Partnership when key events happened so they could not reflect on 
them in the way other interviewees could. There were issues with the interviews of a more 
methodological nature too. As tools to carefully record the patterns of speech used by me 
and my informants my interviews were successful, albeit under somewhat artificial 
circumstances. As opportunities to triangulate my own and other informants’ perceptions and 
conceptualisations with a third party they were reassuringly demonstrable and sometimes 
generated new perspectives or helped to better define concepts that were still protean. These 
interviews had limits, however, as ways of understanding the everyday life of policy work 
and emotion. Many of my participants behaved noticeably differently and spoke more 
guardedly while under interview conditions. Louise in particular shifted in her patterns of 
speech, register and her self-presentation. This last phenomenon was not something I found 
to be easily captured by conventional interview documentation. Jenny, the civil servants and, 
to a subtler but still significant degree, the activists; they all spoke in different ways about 
the same topic if they knew they were being interviewed. I did not feel that this was a 
phenomenon related to trust or confidence. If anything this tendency became more marked as 
interviews went on or I got to know people better. It reminded me of Ulf Hannerz’s 
experiences of talking to foreign correspondents:  
‘There were moments when correspondents came up with some formulation that (I 
suspect) as professional wordsmiths they felt particularly pleased with – and when 
they seemed to steal a glance to make sure I did not miss it’ (Hannerz 2012, p.11) 
I was a researcher in a world where everyone was interviewing everyone else all the time, 
and in general I was dealing with people who were experienced players in the political 
world. Activists were interviewed by journalists, civil servants and NGOs; policy officers 
were interviewed by the media and Parliamentary Committees and each other; civil servants 
may have received some formal media training and would be interviewed by other 
Departments, commissions and committees. Noting the way people talked when they were 
interviewed and when they were not was relevant to my topic, but I realised that I needed to 
be aware I was becoming a part of the way my informants mediated politics and policy 
between one another, however unconsciously. I was conducting research within what 
Silverman describes as an “interview society” (2006), where the interview is one of – 
perhaps the – technology for affirming ‘the speaking subject, with an authenticity guaranteed 
as the author of his or her own life’ (Atkinson & Silverman 1997, p.315). When the lives 
being mediated are also self-consciously political lives, and when the ability to claim 
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authentic authorship of political life is a key part of being a competent political practitioner, 
the social research interview becomes part of the warp and weft of political practice. 
As I began typing up and roughly annotating and coding my first few recordings after my 
pilot phase, it seemed to me that at their best interviews resembled the sorts of conversations 
I had without a microphone running and at their most frustrating were complicated (but 
revealing) dances around the matter of disclosure and displays of political competency. I 
concluded that I should not expend the considerable time and effort necessary for sticking to 
my interview plans rigidly, were that even possible. Grabbing someone while something was 
current was turning out to lead to less stilted, more socially fluent interactions with 
informants. I was convinced of the validity of a more ad hoc approach: 
‘For ethnographers, interviewing, and listening go on all the time. There may not be 
a clear distinction between doing participant observation and conducting an 
interview. A good ethnographer will take any opportunity to listen and to ask 
questions of individuals and groups whilst participating and observing.’ (O’Reilly 
2005, p.115) 
In the end I conducted eight out of eighteen formal interviews I had planned prior to starting 
fieldwork. These eight involved two interviews with two policy officers for NGOs, two 
interviews with an activist, and one interview each with two civil servants. Four of these 
happened in quick succession during the pilot phase of my research and were used to test out 
and critically compare ideas, themes, concepts and terminology around defining the key aims 
of the research. The other four took place within the last six months of fieldwork and were 
used to record and analyse one particular person’s patterns of speech about a specific topic I 
had already heard them mention, because I felt it would generate new insights or redefine old 
ones.  
This shift in emphasis from formal interviews had the contingent effect of placing greater 
emphasis on the journal and fieldnotes I kept. In some senses, this shift was psychological; in 
effect, much of the material I had hoped to find in interviews was actually present in these 
fieldnotes. Nevertheless I was aware that making fieldnotes is an integral part of data 
collection in ethnography and one of the key sources of validity and descriptive depth for my 
project (Sanjek, 1990). There are many dimensions to fieldnotes in ethnographic practice, the 
most obvious being a record of what happened and who said what. Notwithstanding the 
many ways this understanding of fieldnotes is an inadequate description of what such written 
records do and are used for, the physical act of writing down what happened is crucial to the 
plausibility of my eventual findings. I came to ethnographic research used to having to take 
simultaneous notes of “what happened” and particularly “who said what” in contexts with 
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arguably far more at stake than my research setting. As a journalist, my notes were not only 
my sole line of defence against legal charges of libel or corruption. They – not my finished 
articles - also had special status as a historical record in courts of law. I was used to taking 
notes that conformed to such standards and I used some shorthand figures to help capture 
events where necessary. As a policy specialist I was used to taking notes of the procedures of 
events and typing them up into reports that would be scrutinised by my peers and by casual 
participants. I was also aware that it was quite normal for there to be a lot of note-taking at 
policy events and workshops, so this mitigated the intrusiveness of an ethnographic note-
taker.  
These experiences only provided starting points for my note-taking practice, however. I 
needed to adapt as I became more enmeshed in the practices of ethnography more generally:  
‘As analytical ideas develop and change, what is “significant” and what must be 
included in fieldnotes change. Over time, notes can also change in character, in 
particular becoming more concrete and detailed’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, 
p.145). 
In my own case, this change in character can be seen in two different shifts in my fieldnote 
practice. The first relates to my own presence within my notes. I began keeping a journal 
very early on in the research process, which was quite distinct from my formal fieldnotes. 
This was a space for me to give voice to “my” point of view with free reign, without 
worrying about how I was tangling this perspective up with other perspectives. It was partly 
an emotional safety valve, partly a way of opening up some critical distance between me, my 
informants and the hidden “I” of my fieldnotes. The second shift in practice came through an 
ever more concrete and detailed attempt to capture and represent the non-verbal and material 
through words. 
It’s a rather paradoxical situation to want to explore via the written word something like 
emotion which seems to escape language as used in texts. I did consider using other media, 
but quickly decided against them. There were three reasons for this. The first was practical; I 
can carry around a notebook and pencil without fear of circumstance, damage or theft and 
they are quick to set up and put away. I was a broadcast journalist for a while, so I know the 
limitations audio visual equipment places on work in the field. It takes a long time for other 
people to get used to being filmed or photographed and in the hectic, bustling world of 
policy work consent would always be an issue. The closest I got to this approach was audio 
recording semi-formal interviews on my mobile phone, but this was a minimally intrusive 
option and easily made obvious to all participants involved. The second reason I chose 
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writing as a means of recording my data was that I am unconvinced that, in the end, film or 
photography necessarily captures the embodied or experiential any better than text. They are 
authored, edited inscriptions in similar ways to writing: they are mediatisations of 
experience. And the third reason was informed directly by the second: I am extremely 
comfortable with writing and I think I am better at this form of representation than any of the 
others available to me. I stood a better chance of meeting the technical challenge of turning 
experience into expressive representation by writing about it.  
That is not to say that I was dismissive of the scale of those technical challenges, or the 
pressures upon academic writing to abdicate from them.  
‘As those who work with performance have argued, it is partly a matter of textuality. 
Can the ephemeral or the elusive be translated into and made present in textual 
form?... Notwithstanding the aporias it is difficult to remake the real, whatever is out 
there, in ways that do not re-enact its singularity, its anteriority, its independence and 
its definiteness’ (Law 2004, p.9).  
This was the othering I was trying to disturb in my research, and my writing might re-enact it 
all over again. Law suggests exploring allegory, in its widest sense, as a way of changing the 
warrant of sociological writing: 
‘Allegory is the art of meaning something other than, or in addition to, what is being 
said… It is the craft of making several not necessarily very consistent things at once. 
It is the art of crafting multiplicities, indefinitenesses, undecidabilities. 
Allegory might not come in the form of text. But then again, it might.’ (Law 2004, 
p.10) 
So writing field notes was consciously not simply a task of committing “what happened” to 
paper for me. It was an exercise in writing with the ambiguities left in. The sensory and 
somatic experiences are alluded to, evoked, played with. The words people spoke are no 
longer transcripts which betray hidden agendas but pieces of performance in which I and my 
informants and readers are also present.  
As my research progressed, I gravitated towards the ethnographic tradition of assemblage 
(Marcus & Saka 2006), and began reorienting my ethnographic sensitivities towards the non-
textual and non-verbal parts of policy work. I began to think about what I was collecting as 
“material”:  
‘In addition to more conventional notions of “data”, the term “material” is inclusive 
of such things as, information, notes, work, as it were, the “stuff” of research. ….It is 
also suggestive of substance and “worldliness”, if something is material then it is 
grounded and embodied.’ (Gray 2003, p.79) 
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On a practical level, this entailed learning how to capture things that were not to be found in 
texts, or at least which were very hard to access via text. I wanted to stand within the world 
of the Partnership’s policy activities not just as an observer but as a participant in a social 
performance, and performance studies provided some practical ideas for what to pay 
attention to. The concept of dramaturgy itself in contemporary performance studies is a ‘turn 
from a compositional logic based on the primacy of the verbal text, to a logic according to 
which this primacy is not assumed, so that other elements (visual, sonic, physical) may be 
equally significant… one could also consider “dramaturgy”  as a complex network of 
signifiers’ (Turner & Behrndt 2008, p.31). When a critic looks at an event or an interaction 
they pay close attention to the words spoken and the ways meaning is revealed or concealed, 
complicated or contributed to by language. They also look at a number of other things, in 
particular:  
 action (the placement in relation to other people or objects; gestures; facial 
expression; direction of gaze)  
 speech (accent; intonation; paralinguistic phenomena such as pitch and tone 
of voice, speed of delivery) 
 appearance (clothes; hair; make-up)  
 the general mise-en-scène (lighting; props; furniture) (Short 1998, p.12). 
I expanded my collecting of material to note these dramaturgical elements alongside 
linguistic phenomena. I made painfully detailed descriptions of seating arrangements, 
lighting, smells, textures and stains. I started to allow myself to use more unsubstantiated, 
atmospheric adjectives to evoke place and time, such as “depressing”, “bleak”, “brisk” or 
“cheerful” – and then to substantiate them. Actors, directors and set designers put serious 
thought into making a participant in a play feel desolate, but they start with the material 
world around them to achieve this. I began trying to break down what was coming together 
to make the spaces I had experienced meaningful. This was not a happy process at all to 
begin with – I was surprised to discover how uncomfortable I was noting and writing about 
bodies, smells, textures and empty spaces. My fieldnotes had become an exercise in trust, 
specifically trust in the meaningfulness of material things and the non-verbal and the 
meaningfulness of my own experiences of them. 
3.6 ‘Aurora Borealis’: coding, analysing, theorising  
While there are many ethnographic practices around fieldnotes, a heterogeneity which is 
sometimes buried beneath a disciplinary tendency to resist codifying research practice 
(Sanjek 1990), there is a strong preference to see fieldnotes as part of an ‘iterative-inductive 
research’  (O’Reilly 2005, p.203). This means that ethnographic fieldnotes do not just get 
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made and added to a pile of raw data, spurted out like ticker-tape; they have a curious half-
life or undeath as they undergo continual analysis. In turn, this analysis goes back into the 
field as new ideas, concepts or models for the researcher or her informants to conjure with. 
Because of this, separating analysis and analytical processes out from ones of data collection 
and the representation of data is something of a presentational convenience:   
‘Data collection, analysis and writing up (and of course the role of research design 
and theory) are much more inextricably linked in ethnographic research. We 
therefore need a model that looks more like a spiral or helix, that demonstrates how 
analyses and writing up can lead back to more data collection and writing 
down’(O’Reilly 2005, p.177). 
Nevertheless it is important to say something about how I “lived with” my field notes – 
reading and re-reading, writing small bits throughout, and forming impressions and 
descriptions.  
After I had made my notes in the field, I sat down at my desk and typed them up into 
computer files. These were eventually imported into NVivo 10, but in the first instance I read 
through them, annotating them within a Word file as if I was trying to make an index for a 
book I would one day write. This was my way of approaching the question of coding and 
joining together events and statements into a descriptive whole. In many ways this is the 
defining work of ethnography, which sets it apart from repeating unexamined assumptions 
and anecdote; ‘it is the process of moving from lay descriptions of social life, to technical 
descriptions of that social life’ (Blaikie 2000, p.80). I began this indexing process expecting 
to move from codes, to collections of codes, and from these concepts to categories and 
finally to theory, very much in the grounded theory tradition (Glaser & Strauss 1967). This 
was not because I was convinced of grounded theory’s principles or premises, but more 
because I found myself with a practical problem about the lack of definition around my key 
terms. These would have perhaps supplied me with coding frameworks had I been more 
committed to particular interpretations of things such as “emotion” or “policy”. Taking this 
open-ended approach to coding meant that I was able to find a route into my data at an 
analytical remove and begin manipulating it in different ways. The result of this was, 
however, to make me aware  just how non-linear the connections between my codes were. 
Far from providing me with a rationale for reducing my data ever downwards, I was in fact 
starting to see the relations between codes which perhaps would only get lost if I collapsed 
them into categories of things. The other thing this non-linear, associative play between 
codes made manifest was the way that theory was always, already at work in my own and 
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others’ interpretations of the world around us. This was quite at odds with the grounded 
theory steps I had started out with: 
‘Most ethnographers now accept that it is in fact impossible to start out with no 
preconceived ideas , no theories about how the world works, and that the best way to 
be inductive is to be open about one’s preconceptions, to read the literature and 
consider what theories have already been formed on a given topic, then to proceed in 
a manner which is informed but open to surprises.’ (O’Reilly 2005, p.27) 
My methods of working with my materials, by writing an index for a book that does not yet 
exist and imagining the way I can describe the links between the entries, was my way of 
being open to surprises and finding a ‘creative analytic presence’ (Richardson 2000, p.939). 
By relaying the spaces between the index entries, through discussion with my informants to 
generate new materials and through writing for discussion with my supervisors and peers at 
workshops and conferences, I was testing the plausibility and the coherence of those 
connections. 
That tracing of connections is about burying down into not just a text but an experience, 
retracing it, letting it breathe and trying to understand how I came away with the impression 
that I did or others did. This involves close scrutiny of the component parts, but it also 
involves being able to re-knit these back together with a new appreciation for what is so 
mundane it is passed over at first. ‘One looks to see whether any interesting patterns can be 
identified; whether anything stands out as surprising or puzzling; how the data relate to what 
one might have expected...; and whether there are any apparent inconsistencies or 
contradictions among the views of different groups’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, p.163). 
This can be done inductively, as in Glaser and Strauss (1967). But sometimes it is about 
trying to find a way to represent what you can see in the world in new ways, albeit in 
dialogue with pre-existing theories.  
I would like to offer a metaphor about making and remaking meaning with ethnographic 
materials, and it is that of the aurora borealis. There are so many points of light, but no single 
one of them is critically brighter or completely distinct from the others. Sometimes it is 
fruitful to work against them or with them, finding patterns, demanding sense of them, 
seeing echoes of things that, dispassionately, you know have nothing to do with the reasons 
for these lights coming into being. They are just stories I am telling to explain why they 
matter, mostly stories about other things. And sometimes it is far better to stand back and 
just enjoy the display for a bit and let meaning crystallise, through holding open your doubt 
about all these points of light. 
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3.7 ‘Lie down in the word hoard’: data collection, analysis 
and the role of writ ing 
Hidden behind the plans I and my supervisors and informants made was a journey straight to 
the heart of Law’s injunction to represent the mess of life and the mess of research. It would 
be wrong to say that I was not aware that writing would play a significant role in that 
journey, but I was unprepared for its profound scope. I now recognise that, because of who I 
am and because of what Political Studies is, this chapter – this thesis – is unavoidably, 
intimately about writing. It is about how I write, certainly, and it is also about the place of 
writing in my work and the work of those I have in turn worked with. Writing – my own and 
other people’s - became a way of life for the duration of this project. When I designed my 
project, I was going out into the world to process it through writing. When I negotiated the 
relationship I eventually had with my informants, I was negotiating the space and time in 
which to write.  Writing as a way of knowing, as a way of representing and as research 
practice deserves proper consideration at this point. 
From conversations with colleagues I know that practices and conceptualisations of writing 
differ enormously among social researchers, perhaps particularly those who do qualitative 
research.  It is normal, however, to explain your “presentation of data” after you explain your 
research tools in academic social research reports such as this thesis. The implication is that 
there is an uncomplicated relationship between the two: ‘In standard social scientific 
discourse, methods for acquiring data are distinct from the writing of the research report, the 
latter presumed to be an uncomplicated activity, a transparent report about the world studied’ 
(Richardson 2000, p.923). For the ethnographer, however, for whom they are their own 
research tools and their field notes are their data, writing is not just about “writing up”, a way 
of representing data and your thoughts on data. It is also a method of data collection and an 
analytical tool. That is to say it is a piece of your physical and social world, an embodied 
practice. It’s important to understand that what is implied by an iterative approach to data 
collection, analysis and representation is that very frequently the ethnographer is going to be 
doing this through writing. Ethnographers cannot tell the story of how and why they do what 
they do and make what sense they do of it without telling the story of how and why they 
write.  Because of this I want to lift the lid on my own writing practices. 
In doing this, I am foregrounding ‘writing as method of enquiry’, to borrow Laurel 
Richardson’s phrase (2000). The way that social research is written about is a way of 
interrogating research materials and knowledge claims, not merely a way of transmitting 
thoughts about those things. For Richardson this is substantially about complicating the 
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voice of academic knowledge and the things that are transmitted by social science writing: 
‘Casting social science into evocative forms reveals the rhetoric and the underlying labour of 
the production, as well as social science’s potential as a human endeavour, because evocative 
writing touches us where we live, in our bodies’ (Richardson 2000, p.931). I observe that this 
needs a caveat, because only very successful writing is evocative. But even if writing is not 
successfully evocative it can still be a method of enquiry because writing is able to provide a 
landscape of doubt because of the gap between words and texts. I have used writing 
throughout my research to open up my materials and their meaning in ways both creative 
and analytical. 
This is partly about the conventions of my academic discipline – I am obliged to produce an 
account of my work in a bound text of no more than 100,000 words to receive my doctorate. 
If however I had no thesis to produce and no senatus academicus to satisfy I would still try 
and make sense of the world and engage with the world through writing. This text has ideas 
and academic precedents in it, but it absolutely carries pieces of me away into the world with 
it. I’m not alone in having this symbiotic relationship to writing practice among 
ethnographers, but it’s an extreme one and essential part of my research methods. My 
methods for creating a thesis are in part my methods for dealing with life in general. I have 
colleagues who understand their writing as a necessary but auxiliary artefact in the world 
which they load with their finished thoughts. When I reflect upon writing and the words I 
use, however, I reflect upon my relations with myself and the world, even my existence in it. 
In “normal life”, every morning before I open my emails or even read a newspaper or blog I 
write for thirty minutes. At busy or intense times during my active fieldwork I wrote about 
my work during this half hour, my thoughts often flowing on from the unspecified time I 
spent the night before, writing up scratch notes and telling the story of my experiences that 
day. This writing, morning and night, included but did not limit itself to writing up 
transcripts or descriptive notes. It was also aimed at capturing my experience in a more 
somatic and expressive sense. It could be called creative non-fiction perhaps, but with a 
promise to myself not to edit or fuss over it. I just saved it and put it away at the end of the 
session. I kept it totally distinct and in a separate file from my personal journal, which I kept 
up throughout the project’s duration. Some of my commitment to this sort of writing had its 
roots in a desire to try and capture the non-verbal and embodied about policy making. 
However, a considerable portion of this commitment is to do with my own understanding of 
“being there” and my capacity to be fully present in the world around me. When I sit down 
to write, I never know where I will end up or what it is I really want to say. Writing is the 
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contact spark between my fingers and the world. I fully come into being somewhere in that 
spark. 
‘Language is a constitutive force, creating a particular view of reality and the Self… No 
textual staging is ever innocent’ (Richardson 2000, p.925), and becoming an ethnographer 
for me has involved a close examination of how my use of language consciously or 
unconsciously stages a reality and a Self. Or not, as the case may be. I have discovered two 
significant, interesting and persistent problems with the way I write through creating this 
thesis. I say problems, but I am not sure that there are such things as problems when it comes 
to expressive representation. They’re certainly representing something, at least, I have 
realised. They have needed to be addressed head on, however, in what I hope was an 
analytically and interpretively productive way.  
The first problem was that my pronouns were swirling, bewildering inconsistencies. What 
was “we” in one paragraph was “they” or “I” in the next. In some unhappy sentences these 
pronouns were all mashed together, along with “you” and “one”, leaving readers completely 
at a loss as whose story this was and who was its object. Whose ideas and feelings were 
whose is of primary concern in an ethnography, in fact it’s an ethical issue, so I was 
disturbed by this habit of mine when it was pointed out to me. The second great problem was 
that my tenses were as deranged as my pronouns. I – or whoever on earth was the “I” in this 
text – seemed to shift around time and space implacably, bouncing from past conditionals to 
future transitives and back to present continuous in the space of a few words.  
My interpretation of these tendencies is that they reflect two connected fuzzinesses in the 
social world about which I write. As I shall discuss in later chapters, the “emotional 
knowledge” I attempted to represent in this thesis is not something which wholly belongs to 
any one subjectivity. It only comes into itself in between subjectivities and bodies. While I 
fully accept the need for a responsible ethnographer to be explicit about whose perceptions 
of reality are being presented in their writing, my struggles to keep fuzziness about this at 
bay are not symptoms of methodological failure but of an attempt to do a very difficult thing. 
I am trying to tease apart a very enmeshed set of perspectives and experiences. The second 
fuzziness is about when emotion happens, or exists, in writing. Is it something which is 
contained within a bubble of time and space, frozen in a moment, a historically situated 
thing? Is it something which we can only know in hindsight, and which we then name and 
acknowledge and move on from? Is it something which diminishes or changes as time 
passes? Or is it something which is constantly simultaneously being experienced and thought 
of and assimilated and referred to in a reservoir of emotional knowledge? Time and place are 
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very difficult things to be clear about when trying to represent emotion. In writing my notes, 
in rereading them, in writing about my experiences, in writing about my notes, in talking 
about these things to others, I am reliving and re-embodying and adding to and losing 
emotional knowledge. Returning specifically to this thesis, in the end I have decided that 
these two textual fuzzinesses are more hazardous than helpful and I have tried my best to be 
clear when things happened, who experienced them and whose analysis of these experiences 
is being offered to my readers. But I am glad that I was able to work with my earlier, shakier, 
less “rigorous” text first. It is a good example of how my writing is truly a method of 
inquiry, not a presentation of an exquisitely turned thought. It is also a good reminder that 
this text, like other texts, is not innocent, as Richardson points out, but is always performing 






Over the course of this and the following chapters I will examine the way emotion and 
rationality became “split” in the practices of the Partnership’s work as a  way of containing 
conflicts about knowledge and good governance. Specifically, I will outline four key themes 
about emotional knowledge and practice in the forums: 
 A perceived moral necessity of emotional knowledge, as opposed to third-person 
knowledge 
 How different stakeholder groups were associated with particular modes of 
knowledges 
 The way rational and emotional stances were constructed as mutually incompatible 
stances as a way of institutionalising and externalising the split between them. 
 The embodied nature of emotional knowledge and associated practices 
In this chapter I will examine the first two of these findings through the way emotion was 
described in opposition to rationality and “professional” inputs to policy institutions. I will 
address this by looking at the way the civil servants involved in the Partnership’s policy 
forums described their relationship to “emotional” knowledge about policy work and how 
non-civil servant informants described them. In particular I will focus on my interviews, 
discussions and observations relating to two civil servants, Douglas and Craig, who were 
involved in ongoing roles with the Partnership’s programme of policy work and who Louise 
regarded as key contacts. I will also introduce Carla, an activist, whose early discussions 
with me began my process of thinking about emotion and rationality as tied to functional and 
symbolic roles. In the next chapter I will examine the second two key findings I have listed 
here through the way that activists and other “grassroots” participants’ relationship with 
emotional knowledge was described, enacted and conceptualised by me and other people in 
the forum. 
The split in this discussion of emotional and rational knowledge between “professionals” and 
“activists” reflects the way my informants categorised the participants in the Partnership’s 
policy activities into three distinct groups: civil servants, activists and NGO workers. Louise 
had explained at our first meeting with each other that the steering group for her programme 
of policy work was composed of roughly equal numbers of each group. This, she felt, 
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ensured that the steering group was both diverse enough to have the requisite skills and 
experience to adequately steer the programme, and she further believed that this made the 
steering group representative. I realised on analysing my notes that this categorisation 
implied that there were certain qualities inherent in each group of participants that made their 
input into the programme distinctive and necessary.  Coding and categorising my 
observations began for me by looking at how each of these stakeholder groups related to 
three different stances in relation to the world, or “positions” as I coded them, drawing on 
the Head/Hand schema in Sennett (2009) I began my project with, itself owing much to 
Aristotleian ideas about knowledge. These positions were; the “emotional”, pragmatic first 
person (techne); the “professional/ academic/ bureaucratic” third person (rational episteme) 
and a second person position, in which one’s own experiences and those of others or other 
types of knowledge are acknowledged, and what might be called phronesis, applying those 
knowledges to specific situations (Flyvbjerg 2001). In thinking about these positions as the 
adoption of a stance, I tried to get at a representation of something that encompasses both a 
knowing and a doing in policy, and that doing and knowing are related. I also aimed to 
investigate how these modes of knowing and doing, being so incompatible and therefore 
anxiety-provoking, came to be enacted in the practices of the forums. 
4.1 Emotion as knowledge and being-in-the-world 
One early task in my ethnographic process was to try and start to have conversations about 
what I and my informants understood by “emotion” in the context of policy work. I had 
expected to have found that my informants would identify certain behaviours as 
stereotypical, and that certain people would be sanctioned to behave more “emotionally” 
than others. Perhaps, I surmised, women might be “meant” to be more emotional than men, 
older people would have been expected to have been less emotionally labile, and so on. What 
surprised me about the way emotion was articulated to me was the absolute primacy of 
function and occupation in determining who was considered “emotional”. By my 
interlocutors’ own insistence they were grouped into set categories of stakeholders, each 
with different “roles” that symbolised something about their relationship with emotion. One 
of the most direct descriptions of these roles was provided by an activist, Carla, about six 
months into my field work. We had gone for a coffee because I wanted to ask her for some 
practical advice. We had met through the Partnership’s outreach work and she was a long-
standing community activist that the Partnership staff had devoted considerable efforts to 
enabling her to participate. She returned these efforts by being a very conscientious attendee 
of the various forums that they ran and in passing on the various skills she had picked up 
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along the way to others who also wanted to get involved in the Partnership’s policy work. I 
asked Carla for her practical input in spotting the “emotional” and she was very clear and 
unhesitating in her reply: I needed to watch the activists. So the other people involved don’t 
“do” emotion, then, I asked? She affirmed this: 
‘You’ll get more truth from the community activists. […]I think they know from 
experience, where other people only know from what they’ve read or heard, but I 
think the actual person who experiences it can tell it proper.’ 
Carla made it clear that people who worked for NGOs or in Parliament or Government 
would not be bringing any emotional content to the events I attended; ‘I think they just go by 
what they have written down’ she said. She believed that this was the only way that people 
who worked as “professional” policy makers had access to the “reality” of the issues they 
talked about; this was in fact a hallmark of their professional status and part of what made 
them what they were. Emotion was not just a set of behaviours; it was a way of being-in-the-
world which certain embodied experiences could provide, and others by definition could not. 
4.2 Emotional knowledge and morality 
The first time I personally became aware of the divergence in participants’ behaviours and 
expectations around emotion in the Partnership’s work was at the first annual showcase 
event that I attended. This came at the end of the first three months of my fieldwork, and the 
event had been intended as a climax to a pilot phase of my research. I attended as a 
participant observer but in a very low-key way; I was an independent delegate in a 
conference which numbered around two hundred. The annual showcase was a yearly feature 
of the policy strand of the Partnership’s work which I was documenting for my research. My 
understanding of this annual showcase from my briefings with Louise, the Partnership’ full-
time policy officer, and other members of staff is that it had a similar structure each of the 
previous years it had taken place. It was intended to demonstrate the work that the 
Partnership was doing around advocacy and “voice” and impact on policy agendas that 
impacted on poverty in Scotland. Delegates came from the three major stakeholder groups 
the Partnership identified in its strategy documents; Parliament and Government; NGOs and 
similar civil society groups and; “grassroots” volunteers. This last group were typically the 
speakers in the “evidence sessions” convened by the Partnership, which aimed to bring 
policy- and decision-makers into contact with the experiences of people living in poverty as 
a means to influence policy. Anecdotally, while there was some churn year-on-year, there 
were also a large number of return delegates; in particular the “grassroots” attendees were 
likely to be people who had become involved in advocacy and policy work through 
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development projects run by the Partnership and were directly supported in their attendance 
and contributions by Partnership staff and funding. I was particularly keen to observe the 
way these three categories of stakeholder presented themselves and the emotional content of 
their contributions. Through observing and discussing these differences in presentation I 
hoped to begin to analyse the way emotion, knowledge and participant enmeshed in the 
context of the forums. 
As it turned out, my experiences during these two days provided only provisional answers 
and in fact generated several complex questions, particularly around the gap between 
professional role and the person in a more general sense. One episode during the showcase 
event in particular left me uneasy and unable to explain what exactly had taken place at a 
practical, policy-influencing level. The core of this experience was one of the breakout 
“evidence” sessions I attended; this one was about community level responses to poverty. It 
followed the same structure as other evidence sessions – a community or “grassroots” expert 
witness and a Government or civil service representative were introduced by a chair, they 
each gave a brief outline of their take on the matter, and the discussion was opened up to the 
floor. The Partnership’s staff had structured things this way explicitly with the intention that 
by hearing this exchange and debating the matter in a relatively intimate manner new 
insights on all sides would be stimulated and “better” policy would be made. Until this 
exchange I had taken at face value that the chance of “better” policy would be  improved by 
such a set up; as time went on during that afternoon I found myself wondering what we 
believed happened when people shared “their” perspectives and what notions of authenticity 
and the status of knowledge was bound up in that word, “better”. 
We were arranged in an elongated horseshoe shape, with the speakers at one end; the room 
we were in was really a cranny of the large, grandiosely Seventies foyer of the public 
building the annual showcase event was being held in. I knew some thought had been given 
to how to seat people to get the best “dialogue” going. From the start, it struck me that there 
was something antithetical to the sort of “real dialogue” the Partnership wanted to foster 
through its policy work.  One of the two speakers was late for starters, and the civil servant 
from the Scottish Government took the task of explaining his perspective very narrowly. I 
wrote in my notebook the time of the session; ‘the civil servant basically read out the 
sustainable communities strategy in its latest incarnation’. I added, ‘I can’t actually 
remember the content very well’ and noted that the body language of my fellow audience 
members seemed to echo my dissatisfaction. 
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At this point the second speaker, a worker in a medium-sized local charity, appeared and 
began to denounce a list of things entirely unconnected with the rather blank presentation we 
had just listened to. This seemed to fire up the audience rather more, putting their hands up 
for permission to speak or shouting out about things they too found unsatisfactory, and 
eventually one of them asked why he didn’t get a stipend for “speaking for the community”. 
‘This is all directed at the civil servant, who just looks glum,’ I noted, ‘I guess at what’s 
going through his head, as it is the predictable response for someone who works in 
government. Who is the community, why do you think you speak for them and why should 
anyone else pay you to do that? He knows, just as I know, that it would be a fool’s errand to 
ask that series of questions. I’m not going to ask them and neither is he if he can get away 
with it.’ I decided not to weigh in with this perfectly legitimate point, largely as I didn’t want 
to be seen to be at odds with the rather angry delegates around me. 
From there things became increasingly fragmented and fractious: 
‘The stories are becoming increasingly personal and increasingly incoherent. People 
list controversies, not all of which are obviously germane to the point in hand, some of 
which are almost rambling cul-de-sacs in a narrative sense, and it all comes pouring 
out; there are no toilets on the high street, my cousin has had his housing benefit 
slashed and now he’s suicidal, I don’t get paid for my community work, people aren’t 
nice enough to each other, politicians are all shits, where’s my bus pass, who’s going 
to give me a new bus route through my estate… People start to shout over one 
another, the chair looks helpless and caught in his own thoughts, and when he starts to 
ask that people stop attacking the guy from the Government personally he gets 
shouted down too. 
The man from the Scottish Government is just not hearing the anger, or he’s trying not 
to. He’s not really looking at anyone, and just stands there, shoulders drooping as he’s 
cut off mid-sentence. His response to the question “why is such a small amount of the 
budget going to communities?” is to say that essentially all the budget is spent on 
communities as it’s all there to help facilitate daily life in Scotland. I feel angry for a 
moment, I have to say. That was plainly not what anyone was asking. 
I just want to get out of here to be honest. How long before someone turns on me? 
Then the Scottish Government guy, almost as a throw away remark says, “Of course, 
we maybe need a better definition of what a community is…” 
Then a lady gets up to speak and it’s the most angry, vitriolic stuff so far. She stands 
up, pointing her finger I think at the Scottish Government man but equally at the 
facilitator, the NGO dude and the world in general and screams something along the 
lines of “Get your priorities right I mean there must be over £350000 of wages sitting 
in front of me and there’s no hope and no decency and I think you should all be 
ashamed and there are people sticking needles in their arms and I’m holding it 
together and there’s no shame and politicians don’t look after the people and you 
should be ashamed of yourself talking about what a community is when there are 
people dying PEOPLE ARE DYING WHY ARE YOU KILLING PEOPLE you 
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should be helping people and look after the people and then spend money on 
SCULPTORS!”’ 
The effect on the rest of the room was fascinating. I felt very scared, just because of the raw 
anger on display from this woman. Throughout her torrent of accusations most people in the 
audience had been looking awkward and staring at the floor but, I was interested to note, 
‘equally they clap at the end’. In the moment I noted down the way I was trying to figure out 
what my own responses would be were I in the civil servant’s predicament, since  I 
sympathised with his question and thought he was right to ask it. I realised, I wrote at the 
time, that you couldn’t tell the woman that her statement didn’t make any sense – even 
though it certainly didn’t – as:  
‘that would be to dismiss her in the eyes of the assembled crowd. Nor can you take 
her literally as her statement is a mess. Finally you can’t even respond to the anger in 
it because it’s so personal, so unfair, and in the end I suspect rather self-serving’.  
I noted how much relief there seemed to be in the room in general, despite or perhaps 
because the civil servant was squirming over his tactical dilemma (as I was), although I 
couldn’t quite pinpoint how I felt I knew this. I speculated: ‘Certainly everyone in the 
horseshoe is glad to not have to justify their use of the word “community” to anyone else or 
explain why their role in this “community” makes them moral authorities. That threat 
diverted and returned to the Scottish Government chap we can carry on being full of 
righteous indignation.’ 
I decided that there was something about who the civil servant was in the room with us that 
had contributed to this state of affairs, and from my own assessment of the situation I felt he 
had no other legitimate choices in terms of who he was. I realised I needed to talk to him 
more about what he thought he was doing in the way he had presented himself in that 
encounter and why the display of raw, personal vitriol from the audience had apparently so 
wrong-footed him. As much as anything, I wanted to talk to someone else about what had 
just happened and make some sense of it. I went straight up to him after the chair had rather 
shakily thanked everyone and wrapped proceedings up. The way the civil servant dealt with 
this request suggested to me that there was a complex set of codes about his behaviour in 
these encounters that he and I would need to discuss: 
‘I ask if I can interview him next week sometime. He looks initially confused, then 
wary, then hands out his email. “It’s anonymous of course,” I say, and smile what I 
suppose is a sympathetically knowing smile. The physical effect on the guy is almost 
perceptible; his shoulders tumble downwards, his eyes both focus on me and come 
alive; it’s almost like someone being revived from stasis. “It’s just… hard doing it 
every day,” he half-whispers to me. “Like it is for anyone here I suppose,” he adds 
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quickly, “But we just have to take it and how do you take it?” I smile again and say, 
“More later”.’ 
Douglas – as I will refer to him here – had been acting out something by behaving the way 
he did, and now that he was not “onstage” he could step away from his policy-making role 
and towards the complexities of Douglas as a human being. I hoped he could talk to me 
about it and tell me something of why he behaved the way he did when speaking as a civil 
servant in a room of community activists, what he thought was symbolised by that behaviour 
and why it was the right thing to do. Maybe we could consider how it intersected with his 
ideas about emotion and governance. 
My own appraisal of what had “gone wrong”, or more accurately had been uncomfortable 
for me as a participant privy to the Partnership’s aims for the annual showcase, was that 
instead of providing an environment conducive to dialogue of the type Louise had hoped to 
achieve through the session, there was an apparent lack of exchange of points of view 
between the activists and the “professionals” gathered there. Instead the session could have 
been seen as a entrenching of these in opposition to one another. The Partnership believed 
that such an exchange was necessary and desirable for “good” governance to happen and that 
it necessarily flowed from people explaining their position to one another on a controversial 
issue. Instead, my notes were of a dramatic failure to exchange opinion or insight or meet 
any of the other aims of the event and the Partnership’s work in general. This episode had 
impressed itself on my memory as a visceral failure in strict, instrumental policy-making 
terms, perhaps a painful one for at least some of the people involved, and that made me 
wonder if its importance lay in its content which seemed at first glance to be irrational or 
irrelevant to instrumental policy-making. 
4.3 Emotion, knowledge and truth: exploring the anxieties 
of governance 
I met Douglas a week after the annual showcase in a coffee shop half way between my 
department in the University of Edinburgh and his department in the Scottish Government. I 
discovered that he was a career civil servant who had been involved intermittently with the 
Partnership and the forum as a member of various Bill teams, drafting Government white 
papers. I had noted to myself that Douglas had pretty much read from the latest Government 
position paper, and he was somehow curiously absent. I thought this might be because of the 
way he used his body and voice during his time in front of the audience, although I didn’t 
prompt him with this observation during our interview. I noted while he was addressing the 
evidence session that his eyes rarely rested on anyone in particular; his voice was evenly 
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pitched and paced, monotonous even; his shoulders were raised towards his ears in a tense 
rictus; his face was somehow mask-like and expressionless, and I noted his eyes and 
eyebrows were practically frozen. I explained to him that throughout the evidence session he 
and I had been present at I was intrigued not just by what everyone said, but the way they 
said it, their presence in the room. I asked him to explain what he felt had happened, and he 
brought up the idea of roles: 
‘It’s almost like there are rules drawn up around these things, there are like patterns 
of behaviour, which [we] have learned, whether it be business which is you know 
about controlling yourself and trying to get people to listen to you or whether it 
be… Yes, how to reflect that passion but also how to use it effectively and the like. 
[…] You know we all do it in our everyday lives, and in community groups maybe 
less regularly, compared with somebody who [is a “professional”]’ 
Douglas went on to explain the double-bind of being a policy “professional”; ‘I can’t answer 
those questions [about someone’s personal life] because they’re individual experiences. I 
need to respond as an individual but I’m not there as an individual’. Douglas was presenting 
the “personal” as being in direct opposition to everything that he must embody as a “public” 
figure, at the loss of his individual personhood. His bodily and vocal behaviour was in some 
way a performance of this absence, the reading from Government documents a stratagem for 
faithfully suppressing his knowledge that wasn’t rational professional knowledge; he was 
quite literally “reading from a book” as Carla had put it. At the same time, Douglas believed 
that he still cared about the people and the issues at hand, he still had emotional knowledge, 
and that it needed to be accessed to make good decisions. Indeed it was the only thing that 
could make rationality usable or good. When I asked him why he came to events like the one 
we’d just been at if he expected to get shouted at, he explained that they enabled contact with 
people experiencing poverty – not studying poverty, or analysing poverty, or representing 
those in poverty – and that this was essential to uncovering “reality”, echoing Carla’s 
language. ‘It does make it more real. And that, that’s the danger of working in policy, you 
stay in the ivory tower, as the classic cliché goes, and you stay away from all that,’ said 
Douglas. But he went on to explain that these encounters with “reality” were essential for 
making not just effective but just and normatively right decisions, for acting as a moral 
agent, ‘otherwise you don’t really get a sense of what you’re doing, or why you’re doing it’.  
As I thought about the way Douglas’ description of what he knew, what activists knew and 
what made “good” governance, I noted how it mapped to Carla’s explanation of how and 
where I should go looking for emotion in the Partnership’s policy work. Her instructions had 
implied an underlying tension at the heart of “good” governance. If one cannot be both 
rational and emotional, but both ways of knowing a problem address different aspects of 
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“truth” and therefore justice, a stressful anxiety may be created in the people who do policy 
work. This was not just about my fellow participants’ (and my own) relationship to the 
object of the State and our need for it to be a “good” governor, which was in itself contested, 
fragmented and fraught. It was also fundamentally about their anxieties, and my own 
anxieties, about being a “good” person; you could say that there were several scripts running 
at the same time, in which I and others were empathetic, compassionate, caring for other 
individuals and in which I and they were also reasonable, cautious, focused on the common 
good and not just the person in front of us or our own interests. Not much in the way of a 
position that reconciled these two positions, or could intercede between them, was 
spontaneously offered to me by my informants; you ideally would make a choice between 
the two extremes, it seemed. This conflict could be seen in the way that civil servants would 
use language about process, structure and dispassionate cost-benefit analysis to emphasise 
their legitimacy as workers for the State or Parliament, but would also use the terminology of 
personal encounters and individual testimony to explain their presence at the Partnership’s 
forums. Equally, while the activists and volunteers descriptions of a “just” governance 
process was one in which their own emotions and psychic reality was a component of 
decision-making, they often stated their expectation that governance should be as cost-
efficient and dispassionate as possible, particularly when talking about governance practices 
in the agencies and institutions they encountered in their daily lives. 
I felt that Douglas’ statement begged a prior question about the “truth” of emotion, mirroring 
Carla’s insistence that it was only in the emotional testimony of activists that “reality” was 
able to be understood by policy makers.  It seemed that there was two aspects to Douglas’ 
idea of emotion as truth; firstly there is an ontological question about the nature of reality 
which is only accessible through the visceral and somatic experiences relayed in “emotional” 
testimony; there is also a normative, epistemological one about the way we understand what 
is significant and important about reality which only that visceral experience can give us. 
This is the clue which tells us not just “why you’re doing something” but also at a very basic 
level “what you’re doing”. Douglas clearly believed that his presence in the forum was 
meant to stand for a particular relationship with “reality”, one grounded in rational, objective 
knowledge and transmissible through texts, numbers and other artefacts of governance. He 
could in fact sit at his desk and govern in this sense perfectly competently, or perhaps just 
look at emails submitted to public consultations, and stated that many of his colleagues 
preferred to do this given the tendency for face-to-face encounters with the public to be 
somewhat bruising. But his representation of this state of affairs as an “ivory tower” – a 
cliché as he admitted – implied to me that there was a moral problem with this sort of 
92 
 
governance in that it lacked crucial information about the nature of social reality. By 
engaging with the people who came to events like the Partnership’s showcase Douglas was 
practicing good governance by acquiring a different sort of knowledge about the world, 
without which he would not understand something important about his work and the people 
who were affected by it. In short, emotional knowledge of the world was necessary in order 
to understand the morality of one’s decisions as a public servant. In order to do his job not 
just competently but justly Douglas needed to care about the way his work changed the 
world and the people in it, and experiencing these stories first hand and viscerally put him in 
touch with the emotional knowledge he needed. 
I was intrigued. It was not at all clear how far Douglas’ ideas about good governance were 
shared by his colleagues more widely, although his explanation perhaps helped to map out 
the somewhat hazy territory of “better policy” the Partnership believed existed in personal 
encounters between professionals and people experiencing poverty. I was also unsure if the 
values and beliefs inherent in a traditional process-driven, rational model of public 
administration and Douglas’ insistence that understanding “reality” had to involve different 
knowledge were part of a coherent normative system of meaning, and if so what it was. 
4.4 Relating to reality: the embodied encounter in civi l 
service practice 
I got the opportunity to explore in some depth the reasoning behind another civil servant’s 
engagement with the sort of first-person testimonies the Partnership specialised in through 
Craig, a member of a Strategic Review Team that had worked with the Partnership over 
some months. I had met him not long after Summer Recess in 2012, when he and a couple of 
colleagues came to feed back to some volunteer researchers how the evidence they had 
submitted to the Strategic Review had been considered by his team. I had been intrigued by 
Craig’s incredibly deadpan, blank personal presentation in the feedback sessions, and my 
curiosity about how he understood the role he played as a representative of the State was 
only increased by the way he responded to my request for a coffee and an interview. When I 
asked if I could talk to Craig one-on-one about emotion and policy making, he just looked at 
me, face blank. After a short pause he said “You do know I’m a civil servant?”, without 
changing his expression.  
Meeting up in a coffee shop on a dress-down Friday not far from his office, I asked him 
directly what he felt he got from coming to the events run by organisations like the 
Partnership; after all, he could just have read their submission and left it at that. Craig echoed 
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his civil service colleagues’ statements about “emotional” testimony and truth, again 
drawing a direct contrast with the written, received, technical expertise he could bring to the 
process: 
‘Craig: I mean we have loads of statistics, the DWP have loads of statistics and there 
are so many reports published and research and analysis and so on. And it's all 
valuable, it all highlights where the issues are in general terms? But it doesn't really 
tell you how to fix it. It doesn't tell you... [Pause] 
Rosie: What do you mean? 
Craig: It doesn't tell you the things that are getting in the way for customers. You 
know? It'll say the outcomes are bad for this client group or this part of the country, 
in terms of how you solve that if you don't actually go deeper and get kind of 
qualitative stuff, then you're just kind of using your imagination. […] That's why I'm 
quite passionate about hearing from the customers’. 
 
Craig’s words were interesting to me because it appeared what he was saying was that good 
governance was not an exercise in empathetic imagination; that is to say it was not a 
question of trying to imagine what it would be like if you were the person experiencing 
poverty. It was more direct, more visceral than that. It was about being attentive to your own 
feeling reactions to the stories of poverty created in the telling and listening spaces of policy 
encounters.  
My questions about the reasons civil servants and other “professionals” sought out 
“emotional” encounters with people directly experiencing poverty came to be reformulated 
to explore the following problems; clearly there was a different sort of knowledge that was 
being shared through the telling of personal experiences of poverty which civil servants did 
not have access to by themselves, and yet their own selves and their experiences were 
integral to making sense of that knowledge; according to civil servants, activists and 
Partnership staff alike, “good” policy making had to include this sort of information and the 
Partnership seemed to be orientated to engineering these encounters but I was unclear how 
exactly this made for “better policy”; finally I didn’t understand why the way civil servants 
tended to behave was so exaggeratedly blank and impersonal if they were attending the 
Partnership’s forums precisely to have these encounters with “emotional knowledge”.  
Based on these problems, I began asking more direct questions of Partnership staff and 
associates about their beliefs about the value of face-to-face storytelling in governance and 
policy making and how it tallied with ideas of “the emotional”. It seemed that the 
implication of the Partnership’s rationale for their events and the way civil servants spoke 
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about their involvement was that there was something being transmitted through 
performance and presence which could not be conveyed through text or facts and figures, 
and whatever this was formed an alternative or complementary moral imperative to rational 
ideals of governance’s values of impartiality, objectivity and disinterestedness. Shortly 
before I interviewed Craig for the first time I had been asking Louise why she was so 
committed to encouraging people experiencing poverty to tell their stories in person at 
Partnership events. I noted how odd it felt for me to ask the question at all, but I was also 
interested to notice the way that Louise appeared to have to search for the words to construct 
an argument for her approach to her work: 
‘I think… Erm… having people there… I don’t think there’s any actual evidence out 
there that shows that it makes better policy making, that doesn’t exist yet – I can’t 
say that – but what I can say is that it… improves democracy, it improves processes 
that the Scottish Government should be engaging with people, it improves that civic 
participation erm… and I think we do get more from it, and like I say we could do 
this work and never ask anyone anything but it wouldn’t have that same kind of… 
realness as what is just by involving people.’ 
Again, the connection between first-person experience, passionate testimony, “realness” and 
good, democratic governance was made, this time by the Partnership’s lead policy worker. 
“Good policy” was necessarily emotionally-informed. When I asked Jenny, one of the 
Partnership’s board members and herself a policy worker for an NGO, about this idea in an 
interview with her shortly after I spoke with Craig, she elaborated on Louise’s convictions 
that conveying the experience of poverty made for “better” policy, she emphasised that 
including this knowledge was a way of getting at what really mattered and understanding 
what was really important about that experience: 
‘I think there has been lots of learning from, from these really destructive points 
where people come together. […] On some occasions that can be really, really 
effective. You know, where you’ve got a duff policy and policy makers need to 
know about it and they need that kind of direction so they can really sit up and take 
notice and really do something about it, you know?’ 
When a policy is bad, Jenny’s statement suggests, when it doesn’t work, people suffer. 
Through not just knowing of their suffering by report or anecdote and intellectually 
disapproving of it but by experiencing the world in new ways via a somatic encounter, policy 
makers feel the badness of the policy and get a sense of the parts of it that must most 
urgently be put right. 
I was surprised by this conceptualisation of morality in public administration, and surprised 
by its adoption by civil servants and NGO workers alike, because it seemed to be so much at 
odds with what I and they would most comfortably understand good governance to be 
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founded on. I have examined the rationalist and process-driven traditions of public 
administration and policy analysis in some detail in earlier chapters, and I will not recap 
them here. What was remarkable about the things Douglas, Craig, Jenny and Louise said was 
that, without directly contradicting the principles of impartiality, objectivity and evidence-
driven policy making so emphatically espoused by the Civil Service Code (indeed Craig and 
Douglas identified that as their specialist skillset) or demolishing the dichotomy that 
conventionally exists between rationality and emotion, they seemed at the same time to be 
insisting that rationality wasn’t enough. The implication of their reasoning about the 
necessity of direct encounters with people experiencing poverty could be summarised as 
follows: in order to know what really matters about an issue, in order to really understand, 
you must really feel what others feel – not just know it - and you must really care. While a 
version of this principle was relayed to me whenever I asked “professional” participants 
about the purpose of hearing testimony from people experiencing poverty, my interlocutors 
were unable to readily volunteer an explanation for why this was “better” or “good” and how 
it related to other narratives about “good” public administration. Having exhausted 
explanations from the field, I spent some time reflecting on the normative argument being 
made for this special emotional form of knowledge as they described it. 
4.5 The Sentimental Civi l Servant? 
The knowledge contained and evoked by the “emotional” was being described by my 
informants as offering an alternative morality to that of the knowledge of rationality and 
“professionalism”. “Good” governance would draw upon both, despite Craig, Douglas and 
policy workers such as Louise being quite clear that “being a professional” in this context 
involved being dispassionate and using third-person, externally verifiable sources of 
information such as surveys, user data or the civil service code to make policy. I began to 
wonder if these knowledges and positions were in fact enmeshed with two moral codes that 
apparently ran in tandem with each other. I have explored some of the moral justifications 
for rationalism and instrumentalism in policy making in the opening chapter of this thesis, 
and since this is the moral logic commonly applied to public administration and governance 
in Western democracies I will not recapitulate them again here. However my informants, 
including the civil servants themselves, seemed to be saying that this was not enough to 
make morally good policy, and this compelled me to try to articulate this alternative moral 
framework.  
Sentimentalism as such was never used as a concept within the forum or among its 
participants, but its central thesis fits these descriptions of the moral use of emotion in policy 
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and politics; ‘When we judge something is wrong, one or another of these emotions will 
ordinarily occur, and the judgement will be an expression of the underlying emotional 
disposition’ (Prinz 2006, p.34). It is a thesis that has a venerable ancestry in the wider 
cultural context we operated within, most notably the thinking of Hume and the other British 
moralists. It has been argued by Richard Rorty that as a form of moral epistemology it can 
still be found in the very current and contentious political thinking around inalienable human 
rights, through an appeal to recognising sameness within the category of “human” (Rorty 
2011).  I can certainly see a connection between this conceptualisation of human rights on a 
global and abstract level and the concept of rights in a specific, practical context concerning 
poverty in Scotland. I would reformulate Rorty’s “sameness” as “similarity”, as I am not 
sure that empathic sameness was quite a fair representation of what the civil servants told me 
they were experiencing with those who testified at the Partnership’s events. However, the 
moral epistemological process is the same: for others to suffer is an outrage to their 
humanity. Outside of the Partnership’s forum, one may or may not be intellectually 
convinced of this idea of “truth” and moral sense, but inside it this sentimentalism – or some 
version of it – appeared to be an extremely important factor in practicing “good” policy 
making.  
On a practical level other people expected to see that you felt something. Civil servants 
themselves were particularly explicit about this perceived moral imperative to be 
emotionally present in a decision. Douglas’ use of language - ‘otherwise you don’t really get 
a sense of what you’re doing, or why you’re doing it’ - was interesting; without this 
emotional dimension to a decision it was inappropriate in some way, even potentially 
without meaning. The implication of this sentimentalism was that without being emotionally 
present – ‘there but not there’ -  your decisions were potentially immoral, monstrous even. 
Something that makes you whole was lacking, and it is a short step from unemotional to 
potentially inhuman, or perhaps lacking a true personhood. 
This posed a very practical challenge to civil servants in being physically present in the 
forums. The thing that was so directly contrasted with emotional knowledge – technical, 
received expertise – was highly thought of and a key component in the construction of an 
identity as a “professional”. Although the sharpest divide was between community activists 
and individuals experiencing poverty directly and paid professionals, there was a particular 
emphasis placed on the rationality and therefore supposedly unemotional nature of civil 
servants. This appeared to be carried over by forum participants into the concept of 
professional conduct in policy making in general. The meeting that prompted my first 
97 
 
meeting with Craig was a good illustration of the way this need to excise non-rational 
dimensions of policy work informed a shared conception of the “professional” in the 
Partnership’s work. Louise had been in charge of feeding into the strategic review that Craig 
was a part of, but things had gone rather sour by the end of Summer Recess. Craig’s team, 
who Louise had worked with for months by organising evidence meetings and preparing 
testimonies from activists, had completely ignored her organisation’s contributions in the 
final draft Strategy. When I caught up with her when we got back to work at the beginning of 
autumn Louise was visibly furious. I asked her whether she was going to let them know how 
much they had hurt her professionally and personally and disappointed the volunteers she 
worked with. ‘No, she says,’ I wrote in my notes at the time, ‘Because she can’t just go 
around getting upset about things like that; “I’ve got to be professional”. This 
professionalism, this reasonableness, this rationality, was considered to be civil servants’ 
role, their contribution to the forum and Louise couldn’t change the terms of their 
engagement without changing the parameters of governance in the public interest. Since the 
emotional stance and the reasonable stance were incommensurate, someone needed to quite 
literally be the voice of reason, or the social order of the forum would start to spin off its 
axis. Towards the end of my time with the Partnership I and Jenny reflected upon the 
discomfort civil servants displayed when confronted with situations that might require less 
structured interaction with activists and “grassroots” perspectives. She told me about a day 
for informal contact between some activists and some civil servants that required a different 
sort of engagement to that of the world of statistics and reports about poverty, and recalled 
that until everyone started relax while having lunch the “professionals” had been gripped by 
what she could only describe as a sort of terror about having to behave informally: ‘Maybe 
it’s that fear… Maybe fear’s too strong a word, but it’s like any of us going into the 
unknown, they’re outwith their comfort zone.’  
 
The implication was that in order to be a convincing civil servant, individuals needed to 
learn to demonstrate an inhibition of the non-episteme relationships they may have with 
people and situations. Civil servants themselves were very explicit about this part of their 
work, and the discussions I had about their attendance at “evidence” sessions such as the 
annual showcase event or the Strategic Review feedback session naturally led on to 
explaining the way that their behaviour differentiated them from activists as “professionals” 
and dictated the way they encountered emotional knowledge. Craig explained how he had 




‘The civil servants, the idea was always to retain a certain level of impartiality and 
not to get.... too drawn in... to the emotion of the situation. Em... Particularly because 
you might, em, end up... making suggestions or making hints of commitments that 
you can't... or the ministers haven't ... approved. You can't get cornered too much’. 
 
He and others from the Scottish Government also explained that while emotional testimony – 
first-person, lived experience – was invaluable in getting a feel for what was important, it 
was also suspect knowledge. Craig went on: 
 
‘That might be a specific instance or it might be a symptom of a wider issue, so... we 
have to make a judgement about that. […] There is always that thing about […] 
being careful not to over commit. Or... not to over-sympathise.... [laughs] If that's 
not to sound too cruel!’ 
 
Perhaps for this reason, my request to talk with civil servants about emotions in their 
working life was often almost incomprehensible to them at first – it was almost as if they 
were struggling to allocate my invitation a place in the scheme of their work. At the risk of 
ruining Craig’s joke – ‘you do know I’m a civil servant’ - it works because it goes without 
saying - everybody here knows - that there are no emotions in the work he does. He didn’t 
need to tell me that it’s inappropriate for him to have an emotional dimension to what he 
does, he doesn’t need to justify excluding emotional things from his working life. That side 
of his professional self simply does not exist, and it is impossible. So what would we have 
had to talk about? At the same time, it also works as a joke because of its absurdity, the 
absurdity of his situation. 
4.6 The symbol of the civi l servant: symbolic equation or 
standing for reason? 
In the forums the Partnership facilitated, civil servants faced a near impossible task; to be 
legitimately dispassionate and rational but also morally present in policy work. The group 
seemed to be asking them to run two scripts at the same time which are mutually exclusive. 
As the personification of government in general and the Scottish Government or 
Westminster Government in particular they are there to act as avatars of good governance. 
The modern State has been described as the expression of Cartesian dualism at a macro-
social level, with governance and the administrative mind ruling over the passionate, 
sensuous but chaotic social body (Handelman, 2007); culturally the people involved in the 
Partnership’s policy work were maybe more comfortable with the idea that logical rationality 
rules over and guides emotion. At the same time there is also another script running, one 
about being a moral agent as a decision-maker, which in practice seems to be successfully 
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signalled to others by a physical performance of engagement with personal, first-person 
experience. Public servants are no doubt not the only professional identities to suffer this, but 
as Iver Neumann explained in his ethnography of Norwegian diplomats (2005), there does 
seem to be an inherent tension in the narratives we tell about them, or the people we need 
them to be.  These scripts require careful separating and compartmentalising if they are to be 
able to be satisfied by the public servant, and ‘their conceded existence and the need to 
uphold them make for tensions that structure the life of the diplomat’ (Neumann, 2005: 80). I 
could just as easily say these tensions structure the presentation of the self for a civil servant 
in policy making. These tensions are themselves manifestations of a broader anxiety about 
morality, emotion, reason, justice and governance that pervaded the Partnership’s policy 
work. Whether the identification of civil servants with rationality was a symbolisation that 
helped people contain these anxieties, confront them and develop new realities, or whether 
they merely became equated with a hated or loved object, is not clear-cut. Arguably this 
depended on circumstance, individuals and context, and the use of this symbol varied greatly 
during my time with the Partnership.  
 
Where Neumann’s diplomats have a perceived public duty to separate their “home” selves 
from their “work” and “abroad” selves as they represent the Norwegian State, the civil 
servants that attended the Partnership’s events were considered by all participants to have a 
public duty to put a human face to the whole governance machine, without ever allowing 
their “emotional” sides to run away with them, or get them cornered, as Craig put it. This led 
to some significant confusion at times about how to be together and what our relationships 
ought to look like. In particular, a notable amount of effort that went into making sure that 
things “didn’t get personal” and making it clear that personal attacks were not acceptable. 
There was a more or less standard statement that got made at just about every set-piece 
encounter between the three key stakeholder groups; Louise quite often was the one who 
made it, as she did at a feedback session between a strategic review team from Whitehall and 
the Scottish Government and a group of community researchers: 
 
‘“I just want to remind everybody,” says Louise, and pauses, “The people in this 
room aren’t directly responsible for the services we’ll be talking about or even really 
for the whole of the decisions. So I’d like to remind everyone to be respectful, but be 
candid.” 
 
Louise’s statement, on close reading, is important. Implicit in it is a reminder that the civil 
servants are not here as fully present people; they are fulfilling a function and standing for 
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something. The forum’s participants are asked to be polite not just for politeness’s sake, but 
actually to preserve the performance of the dispassionate, rational governor by not confusing 
the role with the more complicated person behind it. The consequences of failing to preserve 
this phantasy person is implied to be that the work of the forum will start to be compromised. 
Yet personal attacks did take place, and sometimes were maybe aggravated by the perceived 
facelessness and bureaucratic lack of empathy on display from civil servants. The way these 
contradictory expectations are negotiated and performed is perhaps best examined through 
the compartmentalisation and boundaries civil servants created while presenting their Selves 
at the forums. Since the realm of the verbal for them was so closely tied to the rational and to 
being a matter of official record, this was particularly in evidence in the way civil servants’ 
non-verbal “emotionality” changed as they made the transit between spaces that were more 
and less “on-stage” as policy professionals, and how it contrasted with my conversations 
with them outside of those spaces altogether. In particular, their physical presence and 
relationship to physical space was especially important. It perhaps helped to explain how 
inner conflicts about legitimate knowledge and good governance became so bruisingly 
externalized as interpersonal conflicts.  
  
Returning to Carla’s advice she gave to me about looking for emotion in the Partnership’s 
policy work, I believe that she was suggesting that part of learning “how to be” as a 
participant in this work was to understand that emotion and reason were mutually 
incompatible ways of knowing and being in the world. She was very explicit about the idea 
that activists would be the only people I would experience as emotional beings in my time 
with the Partnership. Her emphasis was on the way that emotion came into play in between 
two people through the practices of representing experience through telling; ‘the person who 
experiences it can tell it’. Activists were presented by Carla as standing for emotion, being 
vectors through which it entered policy forums and which inhabited them, or they inhabited 
emotion. I would argue that echoes of this association of a way of knowing and being in the 
world with a category of participant are there in the way that those who were self-described 
“professionals” talked about their own presence. They did not just operate according to 
rational principles but stood for them in some symbolic way through this presence. 
Emotional and rational knowledge had to be kept distinct, moreover. Emotional knowledge 
was dangerous to the rational participant, as Craig and Douglas had made clear, as it 
invariably tainted their claims to legitimacy and morality. Carla’s association of emotion 
with “truth” implied more subtly that to taint emotion with a bureaucratic, technical 
understanding of the world was to move away from that “truth” and hence from her own 
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ethical claim to legitimacy. The “professional” was good and legitimate because they were 
dispassionate, objective and rational; the “grassroots” participant was good and legitimate 
because they were emotional. One could not be both without becoming somehow morally 
compromised but also becoming a hybrid non-entity, an un-professional or an un-activist. 
Professionals were rationally-oriented to the world and hence were professional, activists 
were emotionally-oriented to the world and hence were activists; there was a circular 
performativity in being one or the other. It is interesting to note, however, that Carla’s 
schema makes no allowances for those policy participants who might be both emotional and 
rational, or who perhaps need to use and interrogate both knowledges, as NGO workers like 
Louise often had to in the course of their work. This folk-category of policy workers had a 
special relationship to emotional-activist and rational-professional knowledges, and I will 
consider their experiences in two later chapters. 
 
4.7 Disturbing performances: Craig’s physical and vocal 
practices of neutrality 
In keeping with the knowledge claims allied to “professional” status it is perhaps not 
surprising civil servants such as Craig or Douglas tended to describe this state of rationality 
in somewhat abstract terms. Craig’s prescription for preserving his integrity as a rational, 
dispassionate, objective civil servant – to “not over-sympathise” - is hard to picture being put 
into practice in the same detail that Carla was able to give about what I should look for in an 
emotional person. Yet it was precisely through their performative presence and interactions 
with others that participants’ rationality or emotionality entered into the work of the 
Partnership’s policy forums. To illustrate this point, I will describe in some detail the way I 
first encountered Craig at one of the Partnership’s discussion events, shortly after summer 
recess. 
The programme of policy work that Louise ran for the Partnership convened a series of six 
month-long working groups looking at a particular theme. One of these was coming to a 
climax and Louise had organised a general plenary session of the 40 or so stakeholders who 
had been involved, along with input from a relevant Scottish Government Minister and some 
civil servants they had either worked with or who had responsibilities in the area. I had been 
asked to attend and take notes on behalf of the Partnership for their records. The layout of 
the room contributed to a slightly cramped feel: 
‘The room was on the top floor, a long, modern one with slightly gloomy lighting 
which doesn’t match the expectations generated by the building’s ornate Victorian 
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exterior. We were arranged in three round tables in a sort of triangle, which 
overlapped a fairly long “high table”, flanked on either side by the usual banners, 
stands etc. that go with policy events of any description. […]Of course, the problem 
with such “cabaret style seating” is that it in effect makes it impossible for you to 
ever really see everyone who’s speaking, and some find it hard to look at the guest 
speakers on the top table at all. It felt strangely cramped in this room, too, although 
that could have something to do with the lighting; we seemed to be trying to do too 
many different things with a small space, maybe, and that only drew attention to its 
failure to fully include everyone at all times.’ 
The Minister was the first speaker, and generated what seemed to me a rather sour 
atmosphere by giving an extremely curtailed and unenthusiastic talk, then leaving with 
unseemly haste before many questions could be asked. By contrast, the audience had been 
extensively consulted and coached by Louise, with some input from other policy workers 
from partner organisations and my own efforts, and they were raring to go. This created “a 
ripple of dissatisfaction” as I noted at the time. After a comfort break, we reconvened.  
‘This time there are two people sitting with the chair at the “top table”. One is the 
person who was asking about unclaimed benefits; he’s from a charity and support 
group. The other is the slightly haunted looking young man who was sitting 
opposite me on my table during the Minister’s Q&A. […] The civil servant tried not 
to make eye contact with anyone during the Q&A, and mostly sat with his arms 
folded into his lap, his face blank and almost frozen but his eyes darting about 
quickly. I tried to smile at him, but something about his face didn’t make me feel 
like it would reassure him, rather it would make him more anxious. He didn’t look 
comfortable. He is now reading out a statement that I have trouble concentrating 
on, and I’m frustrated as I try to make notes of its content.’ 
As this civil servant, who I would come to know as Craig, read his pre-prepared statement I 
began to realise why I was having trouble listening to him and taking notes for the 
Partnership. The content of his talk was particularly dry, consisting mostly of a chronological 
description of his team’s relationship with the Partnership. But I became more and more 
aware of how his vocal and physical presentation was contributing to my impression of a 
curious blankness:  
‘It’s not just what he says, I realise, but how he’s saying it that makes it almost 
impossible to follow. He’s looking at the desk, with his arms folded in front of him, 
leaning into his notes. His voice is strange on the ear; it’s unusually monotone and 
he reads out statements like “the workshop was held on the 24th at Scottish 
Government premises” in exactly the same way as he then claims “I found it 
interesting”. It doesn’t sound interesting and he doesn’t sound interested. Everything 
about his presence is without purchase – there are no peaks or troughs to grab hold 
of and his words are descriptive, rooted almost exclusively in a sort of omnipotent 
narrator voice. If it weren’t for my earlier attempts at interaction, and an unusually 
blue pair of eyes, I think I would struggle to recall him at all without my notes. It’s 
like he isn’t there.’ 
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Maybe at some level I was recalling Douglas’ description of his presence as a civil servant; 
“I’m there but I’m not there”.  
Craig’s behaviour, language and voice suggested to the rest of us that he had no first person 
perspective at all and existed purely in the realm of the “professional” and received, third-
person knowledge of the issues under consideration or in relation to us.  In other words, it 
was as if Craig had no inner life. At the strategy review feedback meeting Louise chaired, 
Craig attended with his colleague, where I was astonished to see them not only both replicate 
his previous physical performance but also do it in sync with one another. Before the 
meeting proper his colleague had offstage been bubbly, enthusiastic about my research topic, 
smiling, initiating conversations, but she now mirrored Craig completely: ‘She and Craig 
make remarkably similar small, contained hand gestures, and list things very precisely on 
their fingers as they run through their points. There is even a point at which they make tiny, 
precise nods in sync to show they’re listening to a question from Louise’. I have already 
described Douglas’ performance at the first annual showcase event that I attended, where his 
physicality and facial and vocal expressions had the same muted quality as those I have just 
described in Craig. Perhaps, I thought, when Douglas talked about “rules drawn up around 
these things… patterns of behaviour which we have learned” this physical presentation was 
part of what becoming a competent civil servant consisted of. I thought also of Jenny 
suggesting that people became “socialised out” of relating to others and the world around 
them in certain ways as they became “professional” civil servants. I realised that both Craig 
and Douglas had read from official documents where others had given personal testimonies 
or rhetorical exhortations to act. I now interpreted this as an at least partially symbolic act. 
The way Craig responded to a criticism of his team’s work was perhaps revealing of what 
this extraordinary performance was intended to demonstrate: ‘He gestures to a document that 
he holds aloft. He says that we need to refer ourselves to that. The overall impression that the 
ideal would be that the document could be personified, given a human body and a set of 
vocal chords and that that would be the thing we interact with, not the person in front of us’. 
Once again I recalled the way his fellow Scottish Government worker Douglas explained his 
role in the forums: to paraphrase, “yes I’m there, but I’m not there”. When I reflected upon 
Craig’s behaviour, I decided that “onstage” performances from civil servants were 
remarkable not only for how extreme they were as an eerily inhuman set of behaviours, but 
also for their incredible consistency. The civil servants were there as avatars of a particular 
type of knowledge – technical, bureaucratic, received and reasonable knowledge – and to be 
the representative on earth of an institution that is untroubled by human passions, 
perspectives and partialities. The word that recurs in my field notes for this performance is 
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“mask-like”, and the best evocation of the way the faces of civil servants I observed looked 
is the classic “neutral mask”, most famously developed by Jacques Lecoq in his physical 
theatre training to refocus actors’ attention away from the face and onto the body. Lecoq 
explained his use of the mask as a way of refocusing attention on the body, through 
removing the narratives implied by a face. The neutral mask is ‘not a particular character. It 
has no psychology, no problems, no past. It lives in a state of inner calm. It has no 
differentiated attitude… It is totally transparent. It has no plans, no agendas’ (Wain 2005, 
p.38). On this basis, if the Civil Service Code had a face, it might look like the neutral mask. 
 
While these performances may have been consistent with individual and collective narratives 
about civil servants and “professionalism” in general, in specific interactions and contexts 
the need to remove the person from the professional made the presence of civil servants 
unsettling or even inflammatory. However consistent and legitimate (in one sense at least) 
the neutral mask of the professional public servant might have been it was not an easy figure 
to love. My search for a way of talking about how emotion enmeshed with role in the 
Partnership’s work began in part as an attempt to figure out how precisely Douglas’ 
workshop at the first annual showcase event had gone so badly, viscerally wrong. Something 
of a breakthrough on this front came for me when I met the Director of the Partnership, 
Jonathan, for the first time. This meeting took place around the same time I met Craig and 
his colleagues at the Strategic Review feedback session for Louise’s working group, 
although it was only by considering our discussion in light of the Partnership’s work with 
civil servants in those months that I began to realise how it helped explain the way we “split” 
emotion and rationality and the consequences of that split. Jonathan and I finally met roughly 
six months into my time with the Partnership, although we had exchanged several emails 
before. Louise had decided that we needed to meet each other in the flesh, so she took me 
down to his office unannounced and the three of us began discussing my work and how it 
fitted in with the ideas that the Partnership had about what mattered about its particular 
approach to changing policy. Jonathan and I began to develop a rapport by exchanging our 
experiences of working in policy, and some of the frustrations that we felt were endemic to 
the field: 
 
‘And yet, the Director goes on, sometimes all the preparing people to receive your 
policy counts for nothing. “I think I have a great relationship with a civil servant, but 
then he moves jobs and it’s like we’ve never met before. And I just feel thrown by 




Civil servants were baffling creatures to us, we said, capable of being our colleagues one day 
and complete strangers the next. As time went on, and I became more attentive to the ways 
the physical presence of civil servants contributed to this feeling of coldness, I began to 
realise that Jonathan and I experienced this absent presence as upsetting. Observing physical 
and vocal behaviour in “onstage” spaces such as big public events was, on reflection, 
confusing and disorientating to me. At one such meeting, I was sat directly opposite a 
Scottish Government civil servant who was unknown to me or anyone else, as she had just 
moved teams. As I sat opposite her, I wrote, ‘she’s making very small notes about the 
conversation we’re having, but I can’t read her face at all’. This unreadable quality presented 
itself to me as what can only be described as a blankness or an absence of expression as my 
fieldwork continued. I was experiencing for myself the way that the performance of caring – 
or more accurately the lack of a performance of engaging with others as if you felt for or 
with them – was allied in my mind to being morally present as an outward “tell” that my 
interlocutors were attending to the lived experiences, the emotional experiences, of others 
and acting upon them. By standing for rationality, objectivity and dispassionate competence, 
civil servants’ “professionalism” also locked them out of a moral or ethical dimension that I 
and others believed ought to exist in “good” governance. 
4.8 Conclusion: avatars of the State 
I began this chapter by describing the way being and knowing in the world was split by 
participants in the Partnership’s work into two incommensurable modes of knowledge; 
emotion and rationality. Over the course of this discussion I have documented how I 
explored the link between types of knowledge, legitimacy and role in the Partnership’s 
policy forums, and in particular how “professionalism” and those in “professional” roles 
were closely identified with rational knowledge and the way this was enacted in the practices 
of the Partnership’s institutions. This split and subsequent identification between roles and 
knowledge performs both a pragmatic or procedural and a symbolic function in the practices 
of policy making. At face value the construction of a code of behaviour which outwardly 
demonstrates the values of the professionalism expected of civil servants or other people 
who work for the public good rather than personal interests in policy. It therefore serves an 
ethical purpose and could be considered as a healthy boundary, psychically speaking. 
Preserving that distance, retaining that “certain level of impartiality” as Craig put it, is 
perhaps necessary to maintain not only one’s own effectiveness in doing one’s job, but also 
in preserving a sense of one’s own values and perspective at a more fundamental level by not 
becoming overwhelmed by another’s experiences. If something can be considered a defence 
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against anxiety this does not necessarily make it maladaptive. From an object-relations 
perspective, ‘generally speaking, a firm demarcation of self and object representations … has 
been regarded as a developmental achievement’ (Gabbard & Lester 2008, p.9). An inability 
to preserve such distinctions and police them is symptomatic of a failure to develop a sense 
of a self which relates to the world and to others. On a very pragmatic level, civil servants 
and other participants in the Partnership’s policy work could argue that the identification of 
professionals with rationality and activists with emotion is a way of preserving a sense of 
how one’s professional self ought to behave while dealing with important and anxiety-
provoking matters of power, justice and knowledge. 
I would argue that the data I collected suggests that the conflict this split produces goes 
much further, in fact creating secondary anxieties in much the same way that the nurses 
observed by  Lyth did through their efforts to function in a high-stakes, frantic environment. 
Just as  Lyth’s nursing staff and patients colluded in a social redistribution of two things that 
existed within them but were mutually exclusive – responsibility and irresponsibility – we 
were redistributing our rational knowledge, with all its admirable fairness, even-handedness 
and transparency and its horrifying cruelty, materialism and dehumanising tendencies to the 
civil servants. To carry this conflict within ourselves is painful, and ‘the intrapsychic conflict 
is alleviated… by a technique that partly converts it into an interpersonal conflict’ (Lyth 
1988, p.56). Rather than jeopardise their expectations of “good” governance by experiencing 
a conflict within themselves, my informants could attack the figure of the civil servant 
without giving up the phantasy of the almost magically mighty State which knows 
everything and cares for no-one. It stood to reason that emotion needed to be “dealt with” in 
the same way, and activists provided the symbolic expression of emotional knowledge. Civil 
servants were not just acting but standing for a particular ideal of the State and also 
rationality itself; they were becoming the projection of a complex intra- and interpersonal 
palimpsest of beliefs, phantasies and desires about rational knowledge on behalf of my 
informants and myself.  
It was necessary and perhaps morally right to remind ourselves of the separateness of our 
experiences of the world; the abstracted, technical knowledge that civil servants brought to 
the Partnership’s work was indeed tied to their wider identity as servants of a public good 
that existed in reference to ideas and institutions external to our interpersonal encounters. 
However, due to tensions between what the “good” in public good refers to and the moral 
implications of the way one experiences the world that circulated in among the Partnership’s 
participants, we collectively found ourselves in a situation where  ‘the contradictory truth 
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that things or persons can be black and white, good and bad at the same time seems 
unimaginable’ (Fuchs 2007, p.382). Douglas’ experiences at the annual showcase event were 
efficient at maintaining that split between the moral civil servant and the moral activist, but 
unsatisfactory from the pragmatic point of view of the Partnership’s ability to impact policy. 
By analysing the association of activists and emotional knowledge in the next chapter I will 
explore in depth the way that these incommensurable values and ways of experiencing the 
world were externalised and how this conflict became institutionalised, focusing in particular 









If “professionalism” as practiced by civil servants symbolised rationality in the Partnership’s 
policy work, no description of this phenomenon would be useful without exploring its 
counterpoint, described by my informants as “emotion”. I have already explored what ideas 
about knowing and being in the world was contained within the concept of “emotion” as 
used in everyday practice in the Partnership’s policy work. This chapter will introduce the 
idea of activism as a counter to professionalism and document the way the category of 
“grassroots” activist participant was constructed with reference to this idea of the 
emotionally-informed practice of activism. In doing so I want to explore how activists talked 
about themselves, how others talked about them, broadly how they were conceived of 
relating to emotional knowledge, and how I and others have connected this idea of emotion 
to other concepts and explanatory models outside the context of the Partnership’s policy 
activities.  
I want to begin by revisiting two of the statements I referenced at the start of the previous 
chapter. Both attempted to frame what emotion was, who was “emotional” in the context of 
the Partnership’s policy work and both implied particular beliefs about how emotion worked, 
in dialogue with ideas about identity and selfhood. Firstly Carla, a volunteer with the 
Partnership for several years, had insisted I would only find emotion in the activists I met; 
‘the person who has experienced it can tell it proper… [Others] only go by what they’ve got 
written down’ she had told me. However Carla’s description of emotional roles within the 
policy work of the Partnership did not imply that she believed that ‘high-up people’ as she 
called them had no emotions at all, nor that she was only capable of an emotional 
relationship with the world, but she did believe that she stood in some symbolic way for an 
emotional relationship with the “reality” of the things under discussion. Where Carla could 
name these “realities”, however, the bureaucrats could only remain silent. So although these 
intrusions of emotion were often described as disruptive and “unprofessional”, a sort of tacit 
permission seems to have been granted to community activists and the “grassroots” to break 
with protocol.  
I was interested in the nature of this permissiveness; was it respectful, enthusiastic and freely 
given or begrudging and sceptical? In the first instance, at the most superficial level of 
reflection, activists were presented to me during interviews as people who could “get away 
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with” displaying their emotional connection to the issues under discussion in a way that 
others just couldn’t. During our discussion of the first annual showcase event where 
Douglas, a Scottish Government civil servant, had been fairly savagely verbally attacked by 
a member of the audience, he reflected with me upon the apparent lack of socialisation 
displayed by community activists, who didn’t in his opinion obey “the rules”. To recap, he 
observed to me:  
‘Yes, how to reflect that passion but also how to use it effectively and the like. […] 
You know we all do it in our everyday lives, and in community groups maybe less 
regularly, compared with somebody who [is a “professional”]’. 
This statement could be read as implying an essential property of being “grassroots” is a lack 
of sophistication or a naivety about policy and political life, and that emotional behaviour is 
a symptom of that. If activists were to lose this naivety they would become insiders of some 
description, but because they “know no better” they may say things others simply wouldn’t 
or couldn’t. Other people, some working in NGOs, at first glance appeared to reflect similar 
opinions about the reason “grassroots” activists were emotional in policy work. When Louise 
had been to a meeting at which she had been very personally and angrily accused of wanting 
to “use” a community group and their life experience in what they called her “academic” 
work (in reality her policy work), I asked her: 
‘Rosie: Was that a more typical encounter between you and a [community group]? 
Louise: Yeah. Definitely. Like generally yup, people are very “this is what I’m 
going through and it’s shocking” and just an anger, a real anger. 
Rosie: They said some pretty… pretty harsh stuff… (giggles) 
Louise: Hm. (Giggles) I’ve not had that before, I have to say. I mean, been in a 
discussion and that’s happened. I mean, that’s happened in big conferences and 
people are just sort of flipping the finger’. 
Given the perceived importance to so many academics and certain policy workers of 
predictably rational behaviour in the smooth functioning of ongoing policy formation (Hill, 
2005: 147), you might expect that such breaches of the established grammar of being 
“professional” in this context would be experienced as diminishing and embarrassing lapses 
of judgement by community informants themselves. Interestingly, this was not the case. 
Community activists spoke approvingly of their “emotional” behaviour. Carla, who was 
living with complex health and financial problems, reflected on the way she presented 
herself in a video that was shown at a big poverty policy conference: ‘I was saying, “This is 
killing me, this illness”. And my emotions, well, you don’t really realise how bad it is until 
you start talking about it, and then when you’ve seen it back, I thought “God, I didn’t realise 
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it was that bad!”’. She was frequently moved to tears during the short film, her voice 
trembling with what she identified as profound sadness in our discussion. She reported that 
the reaction from the audience was the best she could hope for: silence. She interpreted this 
as having had a resonance for the audience far beyond her expectations. She felt that it was 
actually a moment of great power for her; ‘I was thinking I was glad that it was having an 
impact and I was thinking maybe now they’ll actually look at some of the written stuff and 
actually do something about it. Take into account that this is reality’. This silence could have 
had other roots – embarrassment for example – but Carla located it within the emotional 
realm of policy work and interpreted it accordingly. This reflects a discourse of the power of 
emotion found elsewhere among my informants. 
So although these outbursts of emotion were often described as disruptive and 
“unprofessional”, a sort of tacit permission seems to have been granted by the forum’s 
participants to community activists and the “grassroots” to break with protocol. There is 
clearly more going on here than naivety. By looking beyond the sometimes rather trivialising 
descriptions of activism and grassroots emotionality in policy forums and focusing on their 
participants’ practice, it emerges that their license to behave in this way serves a range of 
purposes for the entire policy-making community. 
5.1 Emotional beings being emotional: the binary opposit ion 
between emotion and rationality 
As I have explained in the previous chapter, bringing the emotional to bear upon decision-
making was seen by informants from each of the three categories of forum participant as 
serving a practical deliberative function, and perhaps a moral one as well. In our discussions 
emotional knowledge was presented as the special and almost exclusive preserve of 
community activists. Not only were they the only ones who are allowed to display emotional 
knowledge or act upon it in the forums uninhibited, but they are the only ones who ever 
legitimately could, according to my informants. Having explained the way that 
“professionalism” as a cluster of thoughts and behaviours adhered to the civil servants in 
such a way that they were expected to embody this quality, I will examine how the same 
association was made between emotion and activists and other “grassroots” participants as 
an apparently essential part of who they were, what they knew and how they knew what they 
knew. 
Right at the very beginning of my field work, while arranging my first trip with Louise to 
visit a community group she wanted to present at the first annual showcase, I had been struck 
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by the way that emotion was used in everyday language as an essential quality that attached 
to certain types of people and in turn produced certain patterns of behaviour in those people. 
I had a phonecall in the first few weeks of 2012 from Louise, who I then didn’t know at all, 
in which she had spontaneously offered her own definition of “emotion” as an abnormal and 
visible eruption of anger or sadness into “normal” working life. She also offered some 
parameters of where I ought to be looking for it in her work on the basis of how she defined 
emotion. After getting off the phone to her, I wrote in my field journal: 
‘“Emotion” is one of the [key terms] that I think is really interesting to talk about. 
Even if my proposals seem to me to be quite particular in talking about that as an 
interpersonal or cognitive thing, people I talk to seem to always interpret it as “being 
emotional”; i.e. getting upset or angry. It’s rarely anything positive! They have a 
tendency to try and ring fence off what I would – or maybe should – be looking at in 
their working lives and to drive me towards it. I pointed out to Louise that I’m just as 
interested in the quiet stuff as the noisy, overt stuff and that even if apparently 
nothing is happening I’m still going to get something out of it.’ 
Louise’s understanding of my work was not unusual among the Partnership staff and no 
doubt profoundly shaped my entire project in two significant ways. Both aspects are implied 
in my journal entry about our initial negotiations. The first was that emotion was something 
which attached itself and found its outlet in particular types of people who could or would 
“be emotional”; while others might or might not experience various emotions in the course 
of their lives, in the context of the Partnership’s policy work there were people who were 
emotional creatures. The second aspect was that these people were apparently external to 
Louise and her working context and they were categorically different to her and many of the 
other people I might meet. This impression of mine was reinforced by the Partnership 
director’s initial refusal that I observe, as a participant or as a non-participant, the everyday 
life of his office as I had originally proposed to do; Louise also sent me an email supporting 
his decision and discussed it at length with me during our initial phone conversation. Their 
dislike of the idea was not practical or ethical; it actually transpired that they were unhappy 
with my conceptualisation of “emotion” itself in my research project and they wished to 
reframe it. To paraphrase the director Jonathan’s position as relayed to me by Louise, he 
didn’t see how what he understood as emotion could be happening in his office as it involved 
emotive displays from the sort of people who go in for emotive displays: i.e. not his staff or 
him. I disagreed with this conviction on an epistemological basis, and disliked the fact that 
my research appeared to be being rewritten as “better” research by the Partnership. However, 
on reflection I realised that, so long as I was aware of what was happening, I was being 
presented with an interesting research opportunity. The places and the people that Louise and 
Jonathan presented to me in those first months of fieldwork as suitably “emotional” were 
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always, without exception, ones in which activists and “grassroots” contributors were the 
main focus. 
This is the context in which I asked Carla about where I should look for emotion and how I 
would recognise it when I saw it. As I have already explained, her response was 
unequivocal: activists are the only people who have an emotional relationship to the “reality” 
of a phenomenon because they are the only person who has direct, unmediated experience of 
it. As she put it, truth was something that required emotional knowledge as ‘the actual person 
who experiences it can tell it proper’. Whether you have that emotional knowledge is 
something which is imprinted in your life history because it is determined by your first hand 
experiences. In the Partnership’s work the maintenance of “professional” status rested partly 
on one’s distance from emotional knowledge. The idea that the very nature of the activist 
required and demanded an emotional experience of the matter under discussion was equally 
current, and furthermore the two ways of knowing were morally incompatible and mutually 
exclusive. 
To illustrate the way emotion and rationality were constructed in a binary opposition to one 
another, and the scale of investment involved in keeping them apart, I will describe an 
encounter I had towards the end of my time with the Partnership with a group of community 
researchers the Partnership’s research officer Cathy had been working with for some months. 
I accompanied Cathy to a preparation session with this group who were planning their 
contribution to the second annual showcase event I attended at the Partnership. The second 
year I was involved in putting together the event in a minor role, facilitating evidence 
sessions, finding and briefing community organisations and activists to act as contributors 
and doing various administrative tasks. Cathy had asked me to come as a second pair of 
hands for the day. She had been leading on the community research project that the women 
had contributed to and they had recently published its findings. It had received quite a bit of 
interest from Parliamentarians in Scotland and London and Cathy wanted to call the women 
together to see how its key messages could be repackaged for an evidence session at the 
showcase; key to this was how the women’s first-person testimony would be woven into this 
presentation. The day was primarily about structuring their contributions as witnesses around 
the key findings of the research report. 
The day-long meeting was held in a community centre in a small east coast town, which 
actually turned out to be integrated into the town’s shopping centre and leisure centre. We 
had a long, low-ceilinged room with no windows on the top floor. I had travelled there with 
Cathy and another research student she knew through her old university, and we sat at a long 
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table which more or less filled the room with the women from the research project, five in 
total, and a case worker from a women’s support organisation. Very quickly, demonstrating 
an uninhibited emotional (first person, somatic, personally invested) relationship to the work 
and relationships of the project became a mode of communicating about the work that, I felt, 
my fellow attendees were keen to reflect to one another. I found this rather uncomfortable: 
‘Cathy tells us that the best thing that’s happened to her all week was  that she got an 
email from a woman in the House of Lords telling her that she used their research in 
a speech in the House.  People are really impressed by this, Cathy is telling them 
how much of an achievement this is and so on. I nod my head. One of the women 
says that she’s rather teared up. “I actually cried yesterday in the office, “ says 
Cathy. “Oh, I’m tearing up now, too!” says the research student. 
Is it a sign of how wicked I am that I am not tearing up (I don’t know anyone here 
after all), but instead going through Hansard to see how the report has been used?’ 
I had been part of big NGO research projects and I did understand very well the sense of 
pride and relief when a group’s hard work gets recognised by others, but no-one had ever got 
tearful when our work was used in Parliamentary business. I have never cried in my office, 
at least not because a peer has referenced my work. The fact that the other incomer to the 
group, the research student Cathy had brought with her, had “become tearful” too left me 
feeling distinctly out of step with the way the other women in the room related to the project.  
I perceived as the day’s business went on that there seemed to be a conviction that the 
group’s emotional perspective on the world around them was the thing that they could most 
valuably contribute to general debates about poverty, and their experiences were not just the 
subject of investigation but also the tool Cathy and the case worker were most keen that they 
use to analyse a given topic. For instance, the research student had brought a questionnaire 
that she wanted to trial for a piece of university work, and the women’s analysis was rooted 
almost entirely in how it made them feel. It was not a well-written questionnaire – it had 
been pieced together from various evaluation tools by the research student’s supervisor and 
contained some nonsensical or clumsy language. I think it aimed to measure the relative 
connectedness or isolation of its sample, going by the questions asked. Nevertheless, the 
women immediately personalised the questionnaire’s agenda, giving it an intentionality I 
wasn’t aware of based on their own perceptions of why someone would ask them such 
questions: 
‘They perceive a malevolence and judgementalism in the questionnaires that I did 
not. “The whole point of this is to find out the bad stuff going on in your life” one 
says. Sitting next to her is the person who Cathy has asked to give a speech in the 
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opening plenary; she suddenly bursts into tears and leaves the room, followed by the 
case worker and Cathy. It becomes clear that they’re gone for a good long while, and 
the research student does her best to carry on. “Oh, I’m crying myself now,” she 
says, tearing up and wiping away incipient tears.’ 
The remaining women continued to describe how the questionnaire was, in fact, aimed at 
making them feel terrible and that the information it was trying to elicit from them wasn’t 
sufficiently emotional knowledge: 
‘The person who raised the idea that the questionnaire was trying to find out the bad 
stuff in your life says, “The questionnaire triggers a lot of bad feelings. I don’t want 
to write that down at all,” referring to the income question. She says that it just 
makes her think of how she isn’t getting the money she should do from her ex. 
People nod and agree, and start to tell their personal stories of how you might 
interpret them as doing fine, but actually they’ve all got a lot of personal and 
distressing stuff to be dealing with.’ 
The idea that the questionnaire might not be interested one way or the other in how they feel 
about the topics it dealt with, or that this might not be germane to the task it was attempting, 
was not part of the discourse of the group. When the research student apologised for having 
made any of them feel bad, saying that she was “so naïve”, one of the women said, 
soothingly;  
‘”It’s not a case of being naïve, it’s just that if it hasn’t happened to you, you don’t 
know.” This is met with nodding. The woman sitting opposite her – the originator of 
the “poorest and maddest” paradigm – starts to recount a narrative that gets repeated 
during the workshop. They’re telling their stories about the way their lives are and 
that’s taking positive action. That’s making a positive change that will affect not just 
them but lots of other people and telling the people “up here” – here the woman 
makes a flat, waving gesture above her head – the policy makers, the politicians who 
think they can make decisions about the people down here – here there’s a 
diametrically opposed hand waved just above the table – the grassroots. “We’re not 
just saying, ‘I wish I could change that’, we’re taking steps to change that”. Cathy 
nods.’ 
That woman went on to describe how she had confronted someone at a Jobcentre about her 
personal experiences of claiming benefits.  
“’Now, you’ll go and tell all your colleagues about it, won’t you?’ I said” says the 
woman, and the sarcastic mock didacticism gets a laugh out of the other women. 
“And she just sat there like this:” and the woman makes a scared, awkward face, 
pulled back and recoiled from an imaginary other, nodding anxiously. This gets an 
even bigger laugh.’ 
I was struck, even in the moment, how the knowledge that the women had because of their 
emotional immersion in the topic was being presented as something inaccessible to others 
except through them, and in particular how powerful the women portrayed it as being. It was 
something that they and only they had at their disposal, and was being talked about as being 
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totally unlike other forms of knowledge about the world. It was also morally superior to 
other forms of knowledge, because by seeing the world the way they saw it you 
demonstrated that you were a caring person, on their side, and if you did not act upon this 
knowledge your decisions could not be morally justified. This was made explicit by one of 
the women: 
‘The original critic of the research student’s question says that the whole point is that 
you can’t make a decision about something that affects someone’s life if you don’t 
know exactly what their lives are like, and you can’t provide them with a service. “If 
you talk to me for six minutes rather than read these six pages you’ll get more out of 
it,” she says, gesturing the questionnaire. After all, this is how they did their own 
questionnaire for their research and so much stuff, really intense and personal stuff, 
came out. “If you don’t work with me then you don’t know how my life works,” she 
says, and concludes that this is what she now expects of everyone “up there”.’ 
As an ethnographer I have some common ground with the women’s belief in immersive and 
experiential approaches to research and their epistemological faith in understanding others’ 
systems of belief about the world in context. Where I differ, however, is that I don’t see 
research as an essentially moral choice between this and other ways of collecting information 
about the world and analysing it. I’m happy for policy to be informed by a range of sources 
of knowledge, some but not all of them “evidence-based”. To the women and to Cathy, the 
research student and the case worker, the project had been premised upon the underlying 
conviction that emotional knowledge was, if not the only, then the primary source of 
information for making morally “good” policy. Their belief that their knowledge was only 
available to them and the way that people lacking this knowledge were placed in a quite 
separate and perhaps somewhat abject category was striking to me at the time. I began to 
think as the day went on that my unwillingness to dissolve the distinctions between their 
experiences and beliefs and my own about the phenomena under discussion was the source 
of discomfort precisely because this made me not “on their side” and therefore amoral, 
perhaps immoral. As one of the women put it, ‘”These people up there need educating on 
real life and not just their academics!” I and others like me had no access to “real life”, being 
who I am, and needed to be guided by people who did. But, if I don’t live in the “real 
world”, I wondered to myself, what world did I live in and why did it feel so “real” to me? 
Was my real less real than their real, or was I actually committing a categorical error here, 
and nothing I had ever experienced was real? Or did it only pertain to certain things others 
didn’t think I had experienced, and if so, how did they know I had or hadn’t experienced 
something, and were there degrees of intensity of experience? I did not find a way to 
articulate these questions at the time, and do not think it would have been a productive line 
of inquiry. Nonetheless, when the women were asked to think about how they would present 
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the work they had done and what was important about it, they emphasised its indivisibility 
from their own emotional lives and indeed their very selves: 
‘The request for reflections on the process brings out more aspects of these women’s 
personal stories, which to me feels like a dimension of the whole thing but 
apparently to them is the same thing. We’re effectively getting a long list of reasons 
why this research was important to them, but not to others necessarily. When you 
ask why someone else should take an interest in it, the answer seems to broadly be 
because it’s “real” and it’s them and they deserve to be listened to because of, well, 
being them.’ 
Emotional knowledge in the context of this group of women was something that you had or 
you didn’t because of your experiences. There were people who knew emotional things 
about policy matters, and there were people, as Carla put it, who “just go by what they have 
written down”. Activists were motivated by this emotional knowledge, either because it was 
their own knowledge, or because they were ideologically committed to providing others with 
a platform for sharing this knowledge. In the research project Cathy had facilitated for the 
Partnership and subsequently presented at the annual showcase, emotional knowledge was 
morally superior to other knowledge, and should define the parameters of debate and action. 
Above all, any action should be emotionally acceptable to the people it affected directly or 
indirectly, otherwise you were not a “good” policy maker, or perhaps not even a “good” 
person. 
This vignette about the preparation workshop is only about one group of activists on one 
particular day, and it is maybe an unusually exaggerated example of the way emotional 
understanding and technical or academic understanding of an issue were generally not just 
seen as separate, but incommensurable and morally incompatible. However the views 
expressed by the women were mirrored surprisingly closely by many of the Partnership’s 
collaborators and at the least demonstrate the way that the knowledge-truth claims of 
volunteers and “grassroots” activists were thought about in the wider context of the 
Partnership’s policy activities. The overall impression I got from the women I spoke to that 
day and several other activists on other occasions was that you would not, you could not, be 
so unfeeling as to have an “academic” or “professional” perspective on something you had 
experienced first-hand. You couldn’t place that perspective before a person’s somatic, 
visceral experience and still make “good” policy, and that policy cannot be “good” unless 
they experience it emotionally as “good”. So while emotion excludes you from 
“professional” status, it is also gives you the right to be at the table and have your role in 
deliberations and is a powerful riposte to the perceived knowledge shortcomings of 
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“professionalism” that caused anxiety for NGO and Government workers I encountered.  
It perhaps should not be surprising that there is a peculiar, almost talismanic power held by 
the publicly emotional person in a process contrived to crush subjectivity and individuality. I 
am anxious to be explicit in where I understand this power to originate and explain how it 
worked in the context of the forums, however. There are perhaps prior claims implied in my 
discussion of this episode with the women’s research group about the relations we have with 
objects such as “knowledge”, “governance” and “truth”, which became important secondary 
concepts as I analysed my data. To frame our understanding of these concepts as 
fundamentally relational suggests they are not simply abstract but enmeshed in our wider 
web of relations and meaning. I have been struck by how powerfully female the activist 
experience and experiences of the activist have proven to be in my data. I mention this 
because I feel the analytical complexities of gender, emotion and governance in the context 
of the Partnership’s work serve to illustrate how the split between rationality and emotion 
perhaps acquired some of its potency and resonance, and indeed suggest how the process of 
standing for I have referred to in this chapter and the previous one actually worked. 
I had entered the field fully expecting gender to be a significant topic of discussion at some 
point. Perhaps naively, I had assumed that because there appeared to be a strong insistence 
on the gendered nature of conceptualisations of emotion and the emotional in academic 
literature that I would not only find this recognisably replicated in the everyday practices of 
the Partnership or the other institutions and organisations I worked with, but that I would 
also find this being brought up in descriptions of emotion and other discussions I had with 
my informants. After all, women’s representation and gender inequality were current 
concerns to the Partnership, as the establishment of a women-only community research 
project demonstrated. As the months went by and no-one voiced an interest in the topic, let 
alone an opinion, I became increasingly frustrated but also intrigued. How could something 
be such a preoccupation to my academic colleagues but apparently not even occur to my 
informants, even when I was explicitly talking to them about who “was emotional” in their 
working lives? I was reluctant to make an issue out of something that wasn’t apparently 
relevant to my informants, but my curiosity also began to get the better of me. Roughly a 
year into my fieldwork I decided to ask Jenny a direct question about gender. As a 
Partnership board member who worked in another NGO, she was something of an interested 
outsider and we tended to have rather more “meta” conversations about policy, politics, 
power and emotion than the practically-focused discussions I had with Partnership staff, and 
I felt that we had built enough of a rapport that she would feel quite comfortable telling me I 
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was asking something irrelevant. When I explained that I had noticed that the activists the 
Partnership worked most closely with over the longest time were almost all women, and that 
women tended to be over-represented at Partnership events for activists, I wondered aloud if 
there was a connection between gender, activism and “being emotional”. Jenny simply 
looked at me, completely baffled, and eventually said that she had never thought about it. 
When I also pointed out that the majority of people who did policy officer-type roles in this 
context were also women, she again said she had never thought about it, and that she would 
have to have some time to ponder a response. The overall impression I got from our 
conversation was that it had never occurred to Jenny that this was a question worth asking, 
because she didn’t actively think about these people as doing gendered roles in policy work. 
My own observation that there was a connection between gender, role and emotional 
knowledge needs to be qualified I think. It would be a neat summary to say that the binary 
opposition between rationality and emotion reflected a split between dominant “good” and 
abject “bad” objects which maps directly to hegemonic masculinities and hegemonic 
femininities and helps to perpetuate them. But it was clear that to Jenny and probably most 
other people involved in the Partnership’s policy work emotion, and activism, was not 
understood as essentially feminine or feminised because it did not reflect an aspect of their 
own construct of womanhood per se. The fault-line in the split between rationality and 
emotion seemed to run between which are tolerable and admissible aspects of our selves and 
which are not under quite specific circumstances. This reframing of the nature of the split 
might go some way to explaining how emotion and rationality ran parallel to one another as 
moral approaches to governance and why it was apparently felt that policy work cannot be 
done without either, even as they threaten to destroy one another. The metaphor of the 
“Shadow” seems appropriate here; there is a recognition that our shadows complete our 
experience of the world, ourselves and others in a way that bad objects do not. If I see the 
emotional activist as the “shadow” of the rational governor, it may help to explain how 
maleness and femaleness and emotion and rationality converge but are not identical in my 
data. Post-Jungian deconstructionist approaches to the shadow contrast this understanding of 
splitting and projection with more “literal” interpretations of images; ‘arguing that 
masculinity and femininity should be understood nonliterally, as having nothing to do with 
bodily men and bodily women in social context, may be taken as an effort to come to terms 
with what is lost by the projection’ )(Samuels 1990, pp.301–302). I would argue that if I 
substitute the dichotomous concepts of emotion and rationality for masculinity and 
femininity in that statement, I can still make the same claim. While analysing my 
experiences and my data, I am not decoding the separate nature of emotion and rationality in 
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a literal way, but trying to recognise that these are constructed oppositions which are not 
documentary representations of social life. The activist is standing for the idea of emotion, 
the civil servant for the idea of rationality, but neither lacks access to either type of 
knowledge about the world or a specific policy problem. Rather their shadow is the thing 
that cannot be “I”; ‘that which they are unable to tolerate in themselves – not so much 
individually but due largely to the limits of what our present culture and the dominant 
consciousness will support or allow’ (Hauke 2001, p.160). Just as archetypal images of, say, 
men can be good and bad (the strong, admirable father and the tyrannical, domineering 
father, to use a rather clichéd example), so potentially other important objects we all 
typically relate to can be incommensurably split depending on what we can tolerate and who 
we need to be. The State, governance, civil society; these are all objects with which most 
contemporary humans are obliged to have a relationship. 
5.2 The embodied nature of emotional knowledge 
The physical presence of grassroots activists developed a prominent role in the way I and 
others discussed emotion and “being emotional” in the Partnership’s policy work. Carla was 
able to give me quite detailed descriptions of how people might behave if they were 
emotional, and also if they were not emotional, to help me understand what in her opinion I 
should be looking for in my data collection. She listed things such as animated facial 
expressions and hand gestures, raised and rapid speech and eye contact as things which were 
“emotional tells”. There was also a set of behaviours she described as “actively listening” 
which involved leaning forward, mirroring what other people said or did physically and 
holding and returning eye contact, which she believed indicated that those displaying these 
behaviours were emotionally present. She also told me that she knew when people weren’t 
emotionally present because she would see their attention wandering. When I asked how she 
could tell if someone’s attention wandered, she mimed someone slumped back in their chair, 
eyes focused on a middle distance somewhat to the side of me, and she then shifted to 
doodling in an imaginary notebook. I was interested in the way Carla’s description of the 
presentation of emotion was fundamentally about intervening in a shared physical space and 
moment. I was also struck by how she did not rely on describing behaviours and patterns of 
speech to me; she seemed to feel it was most effective to re-create the experience of that 
shared moment for me. In part because of Carla’s directions, but also because of my own 
attempts to unpack how the face-to-face encounter might work upon self-identifying 
“professionals” in ways written communication could not, I documented in some detail the 
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way presence, representation and performance was talked about and practiced in relation to 
activists in the Partnership’s policy work. 
I am not going to misrepresent the stories that got told and the emotion on display from 
community activists in the Partnership’s policy events as simplistic, unrehearsed or 
unmediated. Considerable effort was put into finding, nurturing and presenting individuals 
who have a powerfully emotional story to tell by the Partnership’s staff. This was very much 
the work that I was involved in through my engagement with the Partnership as I participated 
in their policy events and one way or another occupied most of my time and the policy 
officer Louise’s time. The various ways in which the organisation managed, translated, 
deleted and created with these stories requires detailed analysis and it will be dealt with at 
length in the following two chapters. But for the purposes of this discussion it is important to 
stress that, for my NGO informants, this first person testimony from people directly 
experiencing poverty is the place where the real business of decision making starts for them 
as policy lobbyists and for the people they wish to influence. This was also reflected by my 
own experiences observing and facilitating meetings and workshops where activists directly 
experiencing poverty or a related problem were encouraged to share stories and then, 
through various processes, reflect upon what the key messages are that policy makers will be 
able to grasp and how best they should present themselves.  
For example, at the very start of my time with the Partnership I accompanied Louise on a trip 
to a community centre in North Glasgow to prepare testimony for the first annual showcase 
event. This testimony was always termed “evidence” in the quasi-juridical language of the 
Partnership’s policy events. Such testimonies are often employed as the route in and through 
what are otherwise either inhumanly complex or boring matters and as such are considered 
to be the key to a productive discussion with civil servants or Parliamentarians by Louise and 
her colleagues. The centre’s users and manager were going to present to a breakout session 
similar in format to the one I met Douglas at and which I described previously. Louise began 
the preparation session by impressing upon the centre’s users that it was imperative that we 
start from personal and emotional knowledge and work outwards from there. I wrote, 
‘Louise says that she wants Linda [one of the centre users] to tell her story as a basis for 
putting words to needs. She reminds us that the assembly is about pinpointing what the goals 
are - that we need to move from vague feelings to material demands’. In practice this process 
of moving from the particular and emotional to general and impersonal, so simple-sounding 
on paper, was actually very difficult to get right in the eyes of policy practitioners such as 
Louise and indeed myself because of emotional knowledge’s ambiguous status in policy. 
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Because of this great efforts were made to figure out how to “stage” the emotional content of 
the testimonies. On this particular occasion we spent over two hours returning to the same 
stories, working over the same ground. There were moments when I, almost instinctively, 
felt that I had experienced what I was looking for as the centre manager and users talked to 
me and Louise, but I was also aware that I wasn’t consciously able to describe what “it” was. 
On reflection, I believe these electric moments were about a particular coming together of 
ideas, words, physical presence and place. There is plenty of technical information about 
areas of deprivation and the built environment, but the problem may be better understood in 
some way if the centre manager, sitting a couple of feet away from you, looking directly at 
you, tells you that, ‘The emotional, psychological side of watching things go to shit is 
devastating, particularly when those buildings were important to the community’. Within this 
statement is not just an unsparing diagnosis of a problem, but also conveyed within his 
personal experience of this problem is an uncompromising challenge about the injustice of 
things. Above all, though, there is something in the way that his body and voice changes the 
world around you, refocuses your attention, retrieves your understanding of the matter from 
the endless deferments of abstraction. You feel in a visceral way, and as a result get a 
suggestion of where and how to act. These moments were what Louise was looking for and 
drawing attention to and what the users of that community centre were being encouraged to 
bring to the forum. 
As my time with the Partnership went on, I began to suspect that, thanks to their special 
license to express powerful, personal emotions and experiences, community activists also 
seemed to have acquired a role as emotional avatars. That is to say they somehow expressed 
an emotional and personal relationship to the process and content of policy on behalf of 
those who may not because of expectations for them to behave as “professionals”. This was 
not something that has been brought up by the community activists themselves, but had been 
mentioned several times by professional practitioners, in particular the NGO workers. The 
strategic review feedback session, chaired by Louise and attended by Craig and his 
colleagues from Whitehall and the Scottish Government, which I referred to in the previous 
chapter was a good illustration of how activists were looked to by “professionals” to provide 
a vicarious “emotional” release. In part this meeting was called because of Louise’s 
dissatisfaction with the way the civil servants involved had behaved; at the end of the 
summer recess when the Strategic Review came to be published, none of the Partnership’s 
input seemed to have made it into the final edit or be directly reflected by the content. This 
omission was described as being professionally embarrassing and a kind of failure by the 
policy workers involved, but for Louise, who had coordinated the submission, it had 
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personal significance. Not only did she look unreliable or misleading to the community 
activists she had persuaded to give up their time and participate in the workshops, a source of 
great sadness and anxiety to her, she also felt betrayed on what can only be described as a 
very personal level by her civil service contacts. When I caught up with her after summer, I 
found her to be visibly fuming; 
‘“They never bloody well used any of our material” she says. “I’m telling you, it’s 
going to be hard to keep my own emotions under control. To be honest I’m hoping 
that the community activists there will do the shouting for me’. […] 
Even at the time I was struck by the implications of what Louise was telling me; that she 
wanted to engineer an encounter between these civil servants and activists to witness a 
venting of bad feeling she could not do herself, but which would nevertheless provide her 
with some vicarious relief, or satisfaction. I attended the feedback session with interest and, 
frankly, some trepidation. In the event, the public meetings between the community activists 
and these civil servants were remarkably polite. Two of them occurred the following month; 
the first was a plenary session of the ongoing stakeholder forum, the other was a feedback 
session specifically for the subcommittee and the evidence givers from community groups. 
During the plenary I had expected a far greater level of hostility from the floor to the 
individual civil servant, Craig, who presented to us the overall strategy document’s contents. 
This didn’t really happen, but I do know that more than one meeting had been held between 
the host organisation and the civil service team in question and by this time some appeasing 
measures had been suggested in private, such as making these discussions a semi-formal 
permanent part of the team’s work. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction was given voice during the 
panel session where Craig and a community research participant who gave evidence to the 
strategy review reflected on the process and the document.  
‘“The feeling I got from last night [a meeting of the subcommittee] was that some 
areas got dismissed [by Government]”, he [the community researcher] says. People 
take a note of this on their agendas and so on. Coming after such a bland, un-pin-
downable account of the process as the previous one by Craig, this seems almost 
shocking to me. I am also aware that the two speakers are sat right next to one 
another. I’m intrigued that the second speaker was comfortable saying this about 
Craig in public. To me, from what I have learnt, this is not what you do. […]It’s not 
“professional”; ultimately embarrassing your colleague is worse somehow than not 
airing the grievance, even in front of a sympathetic audience.’ 
Was this, I wondered, the vicarious emotional catharsis that Louise had been hoping for? I 
actually wondered if the entire meeting was, on some level, a symbolic enactment of 
Louise’s frustrated “emotional” investment in the Strategic Review. If so, it felt to me like a 
radical departure in the way I normally thought about the purpose of such meetings; if this 
124 
 
was in some way a symbolic staging of a cathartic moment for those who otherwise could 
not experience (or admit to experiencing) something personal and visceral about the making 
and implementation of policy, then the community researcher became Louise’s emotional 
avatar. She had said that she hoped that the community activists would “do the shouting for 
her”. Submitting a written complaint about the Review’s procedural failings may have been 
overly formal and therefore not politically prudent, but I would also contend that Louise 
wanted to be able to watch the discharge of pent up feelings and enjoy a moment of catharsis 
herself. Considering this possibility sent me looking through my own journals and notes. I 
wondered if I could find traces of this vicarious emotional release in my engagement with 
policy work. After the first day of the first Partnership annual showcase event, I noted down 
my thoughts after meeting someone who had worked in London at the same time as me for 
an organisation I had known well, although we personally had never met. I had asked her 
how she felt the day had gone so far, and she had told me that she’d got a lot out of it. In 
particular the testimony of single mothers had impressed itself on her as, she said, she had 
got into working in poverty campaigning because of her own experiences as a lone parent. 
‘It’s good to remember why you’re angry at these things [policy events],’ she told me. I 
asked if she meant that anger fades over time. She continued, pulling a sad and pained face: 
‘It doesn’t fade. At all. But of course it changes’. She went on to explain that her job had 
made her preoccupied with how her anger appeared to other people at the expense of her 
own ability to experience this emotion directly; she described this as “reasonableness”. This 
made me ponder what I got out of being there, why I went to policy events and why I 
organised them: 
 ‘I reflect on why I come to these things myself. I recognise what my companion 
says. Did I come to these things looking for solidarity? To give myself a shot in the 
arm? Remind me of who I really am after too much reasonableness? I realise I miss 
having that partisan identity, that purpose, even if it was sometimes a costly act. 
Meeting the panellist and being here has thrown me back to my London days very 
powerfully, and I do feel like I am reliving that state of mind a little.’ 
I believe that this urge to relive a state of mind lies at the heart of the importance of presence 
and the moment in the role played by activists in policy work. Being there is essential 
because it accesses things that cannot be accessed any other way for participants. I came to 
see the importance of presence to the Partnership’s policy work, and particularly the re-
presencing of emotional knowledge through the bodies and physicality of activists, as a 
primarily aesthetic matter. By this I mean to draw a distinction between more cognitive 
attempts to account for the relational dimension of policy work and something which is 
intimately connected to performance, the physical and the moment. Reading my own words 
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now, it seems obvious that what I was engaging in by attending the first annual showcase, 
what I was seeking, was not information in the cognitive sense. I did not attend to simply 
download the information that resided in activists’ accounts of their experiences of poverty 
because in itself possessing this information was not what I really desired. I wanted to 
integrate something about governance and my Self and I could not do this simply by 
possessing the object of emotional knowledge. I appeared to be looking to that object to 
effect some change in me, or at least to remind me of the aspects of it that still reside in me, 
just as the panellist I spoke to attended to reignite her own emotional knowledge.  
What matters about activists’ emotional presence – just as much as the present absence of 
civil servants – is the aesthetic moment of it, which is a complex confluence of material, 
physical, bodily, verbal, sensory and symbolic factors. I am aware that these encounters were 
not wholly pleasurable, and I might argue that in the context of the Partnership’s policy work 
they tended to be somewhat traumatic. However, so are many aesthetic experiences 
exploring the “unthought knowns” of these moments of transformation, which do not 
necessarily have to be pleasant to be existentially constructive. Seen this way, the aesthetics 
of politics is an under-valued factor in what makes it so compelling and addictive to at least 
some of us, satisfyingly fulfilling Bollas’ description of aesthetic moments: 
‘Such experiences are re-enacted memories, not recreations. 
The search for symbolic equivalents to the transformational object, and the 
experience with which it is identified, continues in adult life… We go to the theatre, 
to the museum, to the landscapes of our choice, to search for aesthetic 
experiences.’(Bollas 1987, p.17). 
Bollas’ description of the aesthetic moment draws upon a very different tradition of 
“shadows” to anything I have discussed so far. According to his model, I was looking for a 
transformational object which is ‘pursued in order to surrender to it as a medium that alters 
the self’ (Bollas 1987, p.14) so it is no longer existentially at odds with the world around it.  
What, if anything, I wondered, might the aesthetic experience of politics and policy making 
have to do with the “shadow” model of splitting I was now working with? In keeping with 
my theoretical approach described in my previous chapter, my aim is to explore and develop 
my own implicit theories of data analysis in dialogue with more explicit ones, as ‘explicit 
theories are all too often phrased as abstractions that do not specify how to act in particular 
cases’ (Jones-Smith 2011, p.603). My understanding of what is being split – knowledge of 
the world – demands an explanation of how in practice I and my informants manage and 
experience that split through an emphasis on physical presence in a shared space and 
moment. I would therefore argue that the importance of this aesthetic encounter is bound up 
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in the construction of the activist as emotional being. It is their somatism and their direct 
experience of what others “only read in a book” which places their knowledge of the world 
in the category of the “emotional”. What is being experienced through this aesthetic 
encounter is not just with the activist themselves as an object through their re-presencing of 
that emotional knowledge as symbolic emotional beings, but also a reminder of the nature of 
emotional knowledge itself through an existential remembering of what has been banished to 
the shadows of canonical models of “good” governance. In a moment of aesthetic transport, 
“professionals” re-experience the object of emotional knowledge in a transformative way 
that feels uncannily like returning home, ‘the sense of being reminded of something never 
cognitively apprehended but existentially known’ (Bollas 1987, p.16). These aesthetic 
moments are ways of representing the metaphor of the shadow behind “good” governance. 
Perhaps aesthetic moments are important to understanding the desires underlying the 
sentimentalism of “professionals”. This sentimentality is really about searching for a state of 
being in which one does not have to choose between one’s Heart and one’s Head, of 
recognising the complex whole behind a persona. And to the person who enters into policy 
work to be an activist, it is an aesthetic encounter with rationality and a cluster of other 
attributes which could equally be articulated as the shadow of their somatic, caring persona.  
5.3 Conclusion: Rationality and its shadow  
This chapter and the preceding chapter are an attempt to document how “emotion” was 
described to me by my informants and an unpacking of how I and they observed “the 
emotional” during the Partnership’s policy work and developed ways of talking together 
about these experiences. As I have previously stated, this reflects my concern to address the 
lack of ethnographic descriptions of emotion as understood in everyday life of policy and 
politics. These chapters are an exploration of the way the personal and the social interacted 
to produce these intersubjective experiences, a contribution hopefully to exploring how 
Becker et al’s “dialogical approach” to data collection and analysis (2012) can generate new 
insights into what is meant when people involved in policy talk about  emotion. It is my 
attempt to understand emotion as a complex cultural phenomenon which resides not purely 
inside us or entirely in the context around us, but as an “in-between” thing that is constituted 
both by the inner and outer worlds of the people who experience it. 
The presence of two incommensurable but indispensable ways of being and knowing in the 
world - and more specifically in policy work - that rationality and emotion represented to my 
informants and I has led me to draw upon the literature around the use of institutions as a 
defence against anxiety, and especially the psychosocial literatures which draw upon 
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Kleinian concepts of splitting as such a defence. In this I am to some degree building on and 
referring to the work of other policy scholars who use a psychosocial approach, for example 
such as Hoggett (2013; 2006), Lewis (2004), Hunter (2012; 2009) and Froggett (2002).  By 
looking at the practice the split between emotion and rationality operated in the Partnership’s 
policy work, I have explored the evidence for what splitting in fact consisted of in the 
context of my research in dialogue with other scholarship which also sees the institutions 
which people inhabit as expressive of and constitutive of their need to split “good” from 
“bad”. However, I consider my distinctive contribution to have been to problematize the 
oppositional binaries presented to me by my informants and explore the way these ways of 
knowing and being in the world actually work together to produce policy work. My overall 
model is one of a primarily heuristic split between activists and professionals; in fact these 
archetypal standing fors necessarily work together and rely on each other. Activists stood for 
emotional knowledge, symbolically representing not just the substantive contents of that 
knowledge but also an entire value system which saw emotional relations as a moral 
necessity in good governance. This emotional knowledge was also re-presenced by the figure 
of the activist; through their physical intervention into the shared spaces and moments of 
policy work they enacted aesthetic moments of emotional knowledge which “professionals” 
found cathartic in the Greek theatre sense of that word. By focusing on the way that 
knowledge contributes to power in an overtly political context, my fieldwork foregrounded 
the way that rationality and emotion in fact rely on each other and in fact make use of 
different logics of power in the relations between participants. Emotion and the emotional 
being of the activist can be seen as the Shadow of the dominant figure of the rational 
governor in policy work. As emotional avatars, they embody what the Hands know and 
remind the Head of what it has lost in the maintenance of “professionalism”.  
I see the way emotion and rationality became split and projected into diametrically opposed 
categories of participant in the Partnership’s policy work as having its roots in quite 
pragmatic needs; it was to protect participants (including myself) from experiencing the 
clash of incommensurable beliefs and values about governance and the State. On a purely 
practical level, splitting knowledge and moral narratives into rationality and emotion and 
projecting these onto different categories of participant in the forums was an ingenious 
solution to an otherwise intractable problem. One story about good governance told in the 
forum’s cultural context was that “good” policy never comes from personal, somatic 
experience and private reasoning. The other compelling story was that moral judgement and 
“the good” can only come from emotion and feeling something about the world and other 
people. People from all three of the self-determined categories of participant regularly 
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professed both of these convictions. But their identity and function in the forums’ policy 
work placed more of an emphasis on one kind of knowledge than the other. Furthermore, 
these two sets of beliefs made it hard to behave as an unequivocally “good” person, and it 
also made it hard to relate to the idea of governance and policy decision-making without 
experiencing some loss or conflict within one’s self and about the institutions of governance. 
To this extent, splitting emotional knowledge and rational knowledge and making certain 
categories of participant stand symbolically for those knowledges at work in policy may 
have helped my informants and myself cope with the conflicting demands of governance and 
make otherwise painful decisions or interventions.  
However much splitting knowledge of the world into “rational” and “emotional” symbols 
was supposed to protect the participants in the Partnership’s policy work from experiencing 
anxiety, there is evidence that it generated secondary anxieties in turn. Giving this conflict 
between caring and dispassionate “good” governance an objective existence in the 
institutions, structures and conventions of policy work limits the opportunities for a 
participant to ‘confront the anxiety-evoking experiences and, by so doing, to develop her 
capacity to tolerate and deal more effectively with the anxiety’ (Lyth 1988, p.63). It is a way 
of evading such conflict, and because of the inherent need to do the work of policy that 
evasion is not likely to be able to be sustained indefinitely. At the very least, some structural 
limitations of policy work might expose the contradictions involved in this arrangement, and 
even create new anxieties for participants. At a pragmatic level, it could interfere with 
achieving the objectives of the Partnership, namely that by bringing activists and governors 
together policy could integrate emotional knowledge into its rational decisions. 
For this reason I wish to be careful about being too literal about these splits. Emotion is not 
properly inaccessible and “foreign” to professional categories of participants any more than 
rational knowledge was extrinsic to activists. Rather, one can see the policy work of the 
Partnership as a symbolic re-presencing of the way emotion and rationality act as shadow 
knowledges to one another. Emotional and rational ways of knowing and being in the world 
are capacities we all have, but either knowledge may be inadmissible or unacceptable 
depending on the role we must play in the social context we find ourselves in. To me this 
understanding of the split nature of knowledge is important for understanding my 
observations of the Partnership’s policy work because it recognises the hunger reported by 
my informants for experiential connection with knowledges forbidden or morally distasteful 
to “good” professionals or activists. Bollas’ understanding of shadows as ways of expressing 
“unthought knowns”, experiences of connectedness with objects which we cannot represent 
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to ourselves, seems particularly apt (Bollas 1987). Notwithstanding the apparently binary 
nature of the split, its underlying complexity is mirrored by other categorisations of being in 
the context of the Partnership’s policy work, for example femaleness and maleness. 
Throughout this chapter about activists I have therefore drawn upon the “shadow” as a 
metaphor for a cluster of related concepts about the relationship of rationality to its “split” 
counterpart, emotion. I have used this in the knowledge that I am calling upon a range of 
psychotherapeutic literatures which do not necessarily share an identical understanding of 
the concept of the shadow, and which occasionally possibly conflict with each other, for 
example Jungian shadows and Klein’s understanding of the damaged object of the 
depressive position casting a Freudian ‘shadow upon the ego’ (Joseph 2003, p.326). My use 
of the concept of the shadow is my attempt to do as Burrell suggests and “follow the 
metaphor” (Burrell 2009), because by following the shadow of rationality I hoped to get 
emotion to step out into the light for me and my informants and clarify what it was rather 
than simply accept what it was not. In writing about emotion as the shadow of rationality I 
am primarily creating an expressive, aesthetic re-presencing of how emotion felt to me 
during my fieldwork and my conversations with informants. It hopefully goes some way 
towards conveying the somewhat haunted nature of rationality in policy work as I observed 
it, and why in the end rationality at some level referred to and relied upon emotion to make 
sense. 
Nevertheless, the everyday effect of splitting emotion and rationality and associating it with 
differing interests in policy work – civil servants and activists - was to create moments of 
conflict which could be experienced as fairly traumatic by its participants. This potential to 
cause anxieties in turn made bridging this split very tense and challenging – but the 
Partnership understood that to be its job and all its policy activities stated this dialogue 
between conflicting ways of being and knowing to be its aim. In the next two chapters I shall 
investigate what happened to the people, practices and knowledge involved in doing that 
bridging work and what light, if any, these experiences shed on the underlying processes 








6. IN-BETWEENNESS: TO BE A TRANSLATOR 
 
As I have explained in the previous chapter, the Partnership’s methods and mission were 
consistently described to me by its staff as creating “real dialogue” between otherwise 
diametrically opposing approaches to anti-poverty policy and brokering discussion between 
them. During a valedictory speech at the close of the programme of work I had assisted with, 
the Partnership’s Director Jonathan represented the organisation’s reason for existing as 
facilitating “real dialogue, then taking action”. As time went on, however, it occurred to me 
that there was a potential conflict between this explicit mission and some of the tacit 
practices I observed. Through the course of my deepening involvement with delivering the 
Partnership’s policy activities, I came to understand them as investing considerable effort in 
keeping emotional knowledge separate from rational knowledge and vice versa. I started to 
consider what consequences there were for policy staff in the Partnership and collaborating 
NGOs who were perhaps inevitably going to “contaminate” these rational and emotional 
positions through their work. Furthermore, I was aware that there could be a degree of moral 
jeopardy involved in “facing both ways” by adopting what I came to conceptualise as the 
“second position”. Specifically this positioning included knowing intersubjectively rather 
than intrasubjectively or “objectively”. 
I became interested in the symbolic and relational politics of the things I did in the course of 
discharging my duties as a policy officer, noting down my stance and those of other policy 
workers in relation to the three positions I have already discussed, looking for the practical 
activities which made up the work of being a policy specialist. Exactly what “facilitating 
dialogue” between these two opposing ways of knowing looked like in practice was explored 
through discussion with Partnership staff, volunteers and collaborators. Despite Jonathan’s 
insistence that this facilitation work was the purpose of the entire Partnership and the focus 
of all its activities and staff, my discussions with informants often took the form of 
comparing policy work or policy specialists to other people in the organisation as much as 
they might draw the contrast with those from different backgrounds or organisations. Doing 
policy work was in fact referred to regularly by informants as something that required its 
practitioners to actually be different to other people in the organisation, or at least to have 
certain qualities that others didn’t possess to the same degree. Louise had been the named 
policy officer for the project I worked on, and the only full-time dedicated policy specialist 
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in the organisation out of (at the time I first engaged with the Partnership) ten employees. 
She left abruptly a little under a year after I arrived. The nature of Louise’s work as a policy 
officer, why she ceased to be one, and the extent to which there was something essential in 
Louise which made her a policy worker was therefore the source of some discussion during 
my time with the Partnership. One of her colleagues, Roy, who was in charge of research and 
volunteer engagement suggested over dinner four months after Louise had left that she was 
able to relate to the work of policy somewhat differently from other employees at the 
Partnership. Roy’s choice of words echoed the language that another Partnership worker, 
Cathy, had used earlier that day about Louise, as we prepared for the final annual showcase 
event;  
 
‘”That’s why Louise was such a good policy officer, she’s got the right personality for 
it. Although I think she found it hard because naturally she wants to do more of the 
nurturing stuff, but she's got such a forceful, assertive character that she was good at 
policy stuff and dealing with politicians and the press.”’ 
 
Immediately prior to this comment, Cathy had been explaining how she felt that an integral 
part of the work that she did as a research officer was in standing alongside the people 
experiencing poverty that the Partnership sought to represent. The implication appears to be 
that in doing policy work one does not get to wholly “be on their side” in the way that Cathy 
described as being both necessary and the only valid moral stance for her personally. Louise, 
in Cathy’s eyes, had been disqualified from expressing her nurturing – or caring – side in 
favour of expressing something more assertive, if viewed positively, or perhaps even 
something aggressive and calculated. This interesting way of describing policy work 
suggests it is something which enhances or diminishes aspects of a person themselves. It also 
suggested that – for some Partnership workers at least – it was necessary but distasteful and 
troubling work that they could “hive off” from their own role and give to a colleague without 
fear of being implicated in it. Far from being something that informed everyone’s role and 
responsibilities at the Partnership, policy work was a specialist activity within the 
organisation. If indeed facilitating dialogue about policy between the knowledge of activists 
and the knowledge of “professionals” was at the core of the Partnership’s overall purpose, it 
was a responsibility which was unevenly distributed among its staff and a function which 
aroused complex feelings and anxieties for the staff in general.  
I got another chance to question Cathy about the disconcerting nature of policy work the day 
after our discussion about Louise. She described a volunteer we had both worked with as 
also having ‘”the right mentality for policy work”’; on this occasion she said that this meant 
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‘”never giving up in the face of setbacks. A lot of setbacks”’. Again this suggested a person 
who was almost limitlessly tough in a way that Cathy didn’t believe (or wish) herself to be; 
taken alongside her previous statement it suggests that she saw policy work as requiring an 
ability to be hard or evne callous in some way, a way that allows you to engage with “press 
and politicians” as an equal, and that in her eyes this had implications for one’s moral 
identity at work. This sense of apartness was mirrored by other policy specialists I talked 
with during my time at the Partnership, particularly as experienced as a loneliness or a sense 
of alienation from “the Cause”. Louise didn’t talk at great length with me about her reasons 
for leaving her post so abruptly - she almost seemed uncomfortable with confiding her 
thoughts about her decision - but she did briefly mention that she wanted to be able to do 
something less equivocal and more explicitly activist about her beliefs. Louise in fact went 
abroad to volunteer on development projects when she left, five months before her contract 
was up for renewal. 
6.1 From the noun to the verb: Psychosocial and 
psychoanalytic understandings of inbetweenness and 
translation 
 The previous two chapters of this thesis dealt with the way knowledge of the world and 
being in the world was “split” between “emotional” activists and “rational” professionals. 
This chapter and the following chapter will explore how this split informs the way policy 
work is conceptualised and done, teasing apart the practical and ontological implications of 
“facilitating dialogue” against the backdrop of these anxieties about morality, legitimacy and 
knowledge in governance. While it could be possible to construct the Partnership as the locus 
of this facilitation, as Jonathan’s description of it suggested, and see that facilitation written 
into all the activities the Partnership undertakes, I would argue that the split between 
emotional activism and rational professionalism ran through the Partnership itself. Key to 
understanding the Partnership as a policy actor in this way is to unpacking what it means to 
do that facilitation, and that doing facilitation does not reflect a static state of being or job 
description. Not all the Partnership’s staff felt comfortable thinking of themselves as people 
who “did policy” or having “a personality for policy”. The dialoguing between positions 
implied by facilitation of this kind is something which is done in the active, and is a 
movement between two incompatible concepts or identities rather than a destination in itself. 
Louise’s and my own experiences suggest that being a policy worker is an unstable identity 
to have to maintain, and which plays out in both the identity of the policy worker and the 
more practical activities they undertake in the execution of their duties. This chapter explores 
the relational practices of policy workers as a way of constructing the in-betweenness of a 
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“personality for policy”, as Cathy put it, and understanding what it means to be a translator 
between positions. The following chapter looks at the material and physical practices which 
intersected with the everyday life of the Partnership and which demonstrated the unstable in-
betweenness of actively doing translation. In some ways the split between the relational and 
the physical practices of policy work is a false one; each refers to, bolsters and interrogates 
the other. It is conceptually useful, however, as it reflects the complex and mutable ways that 
policy work as an activity and as an identity threaded in and out of the Partnership’s 
activities. You could do this in-between policy work but not necessarily identify as someone 
who was a policy worker, as with Cathy or Roy. You could have a “personality for policy” 
and nominally be an activist. 
In exploring both policy worker as a status and the doing of policy work I have drawn on the 
literature around policy work as “border work”, which draws heavily on postcolonial 
understandings of territory, deterritorialisation, hybridity and other queernesses. Janet 
Newman (2012b) has conceptualised this border work using postcolonial literatures which 
examine how shifts between physical and cultural territories create hybridities. Newman uses 
this sense of hybridity to reframe translation in a policy context as the association between 
things, rather than the acquisition or loss of ideas or power across static boundaries. The 
border work of participants makes them more than ‘simply boundary crossing actors, they 
can be seen as engaged in a creative process which… generates new emergent practices’ 
(Newman 2012b). In adopting the trope of translation I am making an argument for thinking 
about policy workers not as authors of political and policy texts, but as translators between 
systems of meaning and morality. Translation is  
‘characterised by in-betweenness: caught as it is between the demands of the source 
system and the demands of the target system, the demand to make familiar that which 
is other and to do justice to the other as other, to mediate meaning and negotiate the 
very instability of signification, translation is always a hybrid’ (Littau 1997, p.81).  
If policy work is considered as an inherently relational practice as it is in this thesis, calling 
policy work a translation implies that a “personality for policy” is a hybrid, bilingual or 
multilingual person. The being of translators, as opposed to translation and its products, 
seem to attract less scrutiny in literary and postcolonial scholarship. But translators are at the 
least making the lonely journey between entrenched world-views, and can perhaps be 
thought of as only coming into being when they are in-between. Furthermore if they happen 
to be shifting between worlds with antagonistic and irreconcilable values or systems of 
meaning, as arguably is the case in the context of the Partnership’s policy activities, then 
these in-between people become difficult to relate to, being neither one nor the other but a 
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potential contaminant of both. Psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic literature has 
foregrounded the ‘loneliness of the long-distance therapist’ as Sue Jennings (2008) 
evocatively terms it. In this scholarship the nature of the translator is explored primarily 
through the relations generated by the therapeutic process, specifically how clients relate to 
and construct the therapist/ translator and vice versa, notably in the concept of 
countertransference (Gemignani 2011). Therapists find themselves in the position of trying 
to facilitate a similar creative, generative translation between ways of knowing the world as 
Newman’s policy workers; their relations with the client aims to maintain or bring into being 
“transitional space”  which ‘allows us to be receptive to the emergent… in our relations with 
others and with the world’ (Game 2001, p.71). When this space fails to take shape, or if it 
falters, this can nevertheless provide important insight for both sides.  
I have used the interconnected concepts of in-betweenness and translation found in these 
literatures to look in detail at the practices around writing a particular policy briefing which I 
compiled over three months towards the end of my time with the Partnership, with reference 
to other writing and other policy specialists’ experiences of writing. “Writing” was one 
practice – or perhaps more accurately a cluster of co-dependent practices - which featured 
extremely heavily in my own work at the Partnership and which straddled the thresholds of a 
particularly wide range of shifts and translations. Given the almost fetishised importance of 
texts in policy and public administration, this choice of case study is helpful as it readily 
carries the translation metaphor or trope. Policy documents contain traces of many different 
movements between canonical binaries; the anecdotal to the authorial; the oral to the written; 
the present to the temporally deferred; the embodied to the objectified; the internal to the 
external; the first person to the third; the personal to the depersonalised; the emotionally 
knowledgeable to the technically or intellectually knowledgeable. There are people who 
write these documents, however, and those translations flow primarily through them before 
they leave a mark on the paper. I have chosen this practice to focus on partly because of the 
perhaps exaggeratedly binary nature these shifts, but also because it is a practice I 
extensively engaged with myself and also observed extensively and questioned a wide range 
of informants about. I have had and have documented many relationships to the translations 
of writing as a practitioner of policy work. This chapter deals with the relational dimensions 
of this practice and what it means to be in-between; the following one looks the physical and 
material practices of inbetweenness and translation. 




The briefing paper I was asked to write for the Partnership had originally been pencilled in 
for Louise to do. It has now been published (minus my name) on the Partnership’s website; it 
is one among many similar documents of between four to six pages in length, each focusing 
on a specific policy theme or area, summarising research undertaken by the Partnership or 
documenting the Partnership’s events. The briefing papers tended to adhere to a structure 
that I myself used in my prior work as a policy manager in voluntary organisations, and it is 
one that reflected something of an informal industry standard. This was; a summary of the 
whole document; overview or introduction to the topic; background (plus definition of terms 
if necessary); substantive evidence; key recommendations and potential policy 
implementation. I was asked to pick up this piece of work as a way of getting hands-on 
experience of the working practices of the Partnership, but also to plug the gap in resources 
at the Partnership which meant that, although this had apparently been in Louise’s in tray for 
some months, nothing concrete had been done about it. 
This paper, it transpired, was supposed to have been a reworking in the Partnership house 
style of a document one of the community activists, Iain, had written on an idea he’d had 
about local authority commissioning. I was to take on this briefing paper in addition to 
pulling together a section of the upcoming annual showcase event, and that I was to work 
with Iain closely to achieve this. Although it is routine for such briefing papers to contain 
case studies, and common that they should come from face-to-face interviews with 
individuals, staff at the Partnership considered this way of doing things to be integral to what 
“their” briefing papers looked like. I was instructed by Jonathan and Louise to go through 
Iain in order to find people directly affected by the issues the briefing paper dealt with. 
The raw materials of the briefing paper would consist of desk research I conducted myself, 
looking through an eclectic assortment of other NGOs’ publications, academic work and 
government documents. These sources all drew upon “professional”, third-person research 
and knowledge of the subject. But in tandem with these I was also to find people to interview 
which illustrated how this more abstract but perhaps more “reliable” and “objective” 
knowledge (as other “professionals” might see it) was also situated in lived experiences and 
stories that particular individuals could tell. The Partnership was a voracious collector of 
such testimonies, and entering into story telling relations with “good case studies” took up 
much time and effort from the staff. This effort reflected that this was not a random process. 
Not just anyone’s story about fuel poverty, or childcare, or drugs recovery would do; these 
individuals had to have a story to tell that in some way illuminated the way the quirks or 
surprises in other types of evidence were part of a life one could actually live. In the context 
137 
 
of the Partnership’s programme that I was involved with this choice was made in reference 
with other types of knowledge in an attempt to build an argument about an issue. My own 
notes are interestingly silent about how I felt I would know where to find such stories and 
how I would know if they were “good case studies”.  In group discussions, however, I and 
the staff of the Partnership had to have more explicit discussions about the purpose and 
content of these testimonies and had to articulate our reasons for suggesting the contributions 
we did. Jonathan wanted the second annual showcase event to start with the voices of people 
experiencing poverty that the programme had worked for through its last four years; at one 
of the planning sessions he outlined how he saw this working to the staff team involved in 
planning and producing the event:  
‘The first session is a sort of scene setter – Jonathan really wants to have those 
grassroots voices to the fore. The idea is for three to five community activists to tell us 
what social justice means to them as the whole theme of the assembly is trying to 
articulate what a socially just Scotland would look like. This is to try and tie in with all 
the stuff that’s blowing around at the moment – the [Scottish Independence] 
Referendum, Welfare Reform and so on – without everything getting hijacked by 
those big, depressing issues. This is Jonathan’s solution.’ 
We started to throw names around. We quickly realised that, far from simply being a case of 
finding someone with a compelling story to tell, we had to balance many requirements in 
choosing our story tellers. Firstly there was the question of how someone might tell their 
story; many were rejected for being either too rambling, being too vulnerable or just being 
too offensive: ‘We decide it’s a difficult task. You want someone who’s got a shocking or 
otherwise powerful story to tell but who is able to talk about it in a way that can still see the 
big picture. You want someone who’s going to tell it like it is, but not be ludicrously rude 
with it.’ People were also rejected on the basis of who they were, or perhaps more accurately 
on the basis of how they knew. While some individuals were known to be passionate and 
engaging speakers, Jonathan rejected them on the basis that they were not “community 
activists” – they were support workers or paid staff in an organisation. Even where there was 
some confusion as to where volunteer work and paid work might begin and end for an 
individual, Jonathan insisted that we err on the side of caution and only allow people with 
first- hand knowledge to tell their stories. Finally these people had to echo – but not pre-empt 
– the thematic discussions we had planned for the break-out evidence sessions later that day 
and the day after. We needed people whose stories would dramatise the ideas that would be 
discussed in a more abstract and technical way in later settings in such a way as would grab 
the imaginations of our delegates and inspire them to refract a “socially just Scotland” 
through their response to these individuals’ lives.  
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In both writing documents and in other settings for first-person testimonies, it was expected 
that being physically present and taking in these stories was an essential component of 
understanding the issue in hand properly which went hand in hand with more forensic and 
analytical processes. In the case of gathering case studies for the briefing paper, I was aware 
that the expectation was that first I had to go to potential contributors, specifically attend 
community meetings and be present at a community-led information day, and to listen to 
these contributors’ stories uncritically, immersively, attempting to experience the story as 
they experienced it. Iain did in the end put me in touch with someone at an Edinburgh 
community organisation who would know people whose stories might make good case 
studies, but the contact was only willing to discuss this after I had gone to his organisation 
and attended an unconnected event. Iain had in fact warned me that his contact was ‘not the 
greatest fan of local residents being asked to become case studies in certain circumstances 
but I'm sure you will quickly be able to convince him that everything would be all ethical & 
above board in this instance!' When this email arrived I had been writing up an interview 
with Jenny, a senior staff member at another NGO with particular responsibility for her 
organisation’s policy work, and she had been reflecting on the way that policy workers ‘have 
to go to great lengths to prove how much you care about not just the issue but also the people 
involved before they'll talk to you’, and that this often was played out in having to 
demonstrate a willingness to enter the world of one’s contributors in some way. In gathering 
emotional knowledge to use as evidence, there seemed to be an expectation that policy 
workers should start in a position of absolute empathy and commitment to those whose 
stories were being gathered. It was also apparently not taken for granted that they would 
comply with this expectation: there was a strong atmosphere of distrust in this and other 
occasions I or Louise tried to solicit case studies. 
If one of the policy worker’s skills is to try to translate between knowledges, it is implied 
that they must not align themselves too closely with any one perspective, position or mode of 
knowing but rather continually distance themselves from it. On finding themselves within a 
position, they must immediately switch to looking at it critically from the outside again. In 
doing so, they run the risk of being seen to be amoral and unfeeling agents in the same way 
that the government officials and civil servants are viewed as because of the way their 
professional practice does not allow them to be emotionally present or acknowledge the 
validity of emotional knowledge. Specialist policy workers must see the world through these 
bureaucratic and technical eyes, and specifically see personal stories through these eyes, in 
order to serve their organisation’s interests properly. However, acting as the cynic in an 
idealistic, campaigning organisation can be an uncomfortable position to be in personally. 
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Prior to the prep session with the women’s research group Cathy and another researcher had 
been discussing how they refused to engage with the media at all about their work as they 
only used short quote from them. The second researcher said: 
‘”I mean the media are just so hideous, aren’t they?” 
I don’t quite know what to say to all this. I want to say, “when did you last enjoy 
reading an unstructured piece of writing with no clear point?” Instead I say, 
“Journalists are just so under-resourced…” but [the second researcher] begins 
talking to Cathy again – “They just put out so much poison about people”’ 
I felt I was in a difficult position here; I was a journalist for some time. I also know that I 
was given the opportunity to work in policy because of the skills, experience and perspective 
I had as a former journalist. My dark arts were being used for “the Cause”, as Jenny would 
put it. At that moment I felt like I did the dirty work of organisations such as the Partnership. 
It was probably no accident that Jonathan and Louise, who also supped with the devils in 
Holyrood, were the people who engaged with the press on the Partnership’s behalf. 
The moral ambiguity of the specialist policy workers who does “bad” things for good causes 
has an emotional root: forever soliciting and then drawing away from a position of solidarity 
and caring acceptance of people’s lived experiences, they translate those experiences into 
inhuman things. In writing the briefing paper I had to play devil’s advocate to Iain and a 
community organisation worker about their ideas of how their recommendations might be 
implemented: 
‘[Iain] says that they are public services and should just have to do it. It’s never 
that simple, I say. These are powerful voices in the policy making process and right 
now nobody is going to be happy about creating extra work for someone 
somewhere while funding is being cut so deeply across just about every 
department. ‘You see, what I’d like is to be able to demonstrate how this can work 
for them,’ I say, ‘I’d like to get decision makers in the public sector on side with 
this. We need to imagine what it feels like to be them to do that. It’s all very well 
saying that they must do it, but it’s better not to be confrontational about it. […] 
It’s not in their remit to [do this work].’ 
‘But it should be,’ says Iain.  
‘The fact is it’s not,’ I continue.’ 
It was not the first or last time that I found myself playing the role of cynical “depressor” in 
an idealistic organisation that was essentially optimistic about human nature (the work of the 
Partnership was predicated upon the possibility of positive change and of appealing to the 
powerful in society to enable that change). In playing “devil’s advocate” I was encouraging 
my colleagues to see their agenda through other, perhaps extremely self-interested eyes to 
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ensure that agenda stood a greater chance of success. The dismal implication was we 
‘couldn’t rely on natural justice”, as Iain wryly observed about my intervention. I had been 
struck from the very beginning of my observations of how Louise’s role in the Partnership’s 
meetings and events was frequently to play devil’s advocate in exactly this way, and it 
generally disrupted the flow of the conversation and created a more sombre mood, although 
it rarely led to outright dispute between her and the people she worked with. On one 
occasion at a consultation debrief I had actually seen her subtly play devil’s advocate to both 
Partnership activists and Government officials. I also noticed that the Chair of the two annual 
showcase events performed this same role and punctured entrenched positions in a much 
more direct way; that event was very self-consciously about creating policy outcomes 
through dialogue. Playing this “devil’s advocate” role was rather different to conventional 
facilitation; it was “modelling” contrary points of view, rather than echoing ideas that were 
already in play in the conversation. 
The working practices of the Partnership in finding “good case studies” reveals a paradox 
about the way a specialist policy worker has to relate to stories with emotional content. They 
have to be able to suspend their disbelief, so to speak, and fully appreciate that emotional 
testimony. But then they have to be able to objectify that first-person, lived experience as a 
thing, or perhaps a currency. The Partnership Research Officer Cathy’s belief that being a 
good policy worker involved being able to train yourself not to care referred to a general 
expectation that policy specialists were equally at home with first-person, “emotional” 
stories and with the bureaucratic values and “rational” analysis that more conventional 
policy analysis demanded and that therefore they were unable to fully commit to either. How 
to be both a caring, emotional, somatic subjectivity and a rationally calculating, logical, 
abstracting subjectivity in a context which saw these ways of knowing the world to be so 
incommensurable that it required civil servants and activists to be almost pantomime 
embodiments of these knowledges? This split was, after all, so important for preserving a 
sense of safety and legitimacy for many of the participants in the Partnership’s forums; they 
derived a sense of purpose and of moral agency from it. Essentially this need to be two 
different but incompatible people in processing the necessary range of “evidence” – the one 
who thinks and the one who feels – places the writer of policy documents in a position of 
what R.D Laing called “ontological insecurity” (Laing 2010). By being asked to engage 
equally with emotional ways of knowing the world and rational-technical ways of knowing 
the world, policy specialists are asked to face the troubling possibility that these ways of 
knowing co-exist within us, but he or she is also expected to preserve their separateness 
through categories defined by other participants in the wider policy-making context. 
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Another way of configuring this acceptance of the ambivalence of the objects we relate to – 
in this case knowledge and the people making policy with us – is as a “depressive position” 
as articulated by Melanie Klein (1996). This position is one of difficult feelings of guilt and 
mourning, both in the sense that it involves ‘the wish and need to make restitution for 
fantasied destruction in relation to a loved object’ (Altman 2005, p.327) and in the sense that 
the manic pursuit of self-actualisation is no longer compatible with psychic reality. Once it 
has been acknowledged that things are neither wholly bad or wholly good, it also becomes 
necessary to regret the persecution or adulation previously accorded to them and, perhaps 
uncomfortably, to grieve for these lost certainties (Edwards 2005). It is important to stress in 
introducing this concept that I am not claiming that such a depressive position is in some 
way more “advanced” than the paranoid-schizoid position associated more strongly with 
splitting as a defence against anxiety. These Kleinian terms describe states, not stages strictly 
speaking, and I use these terms on the understanding that there is a ‘”dialectical relationship” 
between the two positions’ (Weatherall 2003, p.111). 
6.3 Lamination: A necessary withdrawal. 
No matter how extensive the contributors of testimonies and stories’ efforts were to ensure 
that the policy worker was “on their side” and aligned with their personal position in relation 
to the policy issues they were going to write about, the demands of being able to address 
wider policy audiences meant these stories were required to come up against other ways of 
knowing the issues in question. This was the work of writing policy documents and the 
policy worker, as someone who was expected to view the issue through many different 
perspectives, positions and knowledge, became the site of that contestation and tension in 
attempting to find a way of making these knowledges speak to one another.  This tension 
reflected the way sense making was experienced as both a process that led deep within 
policy workers to a recruitment of their own memories and emotions, as well as a necessary 
withdrawal from those feelings of care, empathy or personal experience in moving between 
emotional knowledge and other, more technical-rational knowledges. How exactly this 
played out in my own practice may serve as an introductory illustration of this complex 
process. 
Early on in my field work I had noted how hard it was to draw a line between my presence in 
the world as a researcher, as a career policy worker and also an unpaid, private person. One 
evening I had gone to the supermarket to do some shopping, and bumped into someone I had 
worked with a bit in my previous role as a policy manager for a voluntary organisation. He 
had heard I was coming to Edinburgh to do a research project, and it turned out that he was 
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going to a policy event which I was going to as well but as a volunteer with a local 
organisation. I could hear the walls I was “meant” to maintain as a researcher crashing 
around my ears, but as we discussed the likely attendees at the event, and as he tried to probe 
me for clues as to my fieldwork site, I also became aware that I was only able to have the 
conversation I was having in the way I was because the researcher, the policy professional 
and the volunteer were the same person, with intersecting knowledges. When I was 
appointed to the task of writing the briefing paper with Iain, this layered self became both an 
asset and a liability again. Iain’s potential contact for case studies was based at an offshoot of 
a community organisation I had been in discussion with in a private capacity about becoming 
a board member. I had been introduced to their work through an academic contact I had met 
at a conference, where I had been presenting my preliminary work and findings with the 
Partnership (with their anonymity preserved). I was able to navigate the spaces and 
relationships of this organisation and its community a little better than I would have done if I 
hadn’t had this contact with them before – I understood more about their history and 
operating context and asked more productive questions. This familiarity had its ambiguities 
and problems, too. I was bound to them through my demonstration of personal motivation, 
commitment and passion for their work in both the positive sense of being close to them and 
also beholden to their “cause”. I experienced my reappearance on their doorstep wearing the 
guise of a political hack (because that’s who I am as well) as a rewriting of our relationship 
that made me a potentially exploitative figure. 
I became interested in the ways private reasons and public reasons, as it were, for acting in 
the world could be seen to coexist and layer on top of one another in the people around me as 
I went through the process of putting together the briefing paper. The expectation from 
people who identified as “community” or “grassroots” activists that policy workers in NGOs 
should demonstrate commitment and care to their potential contributors’ positions and 
experiences was matched by the knowledge among policy workers that they were expected 
to be able to align themselves equally well with “professional” standards of evidence and 
legitimacy of knowledge. This created some very practical problems which could be 
emotionally acute for policy workers (in the sense of that term used in the context of the 
Partnership’s policy forums). The consensus among my fellows at the Partnership that a 
policy worker in a campaigning organisation should be able to “face both ways” was 
mirrored by how I and other policy workers in similar organisations experienced the more 
prosaic relational aspects of making meaning and making sense in our working lives. I 
observed this once in Louise after a feedback session, held in a different organisation’s 
building with two government departments and a group of community activists who had 
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contributed to a Scottish Government strategic policy review. On our way out, she bumped 
into someone she greeted as an old friend but who was working at one of the desks in the 
office; to my confusion she started asking about where she could buy trees, and they 
proceeded to have a very passionate conversation about gardening: 
‘It turns out that Louise is the co-founder of a community garden, and she put this 
person in touch with such-and-such who has a stall on a busy shopping street every 
now and again who is “the apple guru of Scotland” apparently. I’m not clear if the 
tree interest from the other woman is all professional, purely for personal use or 
maybe for some community side project like Louise’s. The woman on the next desk 
starts chiming in about the price of land for planting trees and then we’re discussing 
the delights of alders. I like trees and horticulture too as it happens, and I’m no 
longer sure whether this is something where we’re all on-duty, all off-duty or if these 
are pointless concepts if you work in this world where you’re expected to care so 
much about your work and work so hard on what you care about.’ 
On our walk back to the Partnership’s office, Louise started to ask me if I felt angry – as she 
did – about the evasiveness of the civil servants’ replies to the questions that were fielded. I 
could have just seen this as a professional talking to a professional. I was newly aware now, 
however, of her as someone who was also a community activist of sorts and who most 
definitely had a deeply first-person, personal and emotional stance in relation to communities 
policy as well as a professional one. I was also aware that she now knew that I had one too. 
Furthermore, I knew from her and the people in the office discussing land pricing and 
ownership laws that their professional knowledge was being recruited to make sense of the 
personal experiences they had had and to place them in some kind of wider context. In turn, 
there might be a technical policy fix to a personal problem, and there could be personal pain 
as a result of professional frustration. I observed this layering of meanings in policy work in 
several staff and associates of the Partnership and it caused me to reflect upon my own set of 
layerings, or my ability to create “laminations” of positions and knowledges, to use a 
metaphor to conjure with. I discussed this on two occasions with Jenny, and she reflected the 
way her deeply personal memories, her professional knowledge and her current relationships 
were involved in the way that she knew what mattered in her work; ‘I think it’s good to have 
that collision […] I think there can be a richness that comes out of that that there wouldn’t be 
otherwise’. However, she also directly warned me that this was a dangerous and demanding 
thing for a policy worker: 
‘I think you’ve got to watch it. You’ve got to have time for yourself within all of 
that because if you don’t have that you can get so caught up you can lose yourself. 
Although you’re enjoying it… immensely, and getting a lot back from it, but in 




When I told her that I had become aware that staff at the Partnership worked evenings, 
weekends and other unsociable hours, becoming personally involved in difficulties in the 
private lives of the people we worked with, and that I myself felt for complex reasons that I 
should always say “yes” and never say “no” to these sorts of demands, Jenny replied that 
precisely because policy work at an NGO or voluntary organisation is always personal work 
to some degree, we are also always ‘getting something out of it’ and putting our own needs 
into it, including ‘ego’. Overall, she stressed that the potential for “the Cause” to take over 
who you are as a policy worker and as a person was real and dangerous; in not being able to 
switch off one’s capacity to care you might hinder your ability to contribute to furthering that 
“Cause”.  
To explore the potential of my chosen metaphor a little further, the ability to laminate 
effectively has many dimensions. It allows a person doing policy work to burrow into their 
own personal system of meaning and their somatic reactions to enliven the narratives 
contained in other forms of data on a subject; it also allows them to engage with stories as 
emotional expositions that come from socially and historically situated subjectivities in a 
way only possible if they bring their own subjectivity to bear upon that story. It tints 
everything with the questions of morality that caring brings in its wake. However, as Jenny 
warned, this loses all its value if the policy worker cannot spot the same patterns in a 
spreadsheet as in a personal testimony, cannot make recommendations that are couched in 
the language used by the people whose working practice the policy worker is hoping to 
influence, and – at a more basic level – they do not know when to strategically withdraw 
their care and emotional presence if it threatens to affect their ability to move between 
positions and make translations. They cannot get lost in that reconciliation of knowledge, 
which is the hoped-for outcome for the people who read their papers; it is their job to build 
the framework for others to use. 
Kathryn Church (1997) describes how on entering the field as a researcher through a 
campaign group’s engagement with policy consultations she experienced a physical and 
mental breakdown. She describes this as a response to this tension between solidarities and a 
crisis of her own sense of morality in a way that was strikingly similar to the Partnership 
research officer Cathy’s descriptions of her own anxieties about becoming part of the policy 
and political world. Louise, Jenny and I (and at something of a remove, Evan and Jonathan) 
regarded our work as holding these tensions between things normally regarded as antitheses 
in the balance indefinitely. This was, of course, impossible. Church’s response to this role, 
however, suggests that this practice demands some sort of very hard labour of the people 
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who undertake it. To me personally, Louise’s decision to leave not just her job but her 
professioneerily echoed my own last days as a professional policy worker. 
6.4 “Exhausted” and “Mental”: Making sense of the 
Translator 
In tracing this idea of “a personality for policy” with a tolerance for manipulation and for 
suppressing one’s capacity to nurture and care, I became interested in the way my colleagues 
at the Partnership differentiated their work from Louise’s work and my own and how they 
chose to describe their experience of this work when they came into contact with it. Two 
interesting terms kept recurring in analysis of descriptions of translation work in my 
fieldnotes: “exhaustion” and “mental”. These were both terms, or clusters of ideas, that my 
colleagues routinely used to describe their experience of doing policy work, the term 
“mental” even passing into cliché as something of a running joke between me and the 
Partnership’s permanent staff. Both of these terms stood out as being somewhat hyperbolic 
in the context of describing what was, on the surface, a rather technical aspect of an office 
job. Looking at the context in which these words or ideas were used reveals something of my 
colleagues’ relationship to being a policy worker. 
In the case of the term “mental” it or close synonyms such as “crazy” or “mad” were often 
used later on in my time with the Partnership in conjunction with a sense of being 
overwhelmed by the sheer amount of work to be done. It was particularly used to express 
something ineffable about the experience of working in policy, and for the Partnership as a 
policy organisation. After I had been left to fend for myself in a potentially difficult and 
gaffe-prone meeting with a political party’s policy team because Jonathan had ignored my 
emails, I raised the matter with him when I next saw him at the office. Jonathan’s only 
explanation was that things were “mental” at the moment. I wrote in my field notes about my 
discussion with him, observing his response; ‘"Oh, yeah. Sorry! That's just kind of the way 
this place is sometimes," [Jonathan] said, with a smile’. The frequent appearance of “mental” 
and its close synonyms towards the end of my fieldwork could reflect both the fact that I was 
more a part of the team by this time, but also operational changes in the Partnership. Louise 
had left abruptly and her functions had been distributed among the remaining staff, who 
often did not feel they properly understood the world of policy and politics. The financial 
(and hence perhaps political) prospects for the Partnership and its staff had also considerably 
worsened over the previous twelve months. “Mental” was interesting in the way it was 
deployed in speech. It was associated with explaining the systemic pressures upon the 
Partnership as a campaigning organisation that relied on cyclical funding; “mental” was 
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often used to describe the atmosphere in the office in general as funding streams dried up 
and failed to be replaced. However there were times when it was suggested that this was also 
something to do with an inherent unreasonableness about the policy work done by the 
Partnership, specifically as a thing driven by the needs of news and political cycles. Cathy 
explained that while she and the team were finding preparing for 2013’s showcase event 
“mental”, it had previously been Louise’s sole responsibility and the transfer of this work 
had been ‘really bad for them, difficult, as a team but it’s been very good for Louise’.  
The choice of the term is interesting too, perhaps, as although to describe something as 
“mental” is a common colloquialism, as a word it has disturbing undertones. I wish to make 
very clear at this point that this colloquial sense of the word was the only way I ever heard 
the Partnership staff use this term, and I repeat it here with no other implication. However it 
leapt out during my analysis of my fieldnotes later as, for me, it had personal and more 
generally cultural connotations of contagionand being  beyond the comprehension of other, 
“normal” people. My attempts to ask people to explain what “mental” meant in context 
resulted in either making a joke out of the term, or their exhorting me to reflect on our 
current circumstances as self-evidently, or perhaps more accurately experientially, “mental”.  
I became very interested in the way my fellow workers and my peers more generally use this 
term in every day speech, and what references lie beneath it. My own understanding of 
“mental” refers via the idea of madness to two closely related families of concepts. The first 
is as a kind of queerness of an individual or group, the mad being marked out from the sane. 
As the opposite of sanity, the “mental” is in its first aspect a pathology in a Foucauldian 
fusion of ‘a largely irresponsible subject and a man who trouble[s] the social order’; it is 
objectified as a disease, ready to contaminate us and remove us from medically-defined 
normal people (Foucault 2004, p.128). Madness has a clichéd but troubling history as a 
“women’s disease”, one in which for a variety of reasons ‘women more than men… are 
involved in “careers” as psychiatric patients’ (Chesler 1973, p.xxii), and as a result 
“madness” has a gender component to its conceptualisation as a disorder. This gendered 
aspect of madness is another aspect of the queerness of the mad, as a deviation from a 
biologically or socially defined neutral (Stoppard 2002). The mad also become the shadows 
of the sane in an existential sense; in R.D. Laing’s well-known formulation of the schizoid 
our shadow madness alienates us from ourselves and others: 
‘Such a man does not experience himself “together with” others or “at home in” the 
world… he does not experience himself as a complete person but rather as “split” in 
various ways’ (Laing 2010, p.1) 
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Madness severs us from the possibility of human comfort, our own or other people’s.  
The other cluster of the connotations of madness turns Laing’s ‘despairing aloneness and 
isolation’ outward, into the universe. It is the “darkness visible” described by novelist 
William Styron in his identically-titled “memoir of madness” (Styron 2010); it is a way of 
viewing the world that is nothing but terrifying, as the original use of the term in Paradise 
Lost describes. This darkness has its effects on us too, as things blown about by the cosmos; 
the Greek tragic understanding of madness (“those whom the Gods would destroy, they first 
make mad”) is of a chaotic force in nature which is violent, damaged and damaging (Padel 
1996). This chaos principle entering us is also commonly associated with creation and 
human creativity, often a destructive and yet beautiful force. As a seduction and a corruption 
madness uses us up to create new imaginative life. Madness is all these things to me and 
maybe a few more, personally and as a social researcher; its precise meaning in the context 
of the policy work of the Partnership’s forums was not clear on first consideration, however.  
What Cathy and Roy were clear about was that, as Louise left, this “mental” became 
distributed and dispersed throughout the organisation in a way it had not previously been. It 
is interesting to note that another running joke among the Partnership staff was that Jonathan, 
the director, was firmly rooted in the “mental” and was the portal through which it flowed 
into the organisation at large. One of Louise’s unofficial roles had been to contain and 
mitigate the “mental” perceived as inherently involved in policy work, and to which 
Jonathan’s dual life with the Partnership’s staff and in worlds other than their own constantly 
threatened to expose them. It is important to state, however, that this is how Cathy, Roy and 
others experienced the work of policy. It tells something of their relationship to the figure of 
the policy worker and what that work came to stand for in their eyes. It is not the same thing 
as claiming that Louise or I or anyone else was “mental” or “crazy” or “mad” in the clinical 
sense. But there was something in the nature of being a policy worker or translator or hybrid 
that was experienced as “mental”, because the work being contained by them and removed 
from others was inherently maddening in some sense. 
Exhaustion struck me in a similar way to “mental” as a peculiar descriptor for the effects of 
doing policy work, yet it was one that I and many of my informants employed. 
Overwhelming tiredness and a sense of depletion at a more-than-physical level was 
something that emerged very early on in my data collection and analysis process and was 
referred to both by a wide range of my informants in discussions and in my field journal.. 
Exhaustion was a particular feature of my discussions with people whose work involved 
policy work explicitly and as other Partnership staff took on more of this function they too 
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reported this very particular form of exhaustion. It was also reported by people outside of the 
organisation who I worked with more sporadically. Charlie, a young architect who had taken 
on the running of a community centre but who was also involved in urban planning policy, 
somewhat unexpectedly began to talk about his own feelings of being consumed by his work 
as he gave me a lift back from a meeting we had both been at; ‘”I suppose I think about it as 
a kind of research problem in some way”, he says. “I don’t think it’s the kind of job you can 
do forever though”’. Bumping into Evan (a part-time policy advisor for the Partnership) 
during conference season we both exchanged commiserations about the way party 
conferences leave you feeling ravaged in some way that goes beyond being tired and 
hungover:  
 ‘‘“You just feel awful,” says Evan, “Like you’ve been talking and standing about all 
day then you just wind up drinking afterwards’. I say that you get this particular 
wild-eyed stare. Now when I get the “Register Now!” emails I always feel 
particularly smug that I don’t have to do that anymore. Evan half-jokingly says that 
he’s jealous.’ 
In more specific and intensive sessions of working on a particular policy document or 
project, it could sometimes be traced through the Partnership staff’s interactions that a 
particular sort of exhaustion came over us collectively. During a long and frustrating 
working group meeting where we attempted to plan the second annual showcase, I noted the 
dampened atmosphere in the room: 
‘Right, this is taking too long, says Jonathan. He’s never brusque, but today he’s 
clearly not patient either. He’s been sitting with a scrunched up face in one hand for 
rather too much of the meeting. But it is taking too long – we’re starting to flag a bit. 
Our own energy is dissipating. The constant nitpicking, the raking over of who said 
what and how things look to others is starting to confuse me and wear me down.’ 
In Cathy’s eyes, the roots of the sense of exhaustion sometimes experienced by people who 
specialised in policy work was to do with the effort of trying to move between the moral 
world of the Partnership and the moral world of the Coalition Government, an enterprise 
which seemed doomed to failure. But this exhaustion was intensified by the way that this 
work necessarily removed you from the comradeship of being in the middle of an 
organisation and a cause in the way that Cathy herself was.  
Louise herself had volunteered that the untraceable nature of the relations her work consisted 
of was a source of sadness and of a sense of constant loss. The work of policy was”mental” 
and exhausting, and policy workers themselves and others described a “good” policy worker 
as someone who was tough enough to contain this exhaustion and madness, albeit in a way 
that was unsettling, cold and perhaps amoral and which was troubling  to the overall moral 
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self-image of the organisation. 
This early and sustained appearance of exhaustion as a key concept for describing those who 
do policy work among my informants was one that I recognised from my previous career, 
and I reflected that back to them when they mentioned it. This exhaustion became a 
touchstone for “where the action was” and what was troubling about it in our discussions of 
policy work informally and in recorded interviews. The ability to tolerate this exhaustion 
sheds light on the tough, callous “personality for policy” that Cathy didn’t want to acquire; 
Charlie and Louise weren’t sure how long they could tolerate it. This particular form of 
exhaustion eventually became something that I myself experienced in the course of my role 
doing policy work for the Partnership, in a way that almost seemed to ambush me and which 
I experienced as a debilitating and, paradoxically, rage-inducing futility about the 
practicability of policy work. This reached a head shortly after the chaos around my meeting 
with a policy team from Holyrood I have described previously, leading me to wake in the 
middle of the night, wake my husband up too, and regale him with my feelings of impotence 
and disappointment. What exactly I had lost control of and what exactly I was disappointed 
about I could not articulate properly. 
In concluding the previous chapter I briefly speculated a little about why policy workers and 
those who took on policy work in the Partnership and beyond characterised their roles as 
chronically draining and saddening. By operating “against the grain” of the way different 
knowledges and moral frameworks were thought about in the context of the Partnership’s 
policy activities, people identified or identifying as policy workers were a curiously 
dislocated and ambiguous group, often working in isolation from the majority of the forums’ 
participants and almost always outnumbered by other categories of participants. The chronic 
sense of impotence and exhaustion experienced pretty consistently by policy workers in the 
Partnership and beyond reflects a deep clash of ways of coping with the anxieties of 
governance. The work of policy in some way conflicts in a practical way with the 
institutional defences against anxiety that these policy forums represent for many of its 
members. To be a policy worker is to be caught between worlds, and to be an unreliable and 
unstable person to relate to. In a working world committed to keeping certain knowledges 
apart from one another, someone who insists on creating dialogue between them is 
idiosyncratic to say the least and, notwithstanding the rhetorical emphasis on dialogue and 
deliberation in contemporary governance, a serious threat to the psychic security of other 
types of participant. They pose a relational problem to others because they do not “fit”, and 
in order to do their job it is perceived that they must be unnaturally tough and cold. Those 
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who identify themselves as existing within a certain position may reject the “dialogue 
enthusiast”. Equally, if the policy worker attempts to reconcile herself to the split she may 
experience such anxiety that she feels compelled to withdraw from membership of the wider 
group, either literally or in more covert and creative ways (Lyth 1988, p.73). In Louise’s 
case, she physically, emotionally and intellectually removed herself from the context 
altogether. Jonathan’s leadership seemed almost to have the effect of ostracising him from 
his employees in an upwards direction. In my case I returned to policy work through 
academia, at an emotional remove but with my career restless in its grave, like Banquo’s 
ghost at the feast. 
6.5 Relating to the translator: ways of talking about in-
betweenness 
The concepts of splitting, projection and introjection afford a coherent explanatory 
framework for how and why different knowledges of the world - particularly the emotional/ 
first-person and the techno-rational/ third person ways of knowing described by my 
informants - come to be not just separated but “given” to specific groups or individuals. In 
considering the role of the “border workers” in policy, the specialist policy professional (in 
this case in a campaigning voluntary organisation), I was aware that in many ways this 
experience occupied an interesting position in relation to this split. If such people are always 
both “inside” and “outside” as Janet Newman’s interviewees and my own observations and 
experiences suggest, then they and their work are in a strange position of continually being 
claimed and “othered” by these split categories and groups. Indeed, this ambiguity about 
knowledge was apparently perceived as an unpalatable moral ambiguity at times by other 
participants in the Partnership’s policy forums and activities. It would mean that the people 
who work on the borders in policy are in fact faced with potential rejection on all sides on 
the basis that they cannot ever fully adopt any position fully – supposing they are performing 
their functional role in policy making properly.  
I keep finding my way back to thinking of the work and the identity of the Translator in 
terms of spatial metaphors. In the collapsing of distinctions between private and public or 
past and present involved in “lamination”, it is perhaps helpful to conceptualise these 
practices of translation in policy writing as an attempt to explore connection and 
differentiation present in the relational unconscious. Work which enlists the personal 
connections between emotional knowledge and other forms of knowledge may be seen as the 
ghostly lines behind the finished text; ‘emotions as theorised in object relations draw our 
attention to internal unconscious multiplicity, “externalised” in more unified, simplified and 
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cognitively known form’ (Hunter 2012, p.19).  Doing policy work is a process of negotiating 
down from multiplicity; multiple knowledges of the world exist within ourselves, although 
they may be projected out onto an Other in a way that both idealises and demonises them, as 
in Lyth’s observations of the splitting of responsible and feckless characteristics among ward 
nursing staff (Lyth 1990b). Translation between the personal, the emotional, the oral and the 
situated ways of knowing the world and the general, the measurable, the economic and the 
abstract ones involves Deleuzian “lines of flight”(Deleuze et al. 2008, p.9) that are hidden 
because they run through the policy worker themselves, as someone who is both emotionally 
committed and intellectually instrumental about “the Cause”. The “inner” world of the policy 
worker becomes a space of deterritorialisation in which a set of multiplicities are forever 
changing to become other multiplicities in turn. This also becomes something of an 
unwinnable game; in doing lamination badly you can “lose yourself”, as Jenny puts it; in 
doing it well you lose yourself again, becoming a not a coherent self at all, just a line of 
flight. 
The abiding sense of sadness about our work that Louise and I experienced, and others 
expressed concern about, suggests that in the final analysis, then, what is split in creating 
categories of emotion and rationality more often than not does not get fully re-integrated in 
policy writing, and perhaps not in policy work more generally. The author of a policy 
document cannot foreclose these categories by resolving them within a coherent, if less 
idealistic, ontologically secure understanding of the world in which neither emotion nor 
“professionalism” threaten to overwhelm or destroy; by introjecting their own voice and 
working through this on paper, it would disturb the phantasies of those whose stories and 
“evidence” need to be presented and which sustain the multiplicities of phantasies about 
“good governance” that policy work contains. Janet Newman reflects that ‘notions of being 
both “inside” and “outside” … of “watching” and “holding one’s self apart” while also being 
“engaged”, [suggests] a form of psychic “splitting” that can result in melancholia’ (Newman 
2012b, p.146). Where exactly this grief might come from is perhaps private to someone who 
has had to do that translation work, who has experienced both emotional knowledge and 
“professional”, rational knowledge as neither wholly good nor wholly bad but in fact aspects 
of the same “reality”. Partnership staff, and Jonathan and Louise in particular, longed for 
reconciliation of these ways of knowing the world through what they called “dialogue” and 
“deliberation”, and felt guilt for not being able to make it happen. This is reminiscent of a 
Kleinian “depressive position” in which ‘the loved and hated aspects [of the object] are no 
longer felt to be so widely separated and the result is an increased fear of loss, a strong 
feeling of guilt and states akin to mourning’ (KLEIN 1996, p.172). This guilt and sadness is 
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compounded perhaps in the writing of policy documents in which this complexity and 
multiplicity, the ambivalence of the testimony of the specialist policy worker and writer as 
feeler and thinker, as insider and outsider, as exploiter and exploited, as callous and caring, 
as wise and ignorant, is effaced behind a strangely empty text that attempts to preserve, 
contain and maintain the splitting of emotion and rationality as categories by acting as 
translator between these ways of knowing, not as transformer. Thus the work of translation is 
inexhaustible, and exhausting. 
Far from being integrated, ‘worked out in everyday practice’ (Hunter 2012, p.11), the 
multiplicity of projections and introjections implied by the splitting of “emotion” and 
“rationality” are in fact preserved and maintained in the everyday practices of policy writing 
in such a way that the job of governing can still get done without most of those implicated 
having to change too much. As the object of the projections of overlapping networks of 
meaning about both emotion and rationality, the apparent treachery of knowledge is 
contained and relocated onto the specialist policy worker. An analysis of policy work, and 
policy writing in particular, which draws on concepts of splitting, projection and introjection 
would at least go some way to understanding how policy workers in voluntary organisations 
can experience their work as both necessary and worth doing and as exhausting, saddening, 
or even as a form of madness. It may also provide narratives for explaining why I and other 
policy workers have made a career out of attempting to hold open this depressive position.  
Louise, Jenny, Jonathan and others described this holding-open as a passion, mission or a 
calling, and were impatient with those who sought to foreclose it. At the same time, this very 
ambivalence, sadness and capacity to be equivocal about policy knowledges and moralities 
was described as being “split” in the Kleinian sense from the “moral” community of other 
policy actors. To move between systems of meaning and morality and to insist on drawing 
attention to the translational spaces between them was separated out in the institutional 
structure of policy making and “given” to a special cadre of people. The separateness of the 
policy worker as described by the Partnership’s staff implies someone “brought in” to the 
expressive life of a group or individual to provide a service, not a product, which has its 
parallel in many other identities or roles. Sue Jennings, both an ethnographer and a therapist, 
presents this function as a “resource”: 
‘The therapist can be seen as a consultant in transitions, a liminal specialist who can 
be a resource for the client during these changes… This means that the therapist needs 
to be able to “hold” the chaos of the client while the process of self-illumination takes 
place… It is only in the space between the therapist and client that the possibility of 
eventual understanding can take place’ (Jennings 2008, p.4). 
153 
 
Building such spaces, and being a person who holds them open, requires considerable trust 
in participants’ ability to hold and be held and be indeterminate. In the therapeutic and 
ethnographic contexts this takes considerable work and rarely emerges unbidden; it can fail 
altogether, despite the attention and skill of participants. In the context of the Partnership’s 
policy activities this trust-building work was not likely to take place at all. Louise, Jonathan 
and I did not reflect upon our own practice in these terms, although Jonathan was explicit 
that the main reason he was interested in participating in my research was to make the 
argument for policy work being profoundly relational work.  Louise, Cathy, Roy and several 
other staff members who worked directly with people outside the organisation frequently 
emphasised the need to build trust, by implication trust in the Partnership, but were not 
explicit what exactly they were going to do that necessitated that trust. Although Louise told 
me when I first arrived that building trust was the main activity in her role, she then warned 
me straight away that there was rarely the time or resources to do this properly, despite good 
support from Jonathan. Jonathan, Evan, Louise and I perhaps lacked the inner resources to 
interrogate and moderate our presence in policy making and to articulate the instability of 
our status in the activist-professional split. Even if we could, the project of translation as 
“real dialogue” had a more fundamental, external problem to confront. The knowledges 
requiring mediation and dialogue were conceived of as incommensurate and morally 
irreconcilable. The letting go implied by having an emergent critical space required 
participants to distance themselves from their own claims to moral and epistemological 
legitimacy. Not only that, politics is a competitive sport at heart. For all the examples of 
rhetorical commitments to consultation, dialogue and learning that contemporary governance 
can provide, politics in Scotland and elsewhere is emphatically adversarial. The Partnership 
itself and its emissaries could not change that, and all participants and staff were most likely 
aware of that at some level. It would have been unwise for them to place their trust in the 
people offering spaces of uncertainty. 
To cleave to such a stance in relation to policy knowledge and other policy participants, 
despite the manifest difficulty of achieving any kind of resolution to the anxieties it 
provokes, suggests that the costs of walking away from this stance were unbearably high for 
Louise and I. Perhaps, it could even be said, this depressive state had become a good object 
in its own right.Played out on an organisational and political canvas, institutional acceptance 
of this depressive function would confirm this position as “good”, rejection of it would be 
confirmed as “bad”. When Cathy and others discussed how policy specialists needed a 
“personality for policy” they tended to dwell on a particular set of behaviours that could be 
observed in another, such as flintiness, stamina, muted moral outrage and so on. However I 
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find it interesting to consider, given my own sense of political and social hybridity, how far 
such a “personality” might be about defending an experience of one’s self as in-between 
against a split, persecutionary - but apparently politically and ontologically homogenous - 
Other. I can only speak for myself here; I cannot speak for Louise in this respect, and will 
not speculate on her behalf. 
Within itself, the Partnership mirrored the wider policy context by having its own “activists” 
and to a lesser extent its own “professionals”. People such as Cathy or Roy drew contrasts 
with their own stance as emotionally knowledgeable, emotionally motivated activists to 
explain what policy work consisted of. Policy work, as the line between the two secure ways 
of knowing, had to “face two ways” and this was believed to require people who did policy 
work as their main duty in the organisation or outside it to have a “personality for policy”. 
This consisted of a hardness, a cynicism and a willingness to compromise their own moral 
and ontological security to engage with that of others. The idea that policy work is 
(unpleasant) relational work which resides in the person of the policy worker became evident 
in the way people talked about the consequences of Louise’s abrupt departure; the policy 
“mental” was turned loose and dispersed around the other people in the organisation now it 
could not be contained by her. Not coincidentally, a degree of distrust and even fear about 
the work of policy was displayed in the way that members of staff described it. Recurring 
use of the words “mental/ crazy/ mad” and references to exhaustion became almost a running 
joke between me and my informants; look for where the madness and the exhaustion is 
coming from, to paraphrase them, and there you will find policy work. Indeed, Jonathan, as 
the head of the organisation and as the one who led on speaking to important political and 
media figures, was openly described as the source of this exhaustion, stress and madness in 
the Partnership.  Janet Newman has compared this ambiguous stance by policy workers to 
that of translators between cultures or languages in other disciplines (Newman 2012b). 
However, the policy worker-as-translator as encountered in my fieldwork was less a stable 
identity and more a stance which came into being through its relations with others and their 
knowledge and being in the world. 
6.6 Conclusion: the “mellow weakness” of translation  
In this chapter I work with another metaphor, just as I worked with shadows in the previous 
two chapters.  “Translation” is employed to evoke what it means to work in-between the split 
knowledges of emotion and reason in policy making. In Chapters 3 and 4 I explored the 
complex and competing conceptions of “good” governance that emotion and reason 
represent. I also outlined how, in contrast with the way most empirical descriptions of 
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splitting in policy contexts take place, I came to see this split reflected an inner conflict that 
ran through most or perhaps all of the participants in the Partnership’s policy work. I 
understand it to be reflected in the institutional structures and stakeholder categories of this 
work not because I or my informants literally believe that activists are emotional and 
professionals are rational, or because one of these positions can easily be equated with 
material or social power, but because it externally dramatizes an internal anxiety about moral 
governance and political legitimacy. I have turned to examining the working practices of the 
third category of participant – NGO workers – because in doing so it helps to illuminate 
what it means to be caught between these competing models of “goodness”.  
This in-betweeness is in fact a specialism, the policy worker, within a specialist institution of 
the NGO. The way Louise’s colleagues described her as being in some way essentially a 
different sort of person to them, and the way that she and they expressed the moral and social 
dangers of doing this work, suggest that most people involved in the Partnership actively 
identified with either an engaged activist or distant professional position. The specialist 
policy workers themselves describe their relations with others suggest a containment, or 
perhaps an embodiment, of the anxiety that others in the organisation or in the wider policy 
making process feel about the legitimacy of their decision-making. Psychosocial studies of 
policy implementation routinely draw upon postcolonial scholarship to explain unequal 
social relations and establishing categories of subalterns and oppressors which reflect 
injustices beyond their immediate context (Frosh 2003). I use both literatures to explore the 
unevenness of social relations, and to reveal some of the fine-grain texture of what happens 
when one finds oneself in-between, socially and existentially speaking. In drawing upon 
psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic approaches to the translational “Third Space”, to 
borrow Homi K. Bhabha’s phrase (2004), I propose it as a way of thinking about the 
invitation that is being issued, explicitly or (more usually) implicitly in the person of the 
policy worker. It is a framework for thinking about the relational dimension of the 
translations involved in policy work. Looking at the practices of policy work and what it 
means to have a “personality for policy”, as my informants described it, requires an account 
of the apparent “two-facedness” of the policy worker, and their unstable ontological position 
in relation to others in the Partnership’s policy activities. Arguably, precisely because the in-
betweenness demanded by “facilitating real dialogue” was not supported or acknowledged 
by either practice or structural resources, Louise, Evan and I – and at something of a remove 
Jonathan – found our work confusing, draining and perhaps futile. 
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I quote at length from Janet Newman’s recent work on women policy practitioners (2012b) 
as a means of contextualising more broadly the experiences of Louise, Jenny and I, and to a 
lesser extent our colleagues who also performed policy functions at the Partnership. Just like 
Newman, I am making an argument for understanding policy and policy work as something 
that happens “in-between” rather than within solid, discrete people, roles, organisations and 
places. This matters when seeking to understand emotion in policy work because so much of 
what was described to me by informants as “the emotional” was brought into being through 
relations; a story told and listened to; a silence in a room; a sense of being overwhelmed by 
angry voices; the incursion on or withdrawal from the space immediately around you. Like 
Newman I am interested in how this “in-betweeness” can be inhabited as a worker, or 
perhaps embodied by a worker, and how this relates to wider patterns of relating for people 
who come to be policy specialists. 
Governance and politics more generally is widely exhorted to be less adversarial, more 
collaborative and more “empowering” by those in and outside the academy.  Indeed, much 
critical policy studies and the “argumentative turn” within it is aimed at engineering and 
promoting the “dialogue” that the Partnership itself espoused (e.g. Fischer & Forester 1993; 
Wagenaar 2011; Hajer 2005; Healey 1992). My research suggests that participants’ 
motivations for taking part in policy making are maybe more complex and conflicted than 
this deliberative democratic ideal can accommodate. This deliberative ambition is at odds 
with both the structural and material pressures upon Parliament and the Civil Service and 
with our own individual commitments to defending our private moral and epistemological 
validity and rectitude. The way knowledge of and being in the world in public life is 
colloquially and canonically conceptualised serves to entrench these apparently 
incommensurable positions. A third sector organisation such as the Partnership offers to 
provide a product which government or citizens can acquire and solve this problem. 
However in reality it offers a difficult and long-term process which proposes change to all 
participants. This is not what government, citizens or even the organisation’s workers 
themselves necessarily sign up to. However, the rise of the specialist third sector policy 
organisation, or indeed deliberative governance consultancies, suggests we like the idea of 
the product still, and that they serve the need to acquire “good governance” of this sort. 
This means of controlling unbearable risks to political systems is what Wolfgang Seibel 
describes as “Mellow Weakness”. Organisations such as the Partnership, indeed 
organisations of the type I have spent most of my working life within, ‘provide the 
“organisational slack” that enables the non-profit sector to serve as a shunting-yard for social 
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and political problems that, basically, cannot be solved’ (Seibel 1989, p.178). They are not 
there to succeed; they are there to fail, but fail gallantly and with integrity. At an 
interpersonal and relational level of analysis, this explanation fits my own experience of 
being a policy worker generally and of specifically doing policy work for the Partnership.  
This is not to say that I believe that the Partnership is a decoy, used by Government to 
deflect attention from its iniquities, as perhaps Seibel’s phrasing suggests. I believe that such 
in-betweenness can be constructive and even radical if the relational spade-work is put in 
first, just as in other walks of life. It chimes with my own political commitments and it is one 
way of interpreting Jonathan’s description of his organisation’s model: “facilitating dialogue, 
then taking action for real change”. The Partnership’s commitment to participatory 
governance is not undermined because so much stands to be lost by all manner of 
participants if they enter into deliberative practices in a truly open-ended way. But it does 








7. IN-BETWEENNESS: TRANSLATION AND 
INSCRIPTION 
 
This chapter and its counterpart about relational translations interrogate the canonical belief 
that policy is fundamentally about texts, themselves repositories of verbalised arguments. 
This emphasis on arguments and texts can be traced through much interpretive policy 
analysis of recent years, particularly  those concerned with understanding the practices of 
policy. Scholarship about the practice of policy has been framed by the concept of politics as 
a forum for debate and argument, leading to Majone’s influential assertion that ‘policy is 
made of language’ (Majone 1989, p.1). Textual analysis of interviews and documents is 
frequently used to understand the power relations and structures behind policy making, 
notably in institutional ethnographic research (DeVault & McCoy 2006; Smith 2005; 
Nichols & Griffith 2009). In this chapter and the previous one I turn this interest in the text 
on its head somewhat by looking at what went into one document I helped to make, rather 
than considering it as a finished article. The approach I have taken to explaining what I and 
other policy workers did at the Partnership has been to go back through my notes and 
examine what went into the black box of the “writing” that formed our only tangible outputs. 
By taking the production of a text – a policy briefing paper – and examining the way that 
emotional knowledge and other knowledges were processed and worked upon in order to 
produce this text, my aim is to draw attention to the interconnected but diverse 
transformations involved in what commonly gets called “writing”. Some of these things are 
fundamentally relational, the spaces between policy participants who are associated with 
particular forms of knowledge. Conceptually I framed the policy worker as a translator 
between perspectives on the world in a similar way to other people who “hold open” 
indeterminate spaces of meaning, such as ethnographers or therapists. However, texts are 
also material products, produced through manual labour and manipulation of materials. 
These practices are done by bodies and take place in spaces with various tools. My journal 
and notes are full of these interventions into the material culture of policy. These 
interventions, like the relational ones, are forms of translation from a source to a target 
system of signification, turning one way of knowledge into new forms of knowing, 
sometimes with rather different logics. 
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The previous chapter explored how taking out a pen or laptop and starting to create words on 
a page is only a small part of the business of writing in policy. Nevertheless these material 
practices of writing do remain important, particularly as it is where the various types of 
evidence and their ever-shifting multiplicities of meanings are translated into an artefact by a 
process of physical labour. It is the point at which some things are fixed on the page and 
some things are left unfixed, becoming silenced or existing only in the gaps between written 
words. Because of this, there is a loss implied in the physical act of writing, and with that 
loss comes difficult moral choices and shifts in power. 
The chapter devoted to relational translations explored in some detail how policy workers in 
the Partnership formed spaces between knowledges, including emotional knowledges, about 
policy issues. Emotional knowledge is conceptualised in this thesis as “first person 
knowledge”; something that gets experienced somatically in and through the Self. To go 
from a sensory, somatic and situated knowledge of the world and a physical text is a 
different sort of translation practice than the evolving, unfolding but fundamentally relational 
work of the policy worker-as-translator. It is taking knowledge which is situated and 
historical and making it into an artefact, which in turn goes on to be used in new contexts 
and histories. This hermeneutic exercise, in which ‘the lived experience surrounding the  
material culture is translated into a different context of interpretation, is common for both 
texts and for other forms of material culture’ (Hodder 2012, p.113) [emphasis my own]. 
Words do things as well as describe things, however, and this acting upon the world through 
language and the potential for control, codification and coercion through the apparent 
concreteness of the text is what institutional ethnography sets out to uncover and 
problematise. However, as pieces of material culture which are only in the active when being 
used by people in context, texts and contexts are in ‘a continual state of tension, each 
defining and redefining the other, saying and doing things differently through time’ (Hodder 
2012, p.112)  Texts as communicators between moments of embodied and knowledges are 
complex things, but ones which rarely seem to attract much attention as pieces of material 
culture with their roots in physical practices in policy scholarship.  
In this chapter I trace the materiality of a policy document through the physical processes 
behind its production. I explore how my own lived experience and the various pieces of 
emotional and other knowledges I engaged with in writing a briefing paper became 
entwined, effaced and inscribed in the material artefact of the finished document. I 
investigate how this tension between text and context is found throughout the physical 
practices of writing and what consequences it has for the presence of the policy worker in 
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policy documents. Without ignoring the special status of the textual in policy and politics, I 
question what about emotional knowledge is lost and what may be traced in such artefacts. 
7.1 Scribing 
The physical practice of writing is a highly visible translation of speech into graphic 
representations of words. It is a translation of an embodied telling of a story, occurring in a 
particular social context, time and place into a set of marks upon a page which endure 
beyond that particular context but also inevitably cannot capture all of the telling of a story. 
It effaces, if not destroys, the somatic nature of storytelling. Likewise, it relocates thoughts 
and ideas outside of the intimacy of a communicative moment and defers it in time and space 
until someone reads them. Writing is thus a way of reifying knowledge. In the policy work 
undertaken by the Partnership events, meetings and conversations were fastidiously noted 
down; “scribing” was a constant activity, creating a parallel version of our lives and work. 
This scribing was considered to be the role of staff and, in particular, whoever was there in a 
policy specialist capacity was expected to be the default scribe. Logically, perhaps, there was 
no reason why this had to be the case; conceivably volunteers or community engagement 
workers could have done the work of scribing just as well. There appeared to be something 
inherent in the nature of what was being done by scribing that suited a policy specialist 
however. When Louise wanted to encourage me to move from an observational to a more 
participative role in the Partnership, she got me to start with scribing at a workshop for her. 
Scribing was an absolute necessity at large policy events such as the annual showcases, at 
which all Partnership staff were expected to take turns as scribes, which was largely done in 
the name of “capturing” the event, but it was also something that policy workers did on a 
more ad hoc basis in smaller policy meetings as well, such as the “rehearsal” sessions that I 
and Louise and latterly Cathy ran prior to public-facing policy events.  
Louise was the default “scribe” at her own workshops and at meetings with people within 
and outside the Partnership to discuss policy issues. At the steering group meetings for the 
policy programme she and I worked on, Louise was always the one making notes for later 
use. She was an integral part of the Jonathan’s framing of these meetings, communicating to 
her when something significant was said, though not always verbally. His eye contact with 
her seemed to signify when something needed to be moved from our – sometimes very 
rambling – discussions and transmitted into another context. It was also a way of drawing 
debate to a close. At the first meeting held by the staff team who planned the final annual 
showcase event, I observed how Jonathan enlisted Louise’s scribing presence to bracket the 
conversation we had been having about evidence session topics. The planning group 
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numbered around ten people, depending on attendance, and on this particular day we were 
gathered in the Partnership’s board room around the board table. Jonathan was sat next to 
Louise, who had been largely silent during much of the discussion; I was sat opposite 
Louise. The brainstorming had been going on in a somewhat circular manner for some time, 
but when Jonathan decided that there was enough of a consensus forming among the group’s 
members, I observed that he and Louise worked together to signify that we had moved from 
a moment-by-moment discussion to something that would be referred to from now on in 
Partnership documents. I wrote at the time: ‘Some tentative areas are fleshed out by 
Jonathan, looking at Louise who takes notes…’. I was intrigued by the way that eye contact 
between the two of them served to seamlessly move from speech to summary to text in a 
coordinated but tacit way, and on reflection Louise’s silent but obviously busy presence 
showing the work of translation in inscription to the rest of us seems to me to be an integral 
part of how Jonathan’s encouragement to wind things up took root. Louise liked to get me to 
take notes for her whenever she could, saying that she found it easier to concentrate on what 
was being said. I was also aware that this gave me a role in her work, and it made me a sort 
of sub-function of Louise, who would typically introduce me as ‘Rosie, researcher from the 
University of Edinburgh, who’s going to take notes for me’. But I nevertheless observed that 
Louise was rarely without her notebook and took copious notes regardless of how 
comprehensive my own were. When Cathy was asked to step into Louise’s shoes and 
prepare some of her community researchers for giving evidence at policy events, I noticed 
that she too made note-taking a significant part of her physicality. Scribing – writing up/ 
down what had so far been oral and non-linear – was used by Cathy to book-end discussion 
but also to refocus attention. At the workshop for the women’s group who presented at the 
final annual showcase, Cathy signalled that we had to move from an exploratory storytelling 
session to something with a policy argument to make by getting out her pen and a new, blank 
sheet in her notebook: 
‘“Right! Lets’ get a structure down,” says Cathy, and she has been noting loads 
down and drawing up sections and segments all the way through this last digression. 
She says that we have a beginning – I’m frankly a little in the dark what its content is 
– and we have an end – similar – but “that bit in the middle” is going to be about 
evidence and the research process.’ 
The fact that this scribing happened is in itself no surprise to me. The conversations we were 
having needed to endure beyond the immediate place and time they were being held and 
inform future work, perhaps the work of people who could not attend that particular event. 
However, the Partnership employed permanent administration staff that usually came to 
most internal and many public events. They were probably more accomplished scribes than 
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Louise, Cathy or I and they would ultimately be the ones who circulated meeting minutes. 
And yet it was the designated policy workers who could be seen to be scribing. Scribing of 
this type became policy work, a practice of policy workers. It was also one which was 
clearly visible to others, and indeed sometimes had general attention drawn to it, as in 
Cathy’s workshop or Louise’s tendency to introduce me as “her” scribe. My interpretation of 
the way this physical practice intervened in discussions is that it was a way of signalling that 
policy work was taking place. It was an outward show of the translation implied by policy 
work, that of relocating knowledge from the personal, the embodied, the private and the 
instantaneous to the durable, the inscribed and decontextualized.  
On one level, the visibility of this scribing made clear that we were engaged in policy. But as 
a physical intervention I would argue that it also made visible the tension between embodied, 
experiential emotional knowledge and context and the inscription of that into an enduring 
text. On a practical level, this intervention visibly set the person scribing apart from the 
conversation around them. Instead of their focus being immediately on the people around 
them and their general surroundings, it was turned to a page that was simultaneously more 
introspective and more abstract than the exchanges going on around them. There could be 
occasions where some participants directly referred to it as a desirable, legitimising process 
that made the discussion more important than it otherwise would be, one such example being 
a break-out session I attended on the second day of the first annual showcase event, where 
community activists were specifically debating what parts of our discussion should be 
included in the permanent record the “scribe” was going to send on to be compiled into the 
report. On some occasions, however, the act of scribing was perceived as a troubling and 
even exploitative practice, involving uneven power relations in favour of the scribe. 
At Cathy’s preparation session for the second annual showcase I had been taking down 
notes, just as Cathy had, about the conversation being had by the all-female research group 
Cathy had been working with for the last year. The support worker for the women’s group 
called me out on this:  
‘“Before we move on, what do you think about what’s just been talked about, 
Rosie?” asks the case worker. “You’ve been making lots of notes there,” she 
smiles, but it feels like I’ve had the attention of the room drawn towards me and 
there’s a point being made: account for yourself, you don’t just get to study us 
without us getting our say.’ 
My own feelings were of slight bafflement, as we hadn’t really been talking about anything 
especially controversial, personal or otherwise potentially upsetting, and also that I felt 
uncomfortable or even criticised as I was being placed “outside” of the group. This inside/ 
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outside, on “our” side/ on “their” side dichotomy had been building throughout the session in 
the way both the research participants and Cathy and the other research facilitators had been 
describing different ways of relating to the project’s findings. I was in danger of not being 
with them, and consequently being against them, and the fact I was taking notes was the 
primary indicator of that difference. In a way, my note taking did indeed set me apart from 
the group – although not to my mind above it. 
These are of course my own feelings of being “positioned” through the visibility of my 
scribing. Others however made play with it during the Partnership’s policy events and 
activities as a way of referring to and exploring tensions about the tension between text and 
context and embodiment and inscription in policy work. At the end of the annual showcase 
planning meeting held in the Partnership’s board room, Jonathan employed a touch of satire 
in drawing the meeting to a close: ‘Jonathan then wraps up and says thank you, and that he 
and Louise will take this away and work up a plan for the Showcase, and he jokes that it may 
or may not be recognisable to us.’ Jonathan’s implication that the person who does the 
writing may turn what has been experienced between participants into something new and 
unrecognisable was an acknowledgement of the latent tensions between the scribe and the 
scribed.  
The use of the physicality of scribing as a way of showing this tension interpersonally was 
brought home to me during a trip Cathy and I made to a public information event shortly 
before the end of my time with the Partnership. We were manning a stall in a community 
hall on a large Edinburgh housing estate, and had been chatting to people who came past 
about Welfare Reform. I had another motivation for being there; I was trying to gather first-
person testimonies to use as case studies in my briefing paper. This was how we always 
introduced ourselves and explained what we could offer; we were a policy advocacy group. 
My notes of what happened that day read: 
‘Our first customer rocks up – an incredibly gaunt young man wearing a woolly hat 
and with filthy hands and fingernails. He tells a rambling story about how someone 
put £10,000 into his bank account that wasn’t his, which he spent quickly thinking it 
was from his granny, then his unwitting benefactor realised their mistake, and now 
he has to pay the bank back £100 a month. That doesn’t leave anything from his 
benefits so he relies on food banks to get by. He knows he spent it so he has to pay it 
back, that’s not in question, but he doesn’t have any money to buy food.’ 
I was trying to get my head around the confusing nature of the man’s story, but I became 
aware that Cathy was physically very active next to me, writing furiously and intently. I went 
on, ‘Cathy has got out a notebook and has been making what to me look like random jottings 
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of the man’s statements.’ Notwithstanding her apparently meticulous note-taking, Cathy’s 
notes did not appear to me to be anything other than a collection of key words that the man 
had said. What mattered to me in that moment though was that Cathy looked more 
authoritative, more active and more prepared to make use of the man’s story in some official 
and presumably “policy” way. I continued, ‘I feel awkward as I don’t have my pen in my 
hand, I’m just listening quietly next to Cathy as she asks active questions and makes 
sympathetic noises and takes more notes.’ My thoughts turned to the confusion of having 
two “authoritative” records, however; ‘It would just be weird if we were both taking notes 
this eagerly’. The act of scribing the man’s words seemed to be satisfying to him, regardless 
of the reality of the notes, since he leaned in towards us, watching Cathy’s hands move 
across the page and projecting his voice in a way that resembled dictation, so we wouldn’t 
miss any of it. He was presenting his story for transmission into other contexts and it was 
being taken seriously because it was being written down. At the same time I couldn’t help 
but notice how much more comfortable I would have been – and how comfortably Cathy 
appeared to be – to have a page to focus on rather than the man’s face. I recorded that I 
found it hard to distance myself enough to listen to him in an analytical way while I had to 
look him in the eye. Cathy had separated herself from the immediacy of the man’s 
storytelling by scribing in ways that showed the translation work being done in moving from 
storytelling to text; she was engaging with him, but in order to produce a very specific sort of 
text. 
Writing of this kind is something only one person’s hands can do at a time, and it isn’t 
always easy to see what is being written. The Partnership did experiment with less obviously 
“scribed” approaches to recording its events, such as projecting a live twitter feed onto the 
walls of the auditorium at both annual showcase events, but these never seemed to replace 
the presence of a policy worker engaged in scribing duties. This presence dramatizes certain 
tensions about the way policy documents relate to emotional knowledge and storytelling; 
these include not just a loss of control on the part of the people being noted down, but also 
perhaps that their testimony is not legitimate until someone “official” has processed it into a 
commodity of governance. There is also the difficulty of being part of a conversation if you 
are writing, and the scribe is set apart from the group, but they maybe are making a statement 
that they are above the group. The “capturing” implied by note taking in the Partnership’s 
policy work is no such thing but in fact a form of editing, in the sense that it serves to 
distance your experience as a listener from what is transmitted about the substance of the 
story or conversation to which you are listening. There are things that, no matter how 
sophisticated the writer, get lost in the translation from a human encounter to an encounter 
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with a page. The women at the preparation session were right about my ambiguity as a 
presence in that this distancing effect opens up the space to be critical of those stories, and 
also to transmit stories imperfectly – perhaps in a language or register that does not belong to 
the original tellers of those stories - into a radically uncertain future with uncertain readers.  
7.2 The Performing Scribe: thinking about the physical act 
of scribing 
The kind of translation being done in moving from the spoken to the written is symbolic as 
well as materially pragmatic. In the history of social science and anthropology in particular 
the division between oral and written became the boundary of what was “other” and what 
was “neutral”; ‘writing implicitly, and later explicitly, provided the dividing line between 
researcher and researched’ (Barton & Papen 2010, p.4).  There seems to be very little 
ethnographic or sociological discussion of writing as a physical, material practice as opposed 
to people’s relations with the finished artefact of the text. Given my acute awareness of my 
own writing as a part of my physical presence as a policy worker and as a part of the material 
culture of policy work, heightened by the attention it garnered from my interlocutors at the 
Partnership and beyond, I find this frustrating and mystifying. I was a body in a room, doing 
something with my body which also involved my mind and my cultural moorings, and it 
worked upon my relations with everyone else in the room in not entirely controllable ways. 
This activity was a physical intervention as well as an abstract one, and it created a thing in 
the world which did not exist before, using the group’s oral materials to fashion something 
which was made for policy. Furthermore, scribing was something that had to be seen to be 
done. This physical activity signalled that the meeting had begun, statements were on the 
record, and that policy work was happening to the participants’ discussions now when a 
moment before it had not. It was the outward sign of the policy worker’s translation 
practices. 
If I were to treat my scribing, and that of Louise and other policy workers, as one of many 
examples of transferring oral words to a written text there are perhaps more conceptual 
resources at my disposal. Ethnographies of oral practices and their transmission in writing 
present more possibilities for understanding what are the nature of the translations involved 
in this movement from the oral to the textual. Key to the concept of orality is the 
performance of an utterance in an impermanent moment in time, itself a reflection of the 
embodied knowledge of the utterer. As such oral communication actively conveys this 
knowledge in ways that fundamentally affects the listener-participants understanding of what 
has been communicated. Indeed this extends to the listener-participants’ relationship to the 
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world around them; ‘Oral folk have no sense of a name as a tag, for they have no idea of a 
name as something that can be seen. Written or printed representations can be labels; real, 
spoken words cannot be’ (Ong 2012, p.33) [emphasis my own]. To Ong, written language 
makes more likely (but does not necessarily demand) certain relations with the world, 
namely ones which categorise, analyse and dehumanise in the many sense of that word. In 
this way, writing language according to textual rather than oral conventions becomes 
entwined with objectifying and colonising practices; ‘The clichés in political denunciations 
in many low-technology, developing cultures – enemy of the people, capitalist war-mongers 
– that strike high literates as mindless are residual formulary essentials of oral thought 
processes’ (Ong 2012, p.38). According to this way of understanding the transition from oral 
to textual, writing things down instead of saying them effaces or promotes certain ways of 
being and knowing in the world, among them the somatic and emotional. As a consequence 
of this concern with paying due attention to the oral in society, or indeed to predominant oral 
societies per se, writing has come to be depicted by many scholars of oral tradition and 
storytelling as ‘a pale and impoverished reflection of language… Writing and language [are] 
entirely distinct’ (Basso 1989, p.425). Attempting to provide an overview of speaking 
studies, Richard Bauman observes the primacy of the idea of performance; ‘the interplay 
between resources and individual competence, within the context of particular situations’ 
(Bauman 1989, p.7). If the vernacular or traditional culture of everyday life was present in 
performances of linguistic speech acts, writing would inevitably remove that performance 
from language contained in documents. The danger and political contentiousness of this 
boundary between orality and textuality certainly suggests why it might be important for a 
policy worker to be seen to be scribing and why others might take an interest in their doing 
it. Scribing is something with which it is possible to associate political and social coercion, 
domination and elitism.  
The shift into a text, in the “oral vs. textual” tradition, marks a shift into the analysis of the 
grammatical and linguistic codes of the text as it also marks a shift away from the oral, 
contextualised, embodied and vernacular. This is arguably the most common way that policy 
analysis comes to policy documents and attempts to understand their meaning and 
significance. To focus exclusively on the internal structures of writing’s written codes, 
however, is to miss all the other ways in which it acts in relation to its social and cultural 
context. Instead of marking a retreat from the social, ‘the activity of writing, like the activity 
of speaking, a supremely social act’ (Basso 1989, p.432). It is communicative activity, 
something done by bodies and social persons in historical and cultural contexts. 
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Writing about the relationship between orality and inscription in Anglo-Saxon poetry, A.N. 
Doane rejects this division, insisting instead that inscription is an active communicative 
practice and, following Basso and Bauman, proposes the concept of the “performing scribe”. 
Rather than seeing scribing as something outside of context and moment, Doane relocates 
scribing intimately within it: ‘If we can put the scribe in the place of the storyteller, we might 
say that he takes not a “narrated event” – something held in the memory before performance 
– but an “event of narration”, a pre-existing text, and restructures it in the memory in the 
moment between reading and copying’ (Doane 1994, p.430). Central to the performance of 
the scribe is an understanding of words as things which always exist within a physical 
context rather than as immaterial abstracts. Words must be spoken in a place and a time by a 
body, and texts must be made, written by the scribe’s hands and formed out of other 
materials. These physical practices are not divisible but are in fact always in dialogue. Thus 
the oral and the inscribed leave traces on each other’s presentation of words and meaning. In 
the case of written vernacular poetry, the physical presentation of the text on a page enacts 
the speech acts of poetry recital within it in various ways, for example in the gaps left 
between phrases to indicate rhetorical or dramatic pauses.  
‘The script would be a kind of prompt or cue in two registers – presenting fixed 
words in one register which would suggest and promote words in another [the oral/ 
aural]. The performing scribe thus produces a palimpsestic text in which the old text 
largely predetermines the new but is authoritatively overwritten by the words of the 
new oral/written text’. (Doane 1994, p.432) 
As Doane indicates in this statement, written texts still involve an “overriding” of oral 
sources and are not apolitical, without power issues and inequalities. However, by attending 
to the scribed manuscript as a piece of physical cultural practice, new ways of understanding 
what can be carried by a text such as a policy document can emerge. Traces of the 
palimpsestic nature of “my” policy briefing paper are part of its physical presentation and its 
ability to be used as a tool of policy. The pull boxes that run around the case studies mark off 
the stories within as just that – stories, mini-narratives, told to me and then retold to you. 
They jostle up against the flow of facts and figures from a summary of recent government 
reports and figures from NGO surveys which runs down the page and over the margins to the 
next page. The document starts in sputtered caveats and qualifications, again pulling out into 
bold little boxes definitions and concepts gleaned from yet other documents. They punch 
through the text and shout for your consideration. The stories in the larger boxes contrast 
with the body text in their talk of sadness, loss, anger and hardship, and are written in a more 
“oral” style, with the rhetorical pauses left in, much like the Anglo-Saxon poetry manuscripts 
might be. These pauses are there for exploration, doubt and uncertainty. But they are 
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contained by the boxes around them and are not allowed to go wandering about the page, 
contaminating the legitimacy of the desk research with their references to emotional 
knowledge. 
 7.3 ‘Policifying” Writ ing: making a document  
These reifying and editing processes could be said to be common to all types of writing, 
perhaps, not just policy writing. They were certainly present in the writing that was 
generated by the research projects Cathy and others led, and the tension between the 
researcher’s stance of solidarity in the Partnership’s work and the inaccessibility of the way 
writing was physically done was present, if not always fully acknowledged by staff or 
participants. Writing for policy involved a particular type of scrutiny of the authorial voice 
though, and the nature of that voice was intended to reflect the translation stance of the 
policy worker. In producing the “final version” of a policy document, the Partnership’s staff 
and collaborators were carefully constructing not just a statement in language but an artefact 
which could be printed, circulated and archived. This making process was taken very 
seriously, but the way in which it was done revealed something about the process of getting 
from idea to object. Far from being an authored work by a specialist with particular insight 
as the highly visible scribing I and others performed might suggest, these were texts built out 
of other texts and with many authors, none with any total control over the end product. In 
addition to the briefing paper that I led on, which I will consider shortly, I also participated 
in a group redrafting of the executive summary Cathy had written for the community 
research project she had coordinated with the women’s group. After a year and a half 
working in academia, I found this process exhilarating at times. In my notes from the 
meeting I began:   
‘A lot of people think that writing is a solitary thing in general, and that policy 
documents are the process of solitary work which is then received by audiences or 
adapted in turn thanks to more solitary work. It’s nice to get back to the reality of 
getting a policy document together; it’s an incredibly collaborative, sociable thing at 
times. Now is one of those moments.’ 
The writing the Partnership did for policy purposes went through a collaborative checking 
process to ensure that it was able to do the work it was meant for: enable an integration of 
emotional and technical-rational knowledge. Being pulled apart forensically by other policy-
literate staff members was integral to this checking, as could be seen in a staff meeting where 
Jonathan assessed the Cathy’s executive summary in its current iteration:  
‘[The report] has been through several drafts among the research staff, now 
Jonathan is policifying it, for want of a better word. He picks out things that could 
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be made to connect to events outside the world of the research. He picks apart 
language – sometimes just a couple of words – and considers how the change the 
emphasis and tone of the document. He casts his eye over the whole of it, selecting 
places where we can make a concrete demand or pin some specific criticism on the 
Government or on Parliament. He considers who else does work in this area and 
how strategically the main points of this report connect to their overall strategic 
aims.’ 
Jonathan’s role was to move between the way that the research had meaning to the 
Partnership staff in the project – and indeed the project’s participants – and the ways similar 
things had meaning to specific individuals in Government, or the way we could echo the 
language of other policy documents. To “policify” the report he had to take the research 
away from its specific and integral position in relation to the themes raised by the project and 
to connect it to the ways those themes are thought about by other audiences in other worlds, 
with their own language for doing so. To borrow the terminology of translation, he was 
bouncing between sources and targets in such a way as the idea of “source” and “target” 
became problematic. Jonathan had to attend not to the thing of the report in itself, but to the 
way the translations, or perhaps the Deleuzian “lines of flight” contained within it could be 
made more visible, indeed become the matter of the writing itself.  
Jonathan was later to do this to my own briefing paper, in which he picked up places where I 
could have used established Government language for a phenomenon rather than my own, 
and other organisation’s work that needed to be alluded to without being explicit.  This was 
something of theme throughout the drafting and redrafting process. “My” text never started 
as a blank page, in fact. It was elaborated from two documents, one a set of notes on the 
same topic that Louise had failed to process into something easily packaged before she left in 
the December before I finished with the Partnership. The other was a text that covered two 
sides of A4 and which had been written by Iain, a long-standing Partnership volunteer, a year 
or so ago. Jonathan liked its ideas, but as it stood it was not suitable for circulation as a 
finished Partnership policy briefing. It mostly consisted of Iain’s own personal reflections on 
the topic in hand; I was asked by Jonathan to turn it into a text that people would recognise 
as containing the usual things that policy briefings have. The document was written in point 
ten Times New Roman, and consisted of eight numbered bullet points. It mostly explored a 
rhetorical line of argument. I noted with some alarm at the time in my journal how the final, 
and most substantial, paragraphs were given over to suggesting how ‘initial quantitative data 
could be gathered both in aggregated and categorised forms (& comprehensive, sampled or 
guessed)’. I was also alarmed by the “gung-ho” scale of Iain’s ambitions: 
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‘I will urge caution when I see him on Monday; what are the procurement and 
competition regulations in this area; who stands to lose what where by doing these 
things and do we necessarily want to piss them off? It's all very good to be in the 
right as you see it, but you do also have to appreciate things from other perspectives 
too to get things done in the political world. It comes across not so much as wrong in 
a factual sense as naïve.’ 
I reflected upon the distributed authorship that was going to go into making Iain’s 
bulletpoints into a policy document, almost talking about it as a form of ventriloquism:  
‘The briefing needs the passion and the insight that a person like Iain and his 
contacts can bring as consultants and as case studies…But it has to be guided not by 
Iain's perspective, Iain's priorities and desires, but by the people I want to read this. 
You do not start from yourself in order to write a good policy document. You start 
from someone else, always.’ 
 
Jonathan’s unwillingness to use Iain’s pre-existing document reflects how in order to 
produce a canonical briefing paper it is not enough to write a text, however compelling or 
beautiful or truthful; it has to take its place in the material culture of policy. It needs to be a 
recognisable and useful product, a thing that can be circulated in certain practical ways that 
other people already use to circulate other products. And these means may include printed 
pages, which bring their own parameters to the writing process. Among the list of things I 
wanted to know in that first email to Jonathan and Iain was the word count I needed to aim 
for; I knew that it had to fit on a number of pieces of A4 paper that was divisible by four, 
assuming that there was going to be a centre fold. Notwithstanding digital communications, 
policy writing traditionally is an object in space and time as well as a text; the briefing I led 
on duly became a printed artefact which was handed out at conferences and seminars. 
Jonathan and Louise responded to my word count enquiry by sending me a selection of hard 
copies of other briefing papers the Partnership had produced recently. I was to ensure that 
the new briefing paper echoed the physical and textual form of the others, so people would 
know how to use them. 
In total the briefing paper went through at least four iterations. The first of these was a 
version that I collated from a range of sources, including; a review of the other policy 
documents relating to the topic in question that were available in the public domain; Iain’s 
original thought-piece; a couple of organisation-level case studies, written up as separate 
mini-narratives; my own original “research”, acting as a sort of “secret shopper” on the 
Royal Mile in Edinburgh. As I was trying to bring all this together in one text I felt 
bombarded by the sheer diversity of sources I needed to incorporate. I wrote in my journal: 
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‘It feels very out of control. Most of the anxiety comes from taking a massively 
complex topic with a lot of stakeholders and squeezing them into a legislative and 
news agenda with an opening the size of an eye of a needle. 
On the one hand, I have emails coming in from Iain, from his colleague, and no 
doubt soon others, full of gung ho enthusiasm and lists of things that someone (me) 
should go and research, make a fuss about, take up. They're right of course - this is a 
complex topic and these challenges have no single source. 
 
Ranged against this, on the other hand, is the relentless march of the policy and 
parliamentary machine. How can you always feel too late for something that moves 
so maddeningly slowly and predictably?’ 
 
This first draft was shown to Iain and one of his colleagues and its key ideas formed the 
basis of a discussion I had with a Holyrood party policy team. All these people commented 
on this draft, which I described as a scoping document, and Iain’s colleague pointed out 
other documents which I had missed which he felt needed to be incorporated into my own. I 
decided that the secret shopping wasn’t persuasive and was unnecessary. I felt it was also 
hard to incorporate this first-person perspective elegantly into a text which was written with 
a very depersonalised voice. Iain however regretted its omission; ‘I think they’ll [sic] find it 
very persuasive’, he insisted. After this rewrite the document was sent to Jonathan, and he 
sent it to Cathy as she had some experience of the topic of the briefing. She brought this 
version and her notes on it along to the information event where we encountered the man 
with the £10,000 debt, and she provided both oral and written feedback. The written 
feedback took the form of margin notes in red pen. Some of this was about clarity and style, 
but some was about ensuring that the document aligned with the Partnership’s existing 
briefings and public statements and that I had not adopted in an unproblematised way 
Westminster or Scottish government terminology she found unsatisfactory. Finally the Cathy 
version went to Jonathan, who proposed few substantive changes but did raise the issue of 
explicit authorship. Generally the Partnership named the authors of briefings if they were 
academics, it was explained, and Jonathan expected that we would do the same in this case. I 
pointed out that I wasn’t meant to leave a publicly searchable paper trail behind me for 
ethical reasons, but also that I hadn’t completed this in an academic capacity and felt 
uncomfortable about implying that I had. In the end Jonathan proposed that the briefing 
paper’s authorship be described thus: ‘produced by staff and volunteers [at the Partnership]’. 
I couldn’t help but feel that this parting uncertainty about authorial voice as inscribed into 
the final document was fitting. With this, the text was sent away to a group of professional 
designers in Glasgow to finally turn it into a usable product. At a couple of weeks remove, 
“my” briefing paper, the one which would have had my name on it if Jonathan had not 
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consulted me, was delivered to the Partnership offices as a bundle of finished pamphlets 
which looked quite unlike my text-with-design-directions. It was a posthumous work; by this 
time I had formally left the organisation and concluded my fieldwork. 
7.4 The intertext in its context: policy writ ing as craft -
making and its consequences  
In this description of drafting a briefing paper, writing for policy can be experienced as a loss 
of a position from which to view the world or a loss of a voice, perhaps paradoxically given 
the way the physical act of writing apparently turns inward. This exposes a trope about 
authors and their relative power which ought to be problematized. Writing may place great 
power to frame the world and other people in the hands of an author, but not all authors have 
a strong unitary presence in their texts. Writing for policy is the opposite of “finding your 
voice” as an author, but rather Jonathan’s (and certainly my own) attempts to policify our 
writing was to crystallise and endlessly refract others’ voices. The author’s skill is in their 
absconding mutability.  
Policy documents have tended to be treated as notable substantially for their discursive or 
rhetorical content in such a way as sidesteps the complexities of the “voice” of the text and 
how it transmits and translates knowledges. Freeman and Maybin note how ‘the authorial 
voice of these documents is often discussed as though it were the singular voice of an 
organisation’ (Freeman & Maybin 2011, p.158) and only rarely treated that authorial voice 
as something to be analysed and interpreted. Even then, by shifting the focus from the author 
to the text as the location of meaning, these texts were still treated as vehicles for discourse 
rather than how they have been produced. Notwithstanding that this scholarship sees policy 
documents as constructed, ‘they say little about the work of construction itself’ (Freeman & 
Maybin 2011, p.159). Instead, by focusing on the materiality of documents and their 
production, it becomes clear that policy documents inscribe other documents and becomes ‘a 
translation that also translates’ (Freeman & Maybin 2011, p.160). In being multiple it also 
multiplies meaning. This is made possible through policy documents’ very materiality. Their 
fixedness is what is attractive and necessary about them, as they provide a nexus for the 
products of all sorts of other discursive practices. These practices are themselves constitutive 
of the social world, not just its mirror.  
To this I would add that policy documents, like Doane’s Anglo Saxon vernacular poetry, 
inscribe not just other documents and other words, but present materially the experiences and 
relations that go into making words mean. This is to say that more-than-language goes into 
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making words mean or making words do things in the world. In the case of the briefing 
paper I have been describing, the black box of “writing” contains practices around relational 
stances, inscription, presence and performance as well as rhetorical strategies and 
grammatical conventions. If policy documents as artefacts are tools for communicative 
performance, this applies to the speaker, the reader and to the scribe. Documents tell us 
things and allow information to flow through them to distant audiences. But, much as in the 
case of the relational work done in the figure of the policy worker-as-translator, the 
translational policy document as a hybrid, in-between artefact facilitates associations 
between things. The boundaries between author, source and target, or rationality and 
emotion, or the moment of the telling and the moment of the reading, may not be as rigid as 
first appears. 
Policy writing is cool, “professional”, abstract and technical. It is also personal, specific, 
passionate and transgressive of professional boundaries. The intersubjectivity of writing 
practices in policy polices the writer’s positioning and effaces their voice as a unitary 
subjectivity that experiences the world and hence has a moral and emotional presence in that 
world. The lack of an “I” in policy writing in this sense is not disingenuous – the translation 
work of a policy worker implies the loss of any fixed point in the world to call your own. At 
its heart policy writing is a carefully constructed echo chamber. This is in fact where the 
drama of policy gets projected into an uncertain future: 
‘Many if not most material symbols do not work through rules of representation, 
using a language-like syntax. Rather they work through the evocation of sets of 
practices within individual experiences’. (Hodder 2012, p.116)  
Policy documents describe things, and they say things, and as ways of transmitting language 
they do things. But the way that they do things also works on a non-language  basis; as 
physical artefacts and pieces of material political culture they also evoke the practices that 
formed them every bit as much as a thumbprint on a hand-thrown pot. 
7.5 Conclusion: reflections on translation and the translator 
in policy work  
This chapter serves as a companion to the previous one, in the sense that it explores the 
materiality of the metaphor of translation in policy work. I concluded Chapter 5 by 
explaining that policy specialists in some way contain and embody the anxieties of other 
policy participants about the knowledge-claims of emotional and rational governance and 
their capacity for moral or immoral decision-making. I also outline how these policy workers 
may be seen as fighting to hold open a Kleinian depressive position in an institution based 
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upon a refusal of that invitation. But these bodies occupy spaces, and these practices make 
their mark on the world. This chapter has explored how texts, documents and other pieces of 
material culture facilitate a deferment of these conflicts and these relational practices. They 
enable policy work to have its place in a dispersed, mediated and highly literate society and 
perform a psychosocial function not just for its immediate participants but for people they 
will never meet. They perhaps go some way to explaining why we invented policy work at 
all. As an ethnographer I am committed to seeing it as a socially- and historically-situated 
practice: there was nothing inevitable about it. I am interested in how my own research is a 
product of its time and place, and how far it differs or agrees with other similar recent 
studies. 
A sense of “in-betweenness” was integral to my own and others’ experience of policy work 
at the Partnership. The work of making positions speak to one another was a primary 
concern – almost an obsession – of my colleagues at the Partnership and it was a key way of 
describing what they and their organisation did and what they were for at a more existential 
level. I have already mentioned Janet Newman’s recent book, Working the spaces of power: 
Activism, Neoliberalism and Gendered Labour (2012b), examining the careers of women 
activists and the way their work reconstituted forms and spaces of governance. This was 
published after my fieldwork ended, and Newman’s analysis therefore did not influence my  
work while in the field, but on reading this book after finishing my time with the Partnership 
I was struck by how in both pieces of near-contemporaneous research (Newman’s interviews 
were conducted 2009 – 2011, my fieldwork commenced February 2012) the work around 
making shift of various kinds had leapt out at Newman and I as significant in understanding 
the working practices of specialist policy workers. Starting from the proliferation of spatial 
metaphors of “between-ness” among her interviewees and taking her cue from post-colonial 
ethnography, Newman conceptualised this aspect of women’s activism work as “border 
work”. In this border work, women ‘holding commitments and allegiances that are grounded 
“outside” while working in, or engaging with, “insider” positions’(Newman 2012b, p.130) 
found themselves occupying spaces within governance processes and relations that ‘required 
complex alliance-building’ (Newman 2012b, p.137). Because they brought to their work a 
“self” which in some way, especially in terms of class, history or place, blurred boundaries 
they created what Newman considered to be new categories or spaces of power.  
I was interested in the many similarities between Newman’s observations and my own, 
particularly the prevalence of the “two-faced” (in a non-pejorative sense) nature of 
campaigning careers, the sense that there were many logics present simultaneously in 
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political work, and the inherently relational nature of that work. I was also struck by the 
differences in the way this border work was described and experienced in Newman’s 
analysis and my own. Newman describes briefly the way that these logics conflict with one 
another, ‘often in uncomfortable ways, producing considerable tension for the worker 
involved’ (Newman 2012b, p.135) but overall presents border work as a positive aspect of 
this work; her interviewees describe it as necessary and making a progressive contribution in 
their eyes, or at least describe it as something generally worth celebrating. In my own 
observations of the practices of similarly-placed workers in voluntary organisations, and in 
my own experience, border work was less emancipatory; it emerges couched in anxious and 
exhausted language and physicality. Another difference was the importance of gender in 
talking about border work. Newman’s interviewees were selected because they were women 
and were aware of this fact, and Newman explores border work conceptually through a 
gender framework to arrive at a consideration of affect/ emotion among many other 
conceptual resources. None of the people I worked with or interviewed ever mentioned 
gender as something they thought about in relation to their work or my research topic. The 
one time I directly asked a fellow policy worker in a voluntary organisation about gender in 
her work, she said she’d never considered it like that. This perhaps illustrates the importance 
of a researcher’s positioning in the field and the tools they use to understand that field. 
Newman asked highly successful women campaigners to reflect upon their career trajectory; 
essentially asking for an in-depth consideration of the meaning they made of their activism 
work set against a very broad narrative of women’s political activism. I was trying to capture 
the micro-practices of emotion in policy work in an organisation which was experiencing a 
traumatic financial and interpersonal fragmentation due to funding cuts and redundancies. It 
was maybe no surprise that translation practices seemed less amenable to being held together 
by “big ideas” in my own analysis. 
I was interested to see if the conceptual resources proposed by Newman might shed light on 
the way the translation practices of people doing border work (not all of them were women) 
seemed to be experienced as less emancipatory and positive than the border work itself. 
Newman considered a range of conceptual approaches fruitful when thinking about border 
work at a strategic or organisational level, but some were more clearly relevant to studying 
the practices of policy work than others. Furthermore, some literatures Newman referred to 
were directly concerned with emotion while others were not. Her understanding of the 
“between-ness” described by her interviewees is inflected with; literatures of post-colonial 
theory around being within and without the State (Gupta 2006); gendered readings of the 
relational nature of politics (Jupp 2010; Rose 1999); and studies of the rise of a cohort of 
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professional “brokers” corresponding with the emergence of a discourse of dialogue and 
deliberation in (neo)liberal democracies (Wedel 2009). However, in thinking about how 
exactly that in-betweenness might work , and/ or be experienced, Newman draws attention to 
the literature of psycho-social approaches to politics. The liminalities involved in this work, 
she observes, can feel like a psychic and organisational “splitting” which may operate 
beyond the register of linguistic and cognitive description. I have already explained where I 
think policy workers may sit in relation to this splitting in the context of the Partnership’s 
policy forums, and what exactly the anxiety about knowledge and governance was that this 
institutionalised split was supposed to mitigate. In this chapter I am primarily concerned with 
the practices of being on the border between that split, and in the forums this meant the 
practices of acting as translator between different positions and knowledges. 
“True” translation, meaning that there can be direct correspondence between the meaning of 
the “original” and the meaning of the “new” work, is never possible; there is always a loss of 
fidelity, often with political and cultural losses and gains involved for the translated 
(Gentzler 2002). The translator becomes a preoccupying figure once cultural power struggles 
over meaning and legitimacy are included in the translation process, often couched in terms 
of territory, imperialism and colonialism; in this approach to translation, ‘to translate is not 
merely to “carry over”, but to take over’ (Freeman 2009, p.434). However, in the 
borderlands of the particular policy setting I am describing in this thesis, this explanation of 
translator as master/occupier to me seems unsatisfactory. It seems to reproduce the 
dichotomy between knowledges and ways of talking about knowledges that itself more 
reflects the internal anxieties experienced by a wide range of participants about knowledge 
and governance than any objective social reality of those two positions. I side with Janet 
Newman in seeing the necessity for reconceptualising policy work as hybrid “border work”.  
In the split world of the Partnership’s policy forums, translation seems to occupy a far more 
precarious place of contradiction and unreliability, and the translator is a more ambiguous 
figure: 
‘'If in the literary field it is unquestionably possible to claim the "monopoly of 
literary legitimacy" and to determine (not only for oneself) who is entitled to be 
called "author/writer", but also, who ultimately is an "author/ writer", this is not at 
all true for the role of mediators." (Wolf 2007, p.111) 
Wolf sees the “translation field” as analogous to the “Third Space” described by Homi 
Bhabha: ‘It is within this Third Space where varying life worlds and life styles superimpose 
upon each other with all their contradictions’ (Wolf 2007, p.113). While the concept of the 
Third Space does not render questions of unequal power and status irrelevant, it makes the 
178 
 
flows between texts, cultures and life worlds more unpredictable and uneven. This encounter  
‘entails the transformation of all agents involved and brings about new positions that do not 
allow the recurrence of already existing structures and formation’ (Wolf 2007, p.113). It is 
not hard to see why, in an institution such as policy making which serves as a defence 
against anxieties about governance, morality and knowledge, these encounters would be 
actively avoided by many participants in the forums and perceived as a threat to the integrity 
of their identity as policy actors. It is also not hard to see why being a professional translator 
is a difficult, threatening, even morally ambiguous function in the eyes of other forum 
participants, and one that might be given to a particular individual within the organisation, 
who would in turn experience it as exhausting and psychically distressing work. 
I am aware that this thesis in many ways reproduces these antagonistic splits in its own 
structure. As with the split between categories of actors and between emotional and rational 
knowledge, I’ve worked with the grain of the split between the physical and the intangible 
aspects of translation because there were conceptual dividends to this approach. However, 
hopefully the overall impression is of the craftiness of policy work and of the policy worker 
as a craftsperson, one whose work involves the Head, the Hands and the Heart. Knowledge 
as a thing that does not just flow but associates is what policy documents such as the briefing 
paper play with: 
‘It is impossible to draw any hard-and-fast distinction between ‘know-how’ and 
‘know-that’, that is, between factual and propositional or tacit or processual 
knowledge. In real world situations, the mobilisation or expression of verbal 
knowledge invariably involves an element of tacit knowledge, whatever analytic 
distinctions philosophers might draw. The embrained is also always embodied.’ 
(Freeman, & Sturdy 2014, p.9) 
In moving from the oral to the textual and back again it is easy to assume that the emotional 
knowledge that informed them cannot be transmitted alongside other forms of information. 
Since this way of knowing and being in the world is so tied to performance in the moment, it 
is not hard to equate the bodies of policy participants with the oral moment of traditional 
storytelling and regard emotion as held within them but excluded from texts. Certainly, 
emotional content is treated in very specific and bounded ways within many policy 
documents by presenting it as “anecdote” or in separate graphic forms. But perhaps this is a 
misunderstanding of the materiality of policy artefacts. Policy documents are constructed in 
such a way as to become tools for the performance of knowledge, not just its reification. 
From the gathering of stories, and the creation of the spaces in which to tell stories, through 
to the performance of inscription and the process of stripping the document of its authorial 
unity, these are acts of communicative activity. Policy and political studies are preoccupied 
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as disciplines with voice and speaking, but at best pay little attention to silence and listening 
as necessary components of expression and communication. At worst they are treated as 
abject. Just because documents have silences in them does not mean these silences do not do 
work, and looking at the relational and the material in policy making practices provides 
space to appreciate the work they do;  
‘Discourse is only possible to the extent that silence (or negative space) is present to 
give that discourse form. … Just as silence allows time for the readers or listeners of 
text to “fill in” their own interpretation, or reflection, of what they are experiencing, 
white space can do the same: the user has time to pause, to take in the “feeling” of 
the [page], to construct meaning outside of the presented text’ (Murray 2005, p.146) 
In this sense, we could say that policy documents are haunted texts. They contain ghosts of 
the relational and embodied within them. They perform as well the in-betweenness of the 
policy worker and the ontological insecurities of policy work, carefully crafted tools for 









‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not 
the exactly the same as being bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have 
something to do’ (Foucault 1983, p.231) 
I began this thesis by saying that what I was hoping to produce was maybe less a series of 
answers to some research questions, and perhaps more a metaphor to conjure with. I want to 
take stock of the success I’ve had in finding a way to represent the life-world of the policy 
work in which I have participated and to consider what metaphor I might be able to use to 
talk about the way emotion is experienced in this world. In doing so, I am reaching for a way 
to express on the page something that hopes to extend the possibilities of what policy work 
may be considered to encompass. These possibilities perhaps escape the scope of the 
representations of policy work currently available in existing scholarship. I want to conclude 
this project by looking at four aspects of this metaphor for understanding policy as a practice 
and their possibilities.  
The point of departure for this conclusion is that the metaphor of the shadow runs throughout 
this thesis, and I have drawn upon several ways of talking about shadows in relational 
politics during my exploration of my findings about emotion in policy work. Shadows are 
about mystery, threat, things which cannot be directly addressed or described, haunting, but 
also secrecy and shelter. I want to explore a little how shadows work as expressive tropes 
and how what is encompassed in “emotion” in the policy work of the Partnership is best 
expressed as a shadow. 
The implication of the Shadow metaphor is that policy work has a non-purposive and non-
instrumental dimension to the investment its participants place in it. In this thesis I have 
explored the ways that the stated ambitions of the Partnership, as a policy advocacy 
organisation, were at odds with the actual activities and practices of its participants and staff. 
I am interested in what this contradiction has to say about the true scope of the role given to 
a policy organisation, a policy worker or indeed of “policy” itself in self-consciously 
democratic governance, and particularly as regards negotiating competing ideals of morality, 
justice and knowledge in policy making. 
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By reasserting the emotional components of that policy work, and by including specific sorts 
of knowing and being in the world in the category of “emotion”, my work has led me to 
consider the presence of a concept of care in contemporary governance. Often this is 
considered by other policy scholars to be absent or even denigrated by liberal democratic 
models of governance, or portrayed as “false empathy” or morally problematic paradigms of 
pity, and I will outline the relevant parts of these critiques in more detail. I consider my own 
observations to suggest a more nuanced and complex understanding of care in the policy 
work in which I participated, which might also encompass concepts such as “being held” 
through intersubjective storytelling. I consider care to be woven into the fabric of the 
practices – if not the narratives – of contemporary liberal democracy in Scottish and UK 
politics. I also consider that neither the dominant “rational” understanding of good 
governance, nor its “emotional” shadow, are wholly bad or good and that this ambivalence 
has been underplayed by much recent psychosocial policy analysis. 
Finally, I also want to consider how one consequence of investigating emotion in policy is 
that the practical, material and embodied aspects of political work have been brought to the 
fore and taken on a degree of importance I did not originally expect. Perhaps this should not 
be so surprising. If a researcher starts her work from a position of frustration about the 
descriptions of politics and policy available to her because they ignore the Hands (and the 
Heart), she will probably end up dealing in material culture, bodies and the senses. I 
conclude this discussion by considering how a craft sensibility can enrich an understanding 
of what matters in policy work and can change the way an ethnographer is present within it. 
In particular I wish to make the case for approaching emotion as a set of practices. This 
understanding demands that scholars pay attention to the non-verbal work of politics and 
policy work, shifting it from something which is purely abstract and incorporeal to 
something which is also local, somatic and carnal. 
8.1 Games With Shadows 
‘Games with shadows’ is the title of a 1988 collection of essays and articles by the Scottish 
journalist Neal Ascherson. The writing within it brings together a series of interconnected 
meditations on the unacknowledged drives and desires Ascherson perceived in European 
politics at the time; nationalism; identities and mythiques under existential threats, real or 
perceived; the iconography of place and space; prejudices; violences; forbidden pasts and 
stories. I read this book many years ago, and while I did not and still do not agree with 
important parts of Ascherson’s analysis, the idea of contemporary politics as a shadowed and 
haunted place has clearly stayed with me. Shadows run through his book as a way of 
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expressing the sense that something else is lurking beneath the ordered and reasonable 
surface of political practice, in much the same way as they do throughout my own work 
presented here. For example, Ascherson presented Scottishness as a shadow of Britishness; I 
perhaps have presented Englishness as a shadowing of Scottishness, and a politically 
convenient one at that. If there is a metaphor that I have reached for consistently, it is that of 
the shadow, and I want to explain why. 
In my analysis of the Partnership’s policy work, “emotion” is a category which contains the 
“secret stuff” (Samuels 2004) that does not fit a dominant ideal about governance, but which 
nevertheless matters, or which at least refuses to die. It is still a part of policy making, and of 
the sense informants made of their political activities. In my discussion of the association 
between emotion and activism I suggested that the metaphor of the shadow as found within a 
variety of psychotherapeutic literatures was an extremely productive way to try and represent 
what emotion was in the context of the Partnership’s policy work. Shadows could be seen as 
threatening, demonic things – bad objects – and emotion was reported by several informants, 
mostly self-identifying “professionals”, as a destabilising, illegitimate, all-consuming and 
destructive phenomenon, something that the rational governor could get lost in. At the same 
time, they were able to talk of it as something they felt drawn to, something that they almost 
desired in a certain sense. As the “thing that cannot be I” emotion is something other to the 
political process, but it is perhaps a part of a total experience that has been lost. It is 
something that the good and rational governor cannot tolerate in themselves, and allocates to 
others in order to distance themselves from it. Nevertheless it is a lost part of “good” 
governance in that it indicates care, love and humanity in a bureaucratised and unfeeling 
world, as informants from across the spectrum of the Partnership’s stakeholders were able to 
point out to me. Knowledge that ‘just goes by what it has written down’ as Carla put it, an 
activist herself, is an incomplete thing without touch, taste, presence and experience. I could 
equally say that the metaphor of the shadow works because “good” governance is 
ambivalent; it is in itself shadowy in the sense that it is fuzzy and ill-defined and not 
amenable to being caught hold of by adherence to a set of static principles, whether they are 
the Civil Service Code or the more informal credo of solidarity or belief in a cause that was 
so important to my informants’ understandings of the motivations for activism.  
My interest in the idea of emotion in politics arose from a conviction I share with Andrew 
Samuels that ‘there is something missing in contemporary Western politics, something that 
involves a calamitous denial of the secret life at its core’ (Samuels 2004, p.832). Emotion 
established itself during my fieldwork, analysis and discussions with my informants as a 
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particular type of knowledge, one born of one’s being in the world and derived from what 
Stephen Frosch describes “concrete experience”: based solely on our own thoughts or 
immediate experience (Frosch 2012). Frosch’s identification of such concreteness with rigid 
and punitive ideologies is echoed by the “professional” critique of such knowledge about 
policy issues offered by informants during my fieldwork. As Douglas, a civil servant in the 
Scottish Government put it, these are just one person’s experiences; he did not believe that 
he could legitimately use them to justify his actions as a public servant: ‘I can’t answer those 
questions because they’re individual experiences. I need to respond as an individual but I’m 
not there as an individual’, he explained. These are private reasons for public actions, and 
are therefore unreliable at best, and selfish and reckless at worst. These things need to be 
contained, disciplined, punished where too egregious by minimising or avoidance. Douglas 
explained that emotional knowledge, as a truth-claim, could be used to make unfair demands 
of him that he was unable to counter, telling me anecdotes about otherwise “professional” 
people who ‘used emotion for their own ends’. Craig put the potential to be outmanoeuvred 
by the competing moral legitimacy of emotional knowledge as “getting cornered”; ‘you’ve 
got to be careful!’ he warned me. At one level of analysis, “emotion” itself is the secret stuff 
denied by policy making and political work. 
Yet this thesis has explored how the ideal, “rational” knowledge of public administration can 
also serve as a form of concrete thinking, or desymbolised experience to use Frosch’s 
Kleinian terminology. It can provide a place to experience the world from which, far from 
ensuring dispassionate justice, brooks no other perspective on the world. The emotional can 
also be seen as a competing form of concrete thinking. For example, Douglas was right about 
emotion in the sense that it – or rather the knowledge and truth-claims attached to it – were 
sometimes used to close down discussions with him. Specifically I would refer to the episode 
I witnessed where an activist appealed to her lived experience as proof that she had a better 
sense of what was “right” than Douglas when he started to question the terminology she had 
used and the assumptions being made about some of the concepts being employed during a 
public event. He was referring to his need for clarity and transparency to make good 
governance; she recast this as a callous lack of humanity masquerading as diligence. I might 
argue that my own experience of feeling compelled to either stand with or against the 
women’s research group’s perspective at my pre-assembly visit to them was produced by 
similar processes. Emotional activism is itself a phantasy about democracy, and my 
informants found themselves caught between two competing and incommensurable good 
objects of governance; the caring, emotional, nurturing state and the evenhanded, transparent 
and rational state. Since there are moral benefits and dangers to these different and 
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supposedly incompatible ways of going about governance, the need to be both caring and 
somatically engaged and objective and just provoked anxiety in the Partnership’s participants 
and staff. At the same time as Douglas expressed his anxieties about the potential 
“unfairness” of the presence of emotion in policy work, he also believed in this knowledge 
as a corrective to “ivory tower” abstraction and bureaucracy. He explained that he had to 
have face to face encounters with people with concrete experience of the issues he worked 
on, because this ‘points you in the direction of things you can try and do better’.  
I consider my informants’ response to this anxiety to have been to split rational governance 
and its knowledge and stance in the world from other ways of knowing, in particular 
knowing from first person experience. These inner anxieties became dramatic and intractable 
interpersonal conflicts played out in public meetings, documents and relationships between 
“rational professionals” and “emotional activists”, both standing for a phantasy moral 
governor. At a deeper level, therefore, it is maybe not simply what informants described as 
emotion which constitutes the secret life of policy work, but the fact that this split exists, and 
that it runs not between categories of participant, but between and through all of us, despite 
its factional appearance. Yes, the argument between Douglas and the activists may have been 
about competing for the distribution of scarce resources, but it was also an expression of an 
anxiety I knew to be shared by many of the people present. They wanted to make decisions 
which were caring, respectful, and grounded in compassion but they also wanted decisions 
which were even-handed, transparent and amenable to third-party scrutiny: they believed 
such decisions to be functionally impossible. 
The drama of policy work as an outward management of an unresolvable inner conflict 
illustrates how politics and governance has a performative aspect to it. I mean this not just in 
the sense that it brings things into being, but that it is more than purposive and is in fact 
expressive. It is a socially symbolic act, a phrase I have borrowed from Jameson (2002) but 
which I mean specifically to mean that it enacts a representation of the relation of rationality 
to emotion through the relations of a group of people. It plays out the anxieties they have 
about good governance, and in particular what constitutes a moral response to scarcity, 
hardship and the need for mutual recognition. 
I have represented this set of relations through shadows throughout this text because, just as 
in Ascherson’s writing about politics, shadows are ‘that sense of intransitive motion to the 
referent; the silence in memories… The shadow is the silence that inherits the words’ which 
somehow survive the ‘ruins of representation’ (Vizenor 1993, p.7). Vizenor is attempting to 
explain how oral traditions inflect written, literary ones, but as a mode of expressive 
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representation like any other why should policy work not carry contradictory representations 
of good governance within itself? As I said when discussing how I would write this thesis, 
metaphors are useful in ethnographic writing not because they put an end to multiplicity and 
doubt but because they amplify them. I am therefore not using the trope of the shadow to 
insist on a fixed and specific concept of what a shadow is. For example, shadows can be 
banished or denied parts of ourselves, as in Freudian analysis; they can be latent parts of 
ourselves as in more Jungian approaches. Furthermore, there are other understandings drawn 
from literature, film, art and science. Whatever value we place upon them, they have an 
unsettling and uncanny absent presence within a context, a haunting perhaps, and modernity 
has been described as a characteristically haunted state. Seeing a shadow, a revenant, 
‘functions as a commentary on the haunted nature of modern subjectivity’ (McCorristine 
2010, p.19), a subjectivity whose claim to rationality hinges on meticulously controlled 
boundaries between the reasoning subject-self and the objects which are beyond reason. 
From this perspective the civil servants I spoke to who insisted that face-to-face, emotional 
experience was an essential component of making morally valid choices, were seeking out 
an encounter with a shadow. 
8.2 Fail again. Fail better. 
The Partnership’s stated aims as an organisation, and my personal programme of work and 
that of Louise, its policy officer, ran counter to this split between emotional activism and 
rational bureaucratic professionalism. Its avowed intent was to broker “real dialogue” 
between intractable positions and bring about a mutual recognition that each had validity and 
needed to incorporate the other in order to fully understand the meaning and impact of policy 
making. I have discussed how this could be seen to be analogous to the Kleinian ‘depressive 
position’, in which the object and the self are understood to be neither wholly good or bad. 
This ambivalence must be held in tension; ‘wholeness for each can only exist if the 
contradiction or tension is maintained’ (Benjamin 1980, p.153). According to the 
Partnership’s articulation of its purposes and goals, policy work in general is a way of 
holding open this in-between, depressive space. We could say it is (ideally) about bridging 
antagonistic divides, creating “dialogue” and resolving conflict. My observations suggest 
that policy work is notable for its failure to deliver on this promise, and also suggest that 
policy as an institution is there to do other things in society and for individuals. Jonathan’s 
summary of the Partnership’s mission (‘real dialogue, then taking real action’), if taken to 
mean the creation of a new, intersubjective understanding of social reality, stood in some 
contrast to the Partnership’s record of directly creating such shared perspectives as I 
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observed it. Set-piece events, such as the hustings-style panel discussion among competing 
politicians or the keynote roundtable among activists at the second annual showcase event, 
seemed unable to broker dialogue between participants in the way I and the Partnership staff 
had hoped as we planned the days out in our meetings. No matter how hard we tried to 
construct processes and structures that would make this rapprochement unavoidable, 
participants always had the option of simply refusing to interact with one another’s views. 
This might be subtle – “forgetting” to answer a question – or it could be quite overt, as when 
two rival MSPs began openly accusing each other of lying and ignoring the Chair’s attempts 
to facilitate proceedings. 
Organisations like the Partnership are in practice about managing the split, not removing it. 
They are “given” the role of resolving our divided understanding of justice, fairness and 
goodness in public life. They occupy the depressive position and hold it open, but they do 
not and cannot force a resolution of the split. Indeed, we all use splitting to cope with the 
uncertainties of living in an uncontrollable world. We cannot give up on it completely, 
regardless of its ability to do us harm or to enable us to do harm to others. Furthermore, the 
participants in this split can find creative ways of staving off the complete destruction of 
other perspectives and this in fact can preserve their ability to get what they need from them: 
‘Although the subject may relinquish the wish to control or devour the object 
completely, it does so only out of self-interest. This is a far cry from a real 
appreciation of the other’s right to exist’ (Benjamin 1980, p.153).  
This need to find security in the face of uncertainty by more or less persecutory coping 
strategies does not rest easy with our hopes for the democratic project. And so the 
Partnership and other organisations provide a service, commissioned on behalf of citizens by 
Government, which plays upon particular ideals of liberal democracy: they are an outlet for a 
phantasy of governance and public life which is about consensus, resolution of conflict and a 
respectful “reasonableness”. It is a politics in which there is no disrespect, no bullying and 
no suffering. Since everyone loses a little in order to gain a little, there are no haves and 
have-nots. However, there is a great deal to be lost in an emotional sense in going about 
governance in this way, and regardless of how much people may say they like the idea of it, 
they would need to give up the power and coherence and certainty brought through 
occupying their position on one side or the other of the split. Ultimately, I believe my 




But policy fails gallantly. The people involved in this work, who are also doomed to fail, can 
find themselves hurtling towards ineffectiveness passionately, in a committed manner. They 
can idealise policy work and its aims and demonise its absence, sometimes for very personal 
reasons. The more I learned of Louise’s feelings about her work, the more I felt struck by her 
vehement insistence that what she was doing at the Partnership, and what the Partnership 
was for, mattered and that she was totally committed to it. This is one way to understand 
how a person who describes their work as frustrating and intangible can also talk of it as 
“improving democracy” and have long conversations with me about their sense that just by 
such work existing it “does good”. I would say that these are the roots of my own 
“personality for policy”. I am desperately holding on to my own ideas about fairness, and am 
haunted by the consequences of dogmatism and entrenchment within a particular 
perspective. After all, vindictiveness and vindication have the same etymological source, I 
might say by way of justification. Ironically, I have to recognise that this in turn represents 
an entrenchment of sorts. 
The main thing I have drawn from my experiences in the field is to reconceptualise what lies 
between “emotion” and “rationality”, “activism” and “professionalism”. There is no void in-
between, and there are few mutually exclusive categories. Rather there are associations, 
links, pathways, relations and Deleuzian “lines of flight”. This is not just where policy takes 
effect, but it is where it gets produced, how the story of policy gets told intersubjectively in 
order to bring it into being.  
8.3 Care, justice and democracy 
Exploring the emotional – the first-person experience of the world and of somatic and 
psychological pain, crisis and desires – I have come to wonder what happens to care in a 
governance context dominated by concepts of justice and objectivity. The obligation to be 
“seen to care” was clear among the Partnership’s participants, particularly the public 
servants. Furthermore, is care something we should care about? Is it just making ourselves 
feel better through “false empathy”, as Richard Delgado’s  critique of apparently well-
intentioned race activism describes (Delgado 1996a; Delgado 1996b)? This concern about 
the political implications of care, compassion and empathy in governance has been 
influential in many psychosocial studies of policy (Froggett 2002; Jones 2013; Lewis 2000; 
Hoggett 2006). What the implications are for the practices of emotion presented in this thesis 
depends somewhat on how one interprets the terms “emotion” and “care”.  
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My own interpretation of what “emotional” meant to my informants involved in the 
Partnership’s policy work and the use they made of it was certainly open to the charge of 
merely facilitating ‘the projection of all self-experiences into the object’ (Eisenberg & 
Strayer 1990, p.105), particularly when one considers the aesthetic expressive practices that 
seemed to be strongly identified with “emotional knowledge”.  “Care” has both a practical 
and pragmatic and a more existential aspect to it. It can be about ‘daily care, the maintenance 
of body, soul and relationships that lies at the base of good human functioning’ 
(Sevenhuijsen 1998, p.181). However, there are many possibilities for defining “care” 
which, appropriately enough for something closely allied to emotion in my observations, are 
diverse and interrelated. For example, in a more explicitly relational and intersubjective set 
of circumstances care may correspond to the creation of a “holding environment” through a 
therapist’s ‘unwavering attention to the patient’s needs… facilitating… his or her own 
insights…  by allowing, without judgement, the expression of affect, dreams, wishes, 
creativity and play’ (Kahn 2001, p.263). Perhaps in the context of policy work it is an 
intersubjective concept of care that is most relevant to a consideration of emotion, but which 
is also uncommonly articulated. The existential dilemma of how to recognise the similarity 
of a person’s needs and experiences and to connect these to one’s own being in the world 
without absorbing, deleting or being overwhelmed by them is surely at the heart of making 
“good” policy, in both the ethical and instrumental sense of that word. 
I have been aware as I have conducted my fieldwork and my analysis that I have been doing 
so in dialogue with literatures which often have serious criticisms to make of liberal 
democratic thought as an individualist, materialist and inherently dehumanising way of 
framing human relations. According to this analysis, this tradition is antithetical to exactly 
this sort of mutual recognition of existence and subjectivity, this care, this holding. Dorothy 
Smith’s institutional ethnography set out to expose how what is presented as the self-evident 
nature of the liberal democratic citizen is in fact the product of a particular historic and 
cultural moment which was, according to Smith, an unprecedentedly sexist and exploitative 
enlightenment moment: 
‘A radical division between the spheres of action and of consciousness of middle-
class men and women emerged. The peculiar out-of-body modes of consciousness of 
the nascent ruling relations required a specialisation of subject and agency. The 
formation of the middle-class male subject in education and ideology aimed at 
creating that extraordinary form of modern consciousness that is capable of agency 
in modes that displace or subdue a local bodily existence.’ (Smith 2005, p.14) 
This cannot help but play upon a researcher’ s mind if their ethnographic field is a liberal 
democracy. Through reading this literature I have come to realise that my own history is 
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entwined in Enlightenment institutions and their understanding of democracy and the citizen. 
Every month, an alumni newsletter drops into my inbox from the University of Edinburgh 
called ‘Enlightenment’; my Politics degree was taught in buildings called Hume, Robertson, 
Ferguson, though not Adam Smith - he was at Glasgow. I worked for a few years at the 
Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, where I was 
tasked with dreaming up projects for ‘a 21
st
 century Enlightenment organisation’. I was 
acutely aware that I trod the same boards as Hogarth, Wilberforce, Adam and Shipley. One 
year I had to suggest candidates for the Benjamin Franklin Medal (his house was around the 
corner). I have inevitably wondered about the possibility that Smith’s analysis is right, and if 
my recent work has caused me to reassess my understanding of these institutions. After all, 
my frustration with the vocabulary of contemporary governance was what prompted my 
doctoral research. 
As someone pursued by the Enlightenment wherever I go, Smith’s analysis seems like a 
rather perfunctory way of describing a moment in political and social history which was 
transgressive, dangerous and passionately discordant. A full exploration of the assumptions 
conveyed in Smith’s characterisation of what we mean when we talk about the 
Enlightenment is well beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is arguably important and 
necessary. I am fully aware of the criticisms Smith and others (Mol 2008) have made of what 
is termed the “Enlightenment project” of liberal democratic governance, and I share many of 
their reservations. But I am also not ready to give up on some the unresolved desires I 
associate with it, and in fact I believe they mirror many of my own and perhaps Smith’s 
concerns; the idea of being assured of both our similarities and our differences to one 
another; that no one person or group of people should have such a monopoly on power that 
the rest are reduced to objects or chattels; that we all have a place in the world where our 
actions and consciences count. Notwithstanding my unease about the way politics, policy, 
governance and citizenship is commonly talked about, I do not think that my exploration of 
emotion demonstrates a viable ethical antidote to the dominance of “rationality” in 
governance. 
I would point out that what is contained within the “emotional” stance in the policy work of 
the Partnership is by no means easy to equate directly with the ethical concept of “care”, 
particularly in the sense of mutual recognition, respect for our enmeshedness or indeed love. 
I have come to see the emotional activist position as something as capable of persecutory 
fantasies, negation and abuse as any other stance within policy work. The fact that this is 
done in the name of the emancipation or protection of a particular interest or group 
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considered to be exploited or repressed by (neo)liberal institutions is beside the point. For 
example, the preparation session Cathy ran for the women’s research group contained 
frequent references to the “up-there” people who become politicians and lengthy caricatures 
of their unfitness to govern both the country and their families, and these provided a 
common narrative for the attendees about their superior moral insight into policy matters. 
The frequently-repeated maxim “nothing about us without us is for us” was backed up by 
unsubstantiated claims about leading politicians’ home lives and provided light relief 
through making them the butt of the participants’ jokes. I recorded at the time how 
uncomfortable this made me. I am not sure that the radical Othering of people does anything 
more than set up competing samenesses. This could sound like I am saying that there is no 
hope for political action and policy: even the “good” people are really “bad”. I can 
understand how my scepticism may appear that way, and how others might see a cowardice 
in my inability to commit to any activism wholeheartedly. But since I accept that governance 
is relational, not abstract, and is produced in local and specific relational practices (Hunter 
2012) I would have to take issue with the insistence that ‘the relational [is] the space in 
between the individual subject and the social order’ (Hunter 2012, p.4). This way of framing 
relational politics is that one part of that relation is always being objectified as the (note the 
singular) social order. This is not a recognition of the complex multiplicity of another’s 
experience of the world and of one’s self; it is unfortunately quite the opposite.  
The women’s research group’s ability to recast people they regard as oppressors as darkly 
comic villains was not an isolated phenomenon. I would argue that this same pattern was 
observable in the way Englishness was constructed during the second annual showcase, and 
in the way civil servants were sometimes described at Partnership events, or the way that in 
casual conversation voters for one party or another might be caricatured by Partnership staff. 
As my research went on I became more aware of this pattern and how intimately it was tied 
to the maintenance of a political identity. I cannot help but be troubled by our tendency to 
create not just adversaries but evil in those who we understand to be obstacles to our political 
goals. It is easy to find an activism (or a professionalism) to inhabit and a political foe-
category to oppose. In principle, this may be a way of righting the grand narrative wrongs of 
the various isms we inhabit. Perhaps these isms may inevitably derive from that Kantian 
enlightenment which so often informs the concept of the citizen, ‘disentangled from mere 
phenomena’ (Mol 2008, p.37), and which atomises lived experience. But I will stick my 
neck out for the enlightened citizen and say that he, or she, is intended to address valid moral 
and practical problems about justice and fairness that my informants were almost without 
exception unwilling to ignore. Carla echoed the criticisms of several activist audience 
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members at the annual showcases when she said that she looked to public servants to be 
rational and impartial, not passionate and partisan, because she needed to trust that they had 
the public good in mind when making policy. Justice, in the sense of dispassionate fairness, 
was a coherent and consistent value that attached itself to the democratic process throughout 
my fieldwork. Those who speak or act from this position are not intentionally cruel, but must 
be recognised as ‘oneself in other circumstances’ (Jackson 2012, p.8). On an interpersonal, 
pragmatic, or existential level, our activisms can produce new persecutions, new abuses and 
more untrammelled power. As a result of these experiences I am concerned by the 
preoccupation with “false empathy” in current psychosocial policy analysis as a way of 
examining a broad range of empathic responses to human experience. I worry that 
insufficient caution is exercised about the acceptance of others’ projections into the 
researcher, governor or citizen as a way of demonstrating “solidarity”.  
This seems to be a reversal of a damaging situation, and not transformative, ‘a joining of the 
other… whereby one person’s experience of another’s state expresses itself in ways that are 
perceived and experienced by the other’ in a cyclical way (Eisenberg & Strayer 1990, p.105). 
The problem with such an open-ended process as this for political projects is that, generally, 
they suppose some kind of end-game, however ill-defined; a world in which there is no more 
inequality, no more abuse, no more suffering and no more despair because those ills are 
linked to the dominance of a particular group or philosophy, not to the existence of such 
hegemonies of concrete thought per se. If there is something that the process of doing my 
current research has impressed upon me is that there is no end-game if one is committed to 
care or justice - or both - in governance. By locating persecution and abuse within a category 
of people we ignore the local, incremental ways relational politics takes place. In this sense, 
even the most self-consciously progressive project can wind up proving Foucault’s maxim: 
‘everything is dangerous’.  
This is what I think I still find compelling about the Enlightenment liberal democratic 
project, and perhaps how I came to find a home for myself in its legacy. Just as we are a 
diverse, contradictory, fractious society, so was Enlightenment Europe and America. One 
important but by no means hegemonic strand of contemporaneous thought was a radical 
scepticism (Popkin 1997), an epistemological preoccupation with the limits of human 
cognition, reason and understanding I also share. For me this moment’s great contribution to 
political thought is as one full of questions, with a multiplicity of answers: everything must 
be questioned, everything is questionable. This applies even if I like the status quo: 
especially if I like the status quo. This is why, as a 21
st
 century ethnographer, I can say that 
193 
 
the spaces in-between matter, and the experiences of the people who exist between the usual 
places are as real as those who occupy more apparently solid ground. We are constantly 
producing our politics in the spaces in between one another, be it in the boardroom, in the 
classroom, in the bedroom or in a Select Committee. There was nothing in the particular 
“enlightenment” questions I found so compelling which wrote love, care and bodily 
experience out of political life in the way Smith seems to imply. The provisional answers 
that subsequently gained traction in Britain and elsewhere undeniably tried. But this is to 
confuse the philosophical provocation with the contextual outcome.  
Michael Jackson has explained the existence of these ambitions within a culture which did so 
much to undermine them by arguing that they are in fact alien. His own exploration of the 
politics of justice and care is prompted by Hannah Arendt’s notion of judgment; 
‘[Which] is anchored in the humanistic goals of the Enlightenment. Understanding is 
its own good. Judgement is “representative” not because one adopts, advocates or 
even empathises with the view of others, still less because one comes into possession 
of an abstract knowledge that corresponds to some external reality, but simply 
because the understanding that informs one’s judgement is pluralistic rather than 
monistic, intersubjective rather than subjective. Yet, in her insistence that reality lies 
neither with oneself nor with the Other, but in-between… Arendt unwittingly echoes 
the communitarian logic of non-Western thought’ (Jackson 2002, p.259). 
I would argue – this thesis argues - that, far from being “non-Western”, these strands of 
thought and knowing- and being-in-the-world were never banished but hidden in plain sight, 
even in the arid landscape of political bureaucracy. They are an intimate part of the 
philosophical and political bric-a-brac which acts as a hinterland to all contemporary 
governance. We are more complex and multiple than we give ourselves credit for, and I am 
prepared to extend that complexity to the historic foundational moments of the 
Enlightenment institutions I have laboured within. As a way of seeking after understanding 
at a more symbolic level, contemporary governance I have experienced recruits many ways 
of knowing and being in the world. It may devalue it or obscure its nuances, but being unable 
to talk about something does not mean that it has disappeared. 
8.4 Craft iness: The Head, the Hands, The Heart and Silence  
Speaking about the implications for evidenced-based policy on everyday practice, Britton 
observes: 
‘Rather than finding them [unevidenced practices] unproven, it makes them seem 
unreasonable. The usual muddle of … practice suddenly seems reprehensible. It is a 
phrase that supplies a sense of authority in situations where uncertainty is a daily 
companion, anxiety is high, and needs are pressing.’(Britton 2003 x) 
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He happens to be describing the impact of evidence-based policy on psychotherapy in 
clinical settings, but it could perhaps stand for the impact such managerialism has had on 
many working practices. It might very well do to sum up the relationship evidence, as an 
objective and professional commodity, has to experience, an emotional attribute, in the 
policy work I have dealt with throughout this thesis. But it could also apply to the study of 
politics and policy work themselves. 
My conversations with my informants, my observations and my own experiences have 
convinced me that reasonably functional policy making is absolutely not just about finding 
out “what works”, in the hackneyed current phrase. It also has to understand “what matters”. 
Not only that but it has to engage people who are confident in interrogating, negotiating and 
renegotiating “what matters” using a range of proofs and tests, a process which is not 
something that can be delocalised and de-personalised and packaged into a toolkit or a 
checklist. In the same way, in policy analysis not just evidence-based but also experience-
based understandings of policy really do matter. The acquisition of policy competence 
derives as much from sitting at the elbow of an old hand as from any spreadsheet, model or 
meticulously argued theory. The slow acquisition of personal experience is an irreplaceable 
guide for those who want to work in this field; the idea that you can study what politics 
means without it is misguided at best, destructive at worst. 
Aside from the long time-frames involved in acquiring this experience, this ethnographic 
research aim poses certain practical problems for policy scholars. Not least, the need to 
accept the non-verbal and non-quantitive elements of political practice in exploring “what 
matters” demands slightly different data collection sensibilities than are commonly found in 
current researcher training. As I have freely admitted, this was something that I struggled 
with personally and which I ended up looking to performance studies literature to remedy.  
I am concerned that certain things that mattered greatly to the practices of emotion in policy 
work have not been dealt with as I’d have liked in this thesis. This is partly due to the 
inevitable constraints of time and space. But it is in part to do with my lack of mastery of 
what I have come to think of as my craft as an ethnographer. A major theme in my fieldnotes 
and analysis is the importance and meaning of silence as an expressive political and 
emotional act. Silences abound in my field notes: I illustrated one in my vignette about 
“Racist English Guy”. At first for me, perhaps as for my readers, the silence in that story was 
not the thing that obviously mattered. But when it came to going beyond the domain of the 
Head, it became clear to me that this silence was significant in explaining the power of that 
experience. My reasoning and descriptive verbal faculties couldn’t help me convey how that 
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experience was powerful, however, and how it worked. My notation, ‘[Silence for 5 
seconds]’ didn’t explain it at all.  
The ubiquity of silences of various sorts in what was labelled “emotional” behaviour was an 
unexpected but very prominent finding early on in my analysis. It was common that, instead 
of emotional outbursts, my informants claimed they knew that another was displaying 
emotion or acting upon emotional knowledge because of their verbal silence, or their lack  of 
demonstrative behaviour. This puzzled me, but led me to investigate the conventional 
relationship between emotion and silence. What my informants called emotional knowledge 
was often put to work in communication and representation of the things we discussed in 
ways that offered disruptive strategies to more “rational” discourses of knowledge. As 
Diamond observes:  
‘Power, as actors in verbal interaction display it, is not so much a possession as a 
capacity or strategy available to all members in an interaction, through the 
statements and utterances of others. Even the participant said to possess lower rank 
has options, strategies and devices at his or her disposal to contest, dispute and 
challenge the roles assigned to him or her by others’ (Diamond 1996, p.149).  
As Diamond notes, these strategies are often covert, embedded in utterances as implicit or in 
other types of communication; they are deniable. Emotion in the context of the forums I 
studied mapped well to these sorts of communicative strategies. 
The problem for the researcher who wants to go beyond the Head in policy is: is the emotion 
in the words or in the silences, too? Is it in the gesture, or in the stillness? And if it is, can we 
read silence like we do words, pictures and gestures? Silence may not be useful in a narrow 
sense, but this need not prevent it from being meaningful. 
Representing and talking about silence pose obvious challenges. It should be acknowledged 
from the outset that the study of silence in communication is a complex and multi-faceted 
matter, with many potential approaches and some attendant controversies. For an 
ethnographer it is of great methodological concern not to “force our data to say things that 
are not there” (Tonkiss 2011, p.417), and this concern is especially heightened when 
thinking about discourse. Among those who take an interest in silence (linguists, discourse 
analysts among others) great effort is directed towards providing a categorisation of silences 
based on intention, reception, expectedness etc. This paper does not have space to do all of 
that work here, although this discussion needs to be acknowledged. However, the ontological 
underpinnings of ethnographic data collection and analysis complicates the matter of 
constructing an overarching theory of silence a priori to entering the field. In his review of 
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silence research, Ulrich Schmitz (1990) has warned of creating what he calls “arbitrary” 
distinctions between silences and I would find it hard in practice to justify whose sense of the 
unexpected or whose intentionality was being used to categorise silence.  
The fact that silences exceeded my capacity to do them justice does not feel to me like a 
failure. In fact, if I was to employ a craft sensibility, this “muddle” of practice could be a 
sign that I am doing my job competently. Exploring silence in politics, which is so 
preoccupied with “voice”, offers an opportunity to develop my craft as an ethnographer and 
in turn hopefully generate new understandings of politics. To return to where I began with 
Richard Sennett, ‘the good craftsman… uses solutions to uncover new territory; problem 
solving and problem finding are intimately relating in his or her mind’ (Sennett 2009, p.11).  
Emotion as a category in policy work is an insistent and destabilising reminder of the 
continued presence of experience in contemporary political practice, that ‘the remedy to ills 
must lie in experience, on the ground’ (Sennett 2009, p.291). It is perhaps time for the 
craftiness of governance to be recognised, the incremental, intersubjective political practice 
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Appendix 1: Cast List  
 
The main protagonists, informants and interviewees referred to by name in the thesis, listed 
by organisation or role. This list is not exhaustive of all people mentioned in the text. 
 
The Partnership 
Louise – the Partnership’s full time policy manager and coordinator of its main policy 
project 
Cathy – a research officer at the Partnership 
Roy – an outreach worker at the Partnership 
Lucy – an outreach worker at the Partnership 
Jonathan – the Partnership’s Director 
Evan – a part-time policy adviser 
Jenny – member of the Partnership’s board and a policy officer at another NGO 
 
Civil Service 
Douglas – member of a Bill Team at the Scottish Government 
Craig – member of a Strategic Review at the Scottish Government 
 
Activists and organisers 
Carla – a veteran activist and long-standing associate of the Partnership 






Appendix 2: Timeline 
 
November 2011 – I first make contact with Evan, who introduces me to Jonathan. We agree 
the terms of my involvement with the Partnership. 
February 2012 – My first visit to the Partnership. I meet Louise and accompany her on 
visits to local groups 
March 2012 – I attend my first Annual Showcase Event 
July/ August 2012 – Summer Recess  
October 2012 – Louise announces she intends to leave at Christmas 2012 
November 2012 – The Partnership’s staff begin to consider the possibility that they will be 
unable to replace the funding for Louise’s programme of work when it expires in April 2013 
December 2012 – Louise departs. Her responsibilities are distributed among the 
Partnership’s existing staff. I take on some of her outstanding commitments relating to the 
2013 Annual Showcase and some writing duties. 
February 2013 – Several key funding bids are rejected, however Cathy’s application to 
continue her research project is successful. Several staff face redundancy. 
March 2013 – I attend my second Annual Showcase Event and publish the policy briefing. 
April 2013 – I formally leave the Partnership 
 
